Report of The Transitional Justice and Reconciliation Commission

Report of the Transitional Justice and Reconciliation Commission
Report of the
Transitional Justice and

Reconciliation Commission
The copyright notice shall be in the form Philippine Copyright 2016 by Transitional Justice and Reconciliation
Commission.
Publisher:
Transitional Justice and Reconciliation Commission
BG3A Lower Ground

Somerset Olympia Towers

No. 7912 Makati Avenue,
Makati City 1200

Tel: (+632) 357-6703
Email: tjrc2015@gmail.com

Technical Editor:
Dr. Marita Concepcion Castro Guevara
Photographers:
Leonard G. Reyes
Mark Navales
Design & graphics:
Pamela Lauren C. Liban
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmittted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without the
prior written permission of the publisher.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Foreword................... i
Acknowledgment.............................. iii
Acronyms.......................... vi
Executive Summary...................... ix
Introduction .................................. 1
Chapter 1
The Transitional Justice and Reconciliation Commission:
Its Mandate, Composition, and Methodology ........................................................... 5

1.1 The TJRC Mandate ...................................................... 6

1.2. The Composition of the TJRC ......................................... 6

1.3 The Methodology of the TJRC ......................................... 6
1.3.1 The TJRC Consultation Process
...................... 7

1.3.2 Developing a Context-Specific Approach to Transitional Justice and Reconciliation ................ 11

1.4 Dealing with the Past and the Management of Diversity ...................... 14
Chapter 2
Results of the TJRC Consultation Process: Main Findings ......................................... 15

2.1 Legitimate Grievances of the Bangsamoro .......................................... 16

2.1.1 Defining Legitimate Grievances ..................................................... 16

2.1.2 Link with the Struggle for Self-Determination ............................................. 17

2.1.3 Legitimate Grievances and Traumatic Experience ....................................... 19

2.1.4 Summary and Conclusions .............................................................................. 23

2.2 Historical Injustice ............................................ 23

2.2.1 Defining Historical Injustice ............................................................................ 24

2.2.2 Patterns in Historical Injustic .......................................................................... 24

2.2.3. Misrepresentation and Profiling: Undermining Muslim and Indigenous

Peoples Narratives of History .......................................................................... 27

2.2.4 Silencing of Womens Agency and Victimization ................................................................... 28

2.2.5 Summary and Conclusions ........................................................................................................ 29

2.3 Human Rights Violations ................................. 30

2.3.1 Defining Human Rights Violations ................................... 30
2.3.2 Patterns of IHRL and IHL Vioilations .............................. 31
2.3.3 Summary and Conclusions ................................................ 42
2.4 Marginalization through Land Dispossession ...................... 44

2.4.1 Defining Marginalization through Land Dispossession ............................ 44
2.4.2 Waves of Land Dispossession ................................................... 44
2.4.3 Roots of Dispossession: Corporate and Resettlement Land Laws ...................................... 45
2.4.4. Reconfiguration of Traditional Political Order and Gerrymandering .............................. 51
2.4.5. Land and Identity .................................... 53
2.4.6 Gender Dimensions of Marginalization through Land Dispossession .............................. 54
2.4.7 Summary and Conclusions ................................................... 54
Chapter 3
Violence, Impunity, and Neglect:
The Imposition of a Monolithic Filipino Identity and Philippine State ........... 55

3.1 On Violence .............. 57

3.1.1 Forms of Violence in the Bangsamoro .................... 57

3.1.2 Context of Vertical and Horizontal Violence .................. 61

3.2 On Impunity .................................................................. 62

3.3 On Neglect ..................................................................... 64

3.4 Addressing Violence, Impunity, and Neglect as a Basis for Sustainable Peace ..................... 65
Chapter 4
Recommendations ................................... 69

