Republicans in Congress have gotten a lot of mileage, and headlines, out of being glibly contemptuous of the Iran nuclear deal.
Some of them charged on Thursday, with barely disguised disgust, that President Obama and his negotiating team were “fleeced” and “bamboozled” by the Iranians who will gain access to $50 billion in assets now frozen in overseas banks and be able to pursue a civilian nuclear energy program if they abide by the agreement.
In fact, the deal is, by all practical measures, a strong one. One thing the critics never mention is that the basic bargain – Iran will receive benefits in exchange for limits on its nuclear program – was actually endorsed by a Republican president, George W. Bush, in 2006, when super-hawks Dick Cheney and John Bolton were also part of the American power structure. It never triggered the rhetorical venom that this deal has.
During his first term, Mr. Bush insisted he would not allow Iran to produce a nuclear weapon or gain the knowledge necessary to build a weapon. But once the 2006 proposal was on the table, administration officials acknowledged that the package of incentives on offer could, at some point, allow Iran to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes.
For some perspective, it’s useful to go back and read the three page proposal that the United States, France, Britain, Germany, China, Russia and the European Union issued in Vienna on June 1 of that year as a means of making a “fresh start” in negotiations towards a comprehensive agreement with Iran.
In order to create the right conditions for negotiations, the major powers promised to “reaffirm Iran’s right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes” and to support the development of a civil nuclear energy program as long as Iran met its obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. They also committed to “actively support the building of new light water power reactors in Iran through international joint projects” and to stop discussing what to do about Iran’s program in the United Nations Security Council. Other cooperation was promised on civil aviation, telecommunications and agriculture.
In return, the major powers said Iran would have to suspend all activities related to enrichment and reprocessing of nuclear fuel. (By contrast, the 2013 interim nuclear deal negotiated by President Obama and his partners actually forced Iran to roll back, not just suspend, key parts of its program and the final deal, agreed on July 14, goes much further.)
The 2006 proposal also said Iran would have to address “all outstanding issues of concern” over its program raised by the International Energy Agency, which the current nuclear deal requires.
Although the 2006 proposal did not demand that Iran dismantle its enrichment and reprocessing activities, it offered legally binding assurances that Iran would have guaranteed fuel for its civilian energy program by means of an international production facility based in Russia and establishment of a five-year reserve stockpile.
The major powers also generously promised to support Iran’s “full integration” into the international economy, including membership in the World Trade Organization — which is not on offer now — and to support a conference on regional security issues.
Two years later, the major powers offered an enhanced proposal but for many reasons, the talks never went anywhere.
Throughout years of failed efforts by the United States and other powers to seriously come to grips with Iran’s dangerous and growing nuclear program, the strategy was always carrots and sticks. If Iran refused demands that it end its most worrisome nuclear activities, Iran would be sanctioned. If Iran acceded, then it would receive some mix of rewards.
There are many differences between 2006 and now including the fact that Iran has 19,000 centrifuges now versus about 200 then. It would unquestionably be better if Mr. Obama’s nuclear deal required Iran to dismantle its entire program but that was never going to happen – a reality Mr. Bush and his team seemed to grudgingly accept long ago.