All,

In May 2013, 4 Houston (Texas) Firefighters lost their lives in the Line of Duty while battling a massive fire at the Southwest Inn Motel. Firefighters Anne Sullivan and Robert Garner, Engineer Operator Robert Bebee, and Senior Captain Matthew Renaud were all killed while battling the fire at the Southwest Inn hotel in May 2013. All four deceased firefighters were located in the front of the building close to the entry door.

 

Captain Bill Dowling suffered horrific injuries at that fire leading to the loss of both his legs-as well as other life changing injuries. http://www.hopefordowling.org/ 

 

Unfortunately, several issues/changes and recommendations that had been pointed out in previous HFD LODD's, by their own personnel, existed in this fire as well.

 

It took just 15 minutes and 29 seconds from the time HFD was dispatched until the collapse of the roof at the Southwest Inn on May 31, 2013. This was the deadliest loss of Firefighters in the history of the Houston Fire Department. More than a year after the fire, the department has released its final report and over 200 recommendations. 

 

The sample items and report BELOW can be used as a template for any of our fire departments in a "could this happen here" scenario....or the report can be ignored. 

Hint: please don't ignore this report.

 

Here is a sampling of issues pointed out in the report:

 

----the need more training on how to fight fires involving "modern" plastic materials, less on wood and cotton (modern materials are more plastic-based) - all related to tactics and operations required in modern fire behavior command, control and operations.

 

-----some firefighters abandoned radio procedures, creating confusion about who was in charge and cluttering radio channels with non-essential transmissions. 

 

----- communication issues in the digital radio system, most notably what's called transmission bonks, when too many people tried to talk at the same time. There were 579 transmission bonks in the first hour. The report says the HFD radio system was a huge problem.

 

-----at times, the response was delayed by limited pre-planning - stations are required to develop response plans for major structures - that includes staging locations for arriving units.

 

-----significant technical challenges with a new radio system, put into use less than a year earlier, fueled the disorganization as strong winds whipped the fire into a much larger fire.

-the report includes stern warnings from the committee to follow procedures, such as adhering to "proper radio discipline." 

 

-----the need for policy changes to clarify who issues orders during emergency recovery operations and suggested improvements to the radio system.


-----the need for more detail in advance pre-fire plans written by each station for major structures in its district and adding bar codes to every piece of equipment so it can be linked to an individual firefighter in the case of a death.

 

-----the report highlighted issues with the quality of radio transmissions and procedures that delayed the relay of essential information.

"Due to an excessive number of people trying to transmit messages, company officers were simply unable to communicate on the radio," read the report.

 

-----the thin casing protecting the radio mic wires melted, causing them to touch and inadvertently key about 20 times as rescue crews searched for members in the collapse. Just before the collapse, the team had reported issues with non-functioning microphones.

 

-----fire companies operating without a charged hoseline.

 

Some of the recommendations that have already been implemented include changes to radio communications and individual firefighter monitoring devices, which were updated a year ago.
In December, a new city ordinance was drafted to address buildings with poor radio coverage. In February, HFD began using a new kind of firefighting glove, and in May, the administration began looking at using helmet cameras and dash cams.


---NOTE: Five fire reports going back to a 2000 fire highlighted problems with HFD's coordination, communication and risk assessment at fire scenes. Some of those same issues are highlighted in this latest draft report.

=====HERE IS THE REPORT:

http://dig.abclocal.go.com/ktrk/PICS/SEPTEMBER14/090114-ktrk-hfd-deadly-fire-report.pdf 

(BE SURE to read APPENDIX A, B, C and D)

=====HERE IS VIDEO: 

 

QUICK FINAL WORD:

One way to use this information is to understand that right now-our/my FD doesn't have a working hotel fire-at least not at this minute....which affords us a chance to USE this information from our Brothers/Sisters in Houston and determine which of the recommendations even remotely apply to our own FD's. We solidly believe there is no more respectful way to honor the Line of Duty Sacrifices of Anne Sullivan, Robert Garner, Robert Bebee, Matthew Renaud as well as Bill Dowling and the other HFD members who suffered life altering injuries.

Take Care. Be Careful. Pass It On.

BillyG

The Secret List 9/2/2014-1500 Hours

www.FireFighterCloseCalls.com