4.1 Introduction ......................... 70

4.2. The Bangsamoro Opportunity ................... 70

4.3 Dealing with the Past towards Healing and Reconciliation............................ 71

4.4 Complementing Past and Existing Efforts and Ensuring a Strategic Approach ................... 72

4.5 Taking a Political Decision.................................................................................. 73
The TJRC Recommendations ........................ 74
Endnotes.................................... 93
Annexes
Annex 1...................................... 114
Annex 2...................................... 117
Annex 3...................................... 119
FOREWORD
Dear Reader,
Before you begin reading, I ask you to pause for a moment and to allow me to
share some personal thoughts about the journey that led to the creation of this
report.
It has been a painful, sometimes almost unbearable experience. At times, even
unreal: people, situations, contexts, and stories seem to blend and resemble
one another. The endless stories about killing, violence, spoliation, abduction,
rape, exclusion, displacement. Yet, the stories are real - each one unique - and
the wounds are fresh even after years and the broken memories continue to
haunt men, women, and children, their homes, their communities, their
landscapes.
There is a penetrating, chilling contrast between the beauty of the Bangsamoro,
indigenous and Philippine people, their extraordinary hospitality, their
kindness, their ancient culture, the beauty of the surrounding landscape and
the permanent, shocking ugliness of everything that has been touched by war,
violence, greed, disrespect, and deep neglect.
There is also a deep ambiguity: So many books, academic studies, media
reports, film documentaries have been published both in the Philippines
and abroad about the origin of the conflict and its consequences. Yet, the violence
continues and it continues to generate new forms of dehumanization. As
Commissioners, we constantly asked ourselves: Is there anything new to be
said? Anything new that can be done?
So, let me tell you straightaway, dear Reader: There is nothing new in this
report nothing that you, as an informed person, would not be in a position
to know already. There is, however, something new in this report that can
perhaps inspire you or even change the way you look at life. You can listen to
your fellow Filipinos, Bangsamoro and indigenous people, women and men
like you, and you can try to imagine their reality. Indeed, this report is about
listening, convening, and acting together.
ii
- Listening: Many people affected by the conflict, men, women and children, farmers, fishermen, teachers,
community leaders, accepted to talk to the TJRC, because they believed that we would listen to them
attentively and that their testimony would be heard. They shared their stories - and also their silence when
words failed them. They also shared their hopes, their visions for the future. Indeed, although they were at
times driven from their homes and suffered unimaginable hardships, they are still remarkably alive and they
stretch out their hands to you.
- Convening: Many people from all walks of life, and from all over Philippines public officials, academic
experts, religious and business leaders, teachers, members of the military and police, men and women
accepted to meet with us, to share their experience and knowledge. Often they expressed shame about
what has happened and continues to happen; the estrangement imposed upon Bangsamoro or indigenous
people; they witnessed scenes of extreme violence; or saw how people lost their loved ones, their place. Some
told us that violence, neglect, and impunity are destroying the country as a whole by undermining its core
moral values and its sense of solidarity as a nation. Some spoke about what can and shall be done to make
sure that there is a future for the Philippines and the Bangsamoro.
Dear Reader,
This is their report. It speaks about their pain and about their hope. It says that it is both possible and
feasible to say yes to peace and to a common destiny. It says that the ones who say yes to mutual
respect, to compassion, to social justice are the future of the nation, the future of the Bangsamoro and the
Philippines. By choosing life over death, peace over war, empathy over indifference, these women and men
are the heroes of this story. You can join them.
M Bleeker, Chairperson
Transitional Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC)
Cotabato City and Manila, 10 February 2016
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The Transitional Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) would like to acknowledge the following
individuals and organizations for their invaluable support:
The Philippine Government under the leadership of President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, particularly
to the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process under Honorable Teresita Quintos-Deles.
The Moro Islamic Liberation Front Central Committee under the leadership of Esteemed Chair Al-Haj
Murad Ebrahim.
Malaysia, the third-party facilitator, in particular Esteemed Tengku Dato Ab Ghafar Tengku Mohamed.
The leadership and staff of the Peace Panels of the Philippine Government and the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front, in particular Esteemed Chair Miriam Coronel-Ferrer and Esteemed Chair Mohagher Iqbal, for
their deep commitment and tireless effort to bring sustaina-ble peace in the Bangsamoro and the Philippines.
The leadership and staff of the various entities under the Normalization Framework:
Third Party Monitoring Team, International Monitoring Team, Independent Decommissioning Body,
International Contact Group, Independent Commission on Policing, GPH and MILF Joint Normalization
Committee, GPH and MILF Coordinating Committee on the Cessation of Hostilities, Bangsamoro
Normalization Fund Mechanism, Joint Peace and Security Committee, Joint Peace and Security Teams,
Ad Hoc Joint Action Group, Local Monitoring Teams.
The women and men of the national, autonomous regional and local governments and State institutions;
for sharing their knowledge, experience and recommendations with the TJRC:
Department of Health (DOH), Department of Justice (DOJ), Department of National Defense (DND), Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP), Philippine National Police (PNP), Commission on Human Rights (CHR),
Disaster Response Operations Monitoring and Information Center (DROMIC)-Department of Social
Welfare and Development, Human Rights Violations Claims Board (HRVB), House of Representatives,
National Archives of the Philippines (NAP), National Historical Commission of the Philippines (NHCP),
National Library of the Philippines, National Prosecution Service, Senate of the Republic of the Philippines,
Office of the President of the Republic of the Philippines, Office of the Presidential Adviser on
the Peace Process (OPAPP), Regional Human Rights Commission (RHRC) and Regional Reconciliation
and Unification Commission (RRUC), ARMM Office of the Governor, ARMM Manila Liaison Office,
Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA), ARMM Regional Board of Investments, ARMM Regional
Human Rights Commission, Provincial Prosecution Office of Maguindanao, Regional Human Rights
Commission, Zamboanga City Library and Zamboanga City Prosecution Service.
iii
iv

The Non-Governmental Organizations; for sharing advice, knowledge and experience with the TJRC:
Alternative Forum for Research in Mindanao (AFIRM), Anak Mindanao Party List, Asian Federation Against
Involuntary Disappearances (AFAD), Balay Rehabilitation Center, Bantay Cease-fire, Bangsamoro Study
Group, Mindanao Peoples Caucus, Bantayog ng mga Bayani Founda-tion, Claimants 1081, Families of Victims
of Involuntary Disappearances, Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG), Forum ZFD Civil Peace Service,
Humanitarian Rehabilitation and Development Component, International Monitoring Team, Initiatives
for International Dialogue, Institute of Bangsamoro Studies, Institute for Autonomy and Governance,
International Alert, International Organization for Migration-Cotabato, Lopez Museum and Library,
KARAPATAN Alliance for the Advancement of Peoples Rights, Medical Action Group, Mindanao Alliance
for Peace, Minda-nao Cross, Mindanao Human Rights Action Center (MinHRAC), Moro Human Rights
Center, Nisa Ul Haqq Fi Bangsamoro, Non-violence Peaceforce (NP), Oblates of Mary Immaculate Philippine
Province, Organization of Teduray-Lambangian Conference (OTLAC), Peace Advo-cates Zamboanga, Philippine
Alliance for Human Rights Advocates (PAHRA), Sentro ng Alter-natibong Lingap Panligal (SALIGAN), Task
Force Detainees of the Philippines (TFDP), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)Cotabato and United for Youth for Peace and Development, Inc, swisspeace Foundation.
The Coordinators and Facilitators of the TJRC Listening Process; for their incredible dedication, handwork
and passion:
Abbas Mobashar; Abdulhalim Ibrahim; Alidain Nulkaisa; Allian Fatima Pir; Antequisa Carino ; Bahidjian
Dayang; Makakua Buat; Juvanni Caballero; Dodo Ammier; Ma. Carmen Gatmaytan; Guiam Guiamaludin
Guiamil; Nurhadi Guiam; Jo Genna Jover; Juhra Kiman; Myla Leguro; Nando Hisham; Akas Parending; Caroliza
Peteros; Mucha-Shim Quiling; Baibonn Sangid; Jurma Tikmasan; Mark Anthony Torres; and Sahie Udjah.
Special thanks and appreciation to Prof. Rufa Cagoco-Guiam and Mr. Guiamel Alim, TJRC LP Coordinators, for
their extraordinary work, unwavering support and remarkable dedication.
The women, men and young people of various communities engaged in the TJRC Listening Process from
the following areas; Basilan, Cotabato, General Santos City, Indigenous Peoples Communities, Lanao del
Norte, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sarangani, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, South Cotabato, Tawi-Tawi and
Zamboanga;
You are the soul of this report; our deepest appreciation for your time, your courage and most especially for
the trust.
The members, experts and rapporteurs of the different TJRC Study Groups: for their une-quivocal sharing
of time, resources and wisdom:
Carmen Abubakar; Guiamel Alim; Mary Ann Arnado; Anna Tajminah Basman; Rufa Cagoco-Guiam;
Octavio Dinampo; Myrthena Fianza; Mohammad Khalid Gunting; Galuasch Gallaho; Fatima Kanakan;
Ayshia Kunting; Fr. Charlie Inzon; Francisco Lara; Aminoding Limpao; Abhoud Syed Lingga; Anwar Malang;
Ma. Victoria Maglana; Nasser Marohomsalic; Michael Mastura; Moctar Matuan; Macrina Morados; Zeny-Linda
Nandu; Jasmin Nario-Galace; Alpha Pontanal; Ma. Lourdes Rallonza; Rudy Rodil; Soliman Santos Jr; Abu
Al-Rasheed Tanggol; Faina Ulindang and Ismael Villareal.

Particular thanks to the following individuals for their support:
Fermin Adriano; Michael Frank Alar; Teenie Amor; Carol Arguillas, Ed Bullecer; Sedfrey Candelaria; Jowel
Canuday; Ruben Carranza; Mary Louise Castillo; Sam Chittick; Nicola Diday; Ica Fernandez; Marita
Concepcion Guevara; Raissa Jajurie; Pam Liban; Rafael Lopa; Ma. Victoria Maglana; Mary Rose Anne
Manahan; Gutierrez Mangansakan; Elmer Mercado; Titon Mitra; Mark Navales; Karen Rose Paje; Buenaventura
Pascual; John Perrine; Viko Perrine; Trudy Peterson; Ma. Lourdes Rallonza-Veneracion; Leonard Reyes, Marian
Roces; Naomi Roht-Arriaza; Ali Saleemi; Soliman Santos Jr; Matthew Stephens and Alfredo Tadiar.
The members of the International Community:
Embassy of Australia; Embassy of Brunei; Embassy of Canada; Embassy of Indonesia; Embassy of
Japan; Embassy of Malaysia; Embassy of the Netherlands; Embassy of Norway; Embassy of Saudi
Arabia; Embassy of Switzerland; Embassy of Turkey; Embassy of United Kingdom; Embassy of the United
States; FASTRAC; The European Union Delegation to the Philippines, Independent Decommissioning Body,
International Contact Group, International Organization for Migration, United Nations Development
Program, UN Women and World Bank, and in par-ticular the following individuals; Alma Evangelista;
Lloyd Yales; Faith Evangelista; Hanny Cueva-Beteta; Maricel Aguilar; Riza Torrado; Sabrina Buchler and Juvy
Huqueriza.
Special tribute to Her Excellency Andrea Reichlin and His Excellency, Ambassador Ivo Sieber, from the
Embassy of Switzerland to the Philippines, for their unwavering support to the work of the TJRC.
The members of the TJRCO team: You have made all this possible, day by day, night after night; our deepest
thanks and acknowledgement for your extraordinary commitment. Young and dedicated team, you are the
future for the Bangsamoro and the Philippines:
Mariecris Araga; Cindy Bullan; Nihaya Casar; Sahraman Disomimba; Evir Galleon; Sophia Dianne Garcia;
Carla Micaela Honasan; Donna Nessa Macaraeg; Maria Mikkoh Ortuoste-Samba and Jamila Sanguila.
And our deepest gratitude to the persons that we do not name here, but know what their contribution has
been.
The TJRC takes the sole responsibility for the report, its content and the materials presented in this
publication. The TJRC makes no statements or warranties about the completeness of any information
contained in this publication.
vi
ACRONYMS
AFP
Armed Forces of the Philippines
ARMM
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
ASG
Abu Sayyaf Group
BBL
Bangsamoro Basic Law
BCMS
Bangsamoro Conflict Monitoring System
BDA
Bangsamoro Development Authority
BIAF
Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces
BIFF
Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters
BLBAR
Basic Law on the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region
BSDU
Barrio Self-Defense Unit
CAB
Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro
CAFGU
Citizen Armed Force Geographical Unit
CARL
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
CAT

Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,

Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
CCP
Cultural Center of the Philippines
CEDAW

Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination

Against Women
CHDF
Civilian Home Defense Force
CHED
Commission on Higher Education
CHR
Commission on Human Rights
CIIF
Coconut Industry Investment Fund
CRC
Convention on the Rights of the Child
CSC
Civil Service Commission
CSO
Civil Society Organization
CVO
Civilian Volunteer Organizations
DA
Department of Agriculture
DAR
Department of Agrarian Reform
DBM
Department of Budget and Management
DENR
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
DepEd
Department of Education
DFA
Department of Foreign Affairs
DILG
Department of Interior and Local Government
DMCI
David M. Consunji, Inc.
DND
Department of National Defense
DOJ
Department of Justice
DSWD
Department of Social Welfare and Development
DwP
Dealing with the Past
EDCOR
Economic Development Corps
FAB
Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro
FIND
Families of Victims of Enforced Disappearances

GPH
Government of the Philippines
GRP
Government of the Republic of the Philippines
HMC
Historical Memory Committee
HRVCB
Human Rights Victims Claims Board
IBP
Integrated Bar of the Philippines
ICC
International Criminal Court
ICCPR
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights
ICERD
International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination
ICESCR
International Convention on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights
ACRONYMS
ICHDF
Integrated Civilian Home Defense Forces
IDPs
Internally Displaced Persons
IHL
International Humanitarian Law
IHRL
International Humanitarian Rights Law
IOM
International Organization for Migration
IP
Indigenous Peoples
IPRA
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act
ISIS
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
JAGO
Judge-Advocate Generals Office
LA
Land Authority
LASEDECO
Land Settlement Development Corporation
LEO
Law Enforcement Operations
LGU
Local Government Unit
LMB
Land Management Bureau
MAG
Medical Action Group
MCPA
Moro Christian Peoples Alliance
MILF
Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MINDA
Mindanao Development Authority
MNLF
Moro National Liberation Front
MOA-AD
Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain
MOU
Memorandum of Understanding
MPRC
Moro Peoples Resource Center
NARRA
National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration
NCCA
National Commission for Culture and Arts
NCIP
National Commission on Indigenous Peoples
NCMF
National Commission on Muslim Filipinos
NDCP
National Defense College of the Philippines
NEDA
National Economic and Development Agency
NFDC
National Film Development Council
NGO
Nongovernmental Organization
vii
viii

NHCP
National Historical Commission of the Philippines
NLSA
National Land Settlement Administration
NPA
New Peoples Army
NSCWPS
National Steering Committee on Women, Peace, and
Security
ACRONYMS
NTJRCB
National Transitional Justice and Reconciliation
Commission on the Bangsamoro
NUC
National Unification Commission
OPAPP
Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process
PAO
Public Attorneys Office
PC
Philippine Constabulary
PCGG
Presidential Commission on Good Government
PCHR
Presidential Committee on Human Rights
PCW
Philippine Commission on Women
PD
Presidential Decree
PDP
Philippine Development Plan
PMA
Philippine Military Academy
PNP
Philippine National Police
PNPA
Philippine National Police Academy
RA
Republic Act
RCBW
Regional Commission on Bangsamoro Women
RCPA
Rice and Corn Production Administration
RHRC
Regional Human Rights Commission
RRUC
Regional Reconciliation Unification Commission
SCAA
Special CAFGU Armed Auxiliary
SEARC
Southeast Asia Research Center
SoCSarGen
South Cotobato, Sarangani, and General Santos City
TFDP
Task Force Detainees of the Philippines
TJRC
TORs
Terms of Reference
UDHR
Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UN
United Nations
UPR
Universal Periodic Review
US
United States
VAW
Violence against Women
WB
World Bank
Transitional Justice
and Reconciliation Commission
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
ix
TJRC Study Groups-Listening Process

Convergence Workshop in Davao, August 2015
I. TJRC Mandate, Composition, and Methodology

The Transitional Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) was established as part of
the Normalization Annex of the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB) and, as such, was
mandated to undertake a study and to make recommendations with a view to promoting healing and
reconciliation among the different communities affected by the conflict in Mindanao and the Sulu
archipelago.
The Peace Panels constituted the membership of the TJRC as follows:
Chairperson: Ms. M Bleeker, Special Envoy, Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs
Government of the Philippines (GPH) Delegate: Atty. Cecilia Jimenez-Damary
GPH Alternate Delegate: Atty. Mohammad Al-Amin Julkipli
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) Delegate: Atty. Ishak Mastura
MILF Alternate Delegate: Atty. Abdul Rashid Kalim
Senior Adviser: Mr. Jonathan Sisson, Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs
Senior Gender Adviser is Dr. Ma. Lourdes Veneracion Rallonza
The TJRC is supported by office staff based in Manila and in Cotabato City.
The TJRC was mandated to propose appropriate mechanisms:

To address legitimate grievances of the Bangsamoro people;

To correct historical injustices;
To address human rights violations;
To address marginalization through land dispossession.

The TJRC subsequently designed and implemented an elaborate Consultation Process that focused on
the four topics of its mandate and involved community-based listening process sessions, study group
reviews of existing research, as well as key policy interviews. Additional independent research projects
on particular subjects related to its mandate were also carried out.
In all, the TJRC conducted listening process sessions in more than 210 Moro, indigenous, and settler
communities in Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago, involving some 3,000 community members and local
officials. The TJRC also engaged with a wide range of experts from the Bangsamoro region and at the national
level, including peacebuilding and human rights practitioners, community and religious leaders, academics
and scholars of Bangsamoro history and culture, public servants, and representatives of the security and
private sectors.
Based on the findings of the Consultation Process, the TJRC produced its own analysis of the issues
related to its mandate and of the root causes of the current conflict. In the view of the TJRC, the
four topics of its mandate are interrelated and intertwined: The Bangsamoro narrative of historical
injustice is based on an experience of grievances that extends over generations, particularly with
respect to land dispossession and its adverse effects upon their welfare as a community as well as
their experience of widespread and serious human rights violations.
Moreover, the TJRC came to the conclusion that these issues are the result of three interlocking
phenomenaviolence, impunity, and neglectwhich, in turn, are rooted in the imposition of
a monolithic Filipino identity and Philippine State by force on multiple ethnic groups in Mindanao
and the Sulu archipelago that saw themselves as already preexisting nations and nation-states.
II. The Bangsamoro Opportunity
Armed conflict in Mindanao has had tragic consequences for the Bangsamoro and indigenous peoples
and for Filipino society at large. Over the past four decades, an untold number of people in Mindanao
and the Sulu archipelago have been subjected to immense suffering due to vertical and horizontal
violence. They have lost family members; they have been driven from their homes and have lost their
lands and livelihoods. Incidents of violent conflict and systematic discrimination and exclusion have
become a collective experience and memory. The people of the Bangsamoro are poor and tired and they
want peace.
At the same time, the Philippines as a nation has not remained unscathed. The prolongation of the armed
conflict has generated pockets of malgovernance, violence, and corruption. It has eroded the values of the
nation and undermined trust between citizens and the State. On another level, the conflict has cost the
Philippines precious time and opportunities. It has effectively hindered decades of potential social
and economic development and weakened the quality of democracy and of human security. With the
appearance of new armed groups and new forms of violence (e.g., international terrorism and drug-related
crime), an environment of multidimensional conflict has begun to take hold in the Philippines.
In this context, bringing peace to the Bangsamoro in a durable manner offers a unique opportunity
for the Philippinesthe opportunity for a modern nation-state to emerge that is capable of managing
the diversity of peoples and communities inherent to any modern democracy in a constructive
manner based on equality of opportunity and on the rule of law. Similarly, the Bangsamoro aspire
to a political framework, which shall enable the practice of good governance, the development of the
Bangsamoro region and people, and the possibility for them to proudly assert their identity, and
constructively engage with their own multiethnic constituency.
xi
xii
IDB personnel conducts inspection and

inventory on the weapons that were turned over.
( OPAPP)
Both the Government of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front deserve to be
commended for their commitment to the peace process during seventeen years of protracted
ne got i ations. As a result, the two parties were able to sign the historic Comprehensive
Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) on March 27, 2014. Thus, the TJRC prefers to speak of a
Bangsamoro opportunity rather than of a Bangsamoro problem. The implementation of the
CAB is a unique and extraordinary opportunity not only for Bangsamoro, but also for the whole
Filipino nation:

It offers an opportunity for the historical and cultural resilience of the Bangsamoro
and indigenous peoples to be recognized as a vibrant and constructive part of the
Philippines, based on the acknowledgement of plural identities.
It offers an opportunity for the Philippine State to assume the political and moral
responsibility for all of its peoples by opening and strengthening spaces for political
debate and for the nonviolent management of conflicting views and interests.
It offers an opportunity for the Philippines to join hands with the Bangsamoro and
indigenous peoples to promote the rule of law, security, and development in the
Bangsamoro as a potential model for the rest of the country.
It offers an opportunity for the Philippines to become a champion in the protection of

diversity and of territorial integrity at the regional and international levels.
It offers an opportunity for the Philippines and the Bangsamoro to embrace diversity
as one of the key human resources of its society.

III. Dealing with the Past towards Healing and Reconciliation
The recommendations of the TJRC are elaborated with the intention of opening the path for a joint
Bangsamoro and Filipino process of dealing with the past that can address both the root causes of the
conflict and their consequences, while building on the extraordinary Bangsamoro and Filipino capacity
for resilience.
The TJRC is convinced that the transitional justice mechanisms proposed below, when implemented
with a conflict transformation perspective in mind, are suited to address the complex of grievances
of the Bangsamoro people cited in its mandate. Moreover, they will provide a solid basis for healing and
reconciliation between the different communities directly affected by the conflict as well as between the
Bangsamoro and the Filipino society at large.
The TJRC has adopted a conceptual and analytical framework for transitional justice (or what it prefers
to call dealing with the past) that is inspired by the United Nations (UN) principles against impunity,
which have the force of customary international law. In this regard, the TJRC highlights the fact that the
principles against impunity are based on the rights of victims to seek redress for past abuse and on the
obligations of the State to ensure accountability for wrongs committed. Moreover, initiatives related to
truth seeking, justice, reparations, and institutional reform offer a mutually reinforcing framework that
is needed in the struggle against impunity and to strengthen the rule of law (see Figure ES-1 for the TJRC
Dealing with the Past Framework).
Figure ES-1
TJRC Dealing with the Past Framework
xiii
xiv
President Benigno Aquino III talks with IDB Chair

Haydar Berk as he inspects the weapons turned
over by the MILF. He is joined by Secretary
Teresita Quintos Deles, MILF Chair Ebrahim
Murad, Secretary Mar Roxas, and Government
Peace Panel Chair Miriam Coronel-Ferrer.
( OPAPP)
At the same time, the TJRC proposes a future-oriented approach to dealing with the past that is sensitive
to the Bangsamoro and Filipino context. While addressing legitimate grievances, historical injustice, and
the effects of marginalization through land dispossession, dealing with the past also strives to prevent the
recurrence of human rights violations. To do so, a combination of short-term, medium-term, and long-term
interventions are required to create conditions in which the root causes of political and social conflict
can be addressed by nonviolent means. The support provided to existing national and regional
institutions and the creation of additional transitional justice mechanisms recommended by the
TJRC shall contribute to an environment of trust building and power sharing that respects the historical
diversity of the Philippines and the Bangsamoro region.
IV. Complementing Past and Existing Efforts and Ensuring a Strategic Approach
Many efforts have been initiated by government and civil society in the Philippines to address the violent
legacy of the Marcos era. There are a number of good examples of dealing with the past, among them the
recent ongoing efforts to compensate the victims of Martial Law undertaken by the Human Rights
Victims Claims Board (HRVCB). Initiatives have also been launched by previous administrations
to mainstream human rights education and monitoring in the national security institutions as well as to
identify and protect archives related to human rights violations under Martial Law.
Nevertheless, the impact of these initiatives has been limited with respect to the conflict in Mindanao,
notably in providing satisfactory redress to victims and in preventing the recurrence of violations. There

are a number of reasons why past government initiatives related to transitional justice have failed to
live up to expectations:

They have not been effective in addressing the root causes of violence.
They were not implemented as a result of broad and transparent consultations.
They promoted isolated measures, instead of a holistic strategy, for dealing with the
past.
They did not succeed in ending conflict-related violence and thus failed to draw a line
between before and after the period of wrongdoings and injustices.
They did not contribute to the prevention of revisionist discourse and denial about the
abuse committed in the past.
Nevertheless, important steps have been taken. We note the significant contribution towards healing
and reconciliation made by President Benigno S. Aquino III when he publically acknowledged
the grievances of the Moro people in a speech:
As a congressman, I had come to understand that the degree of resentment in the hearts of the
Bangsamoro people was, on a large part, a result of land grabbing and the opportunism of some of
our less scrupulous compatriots. Taking advantage of the illiteracy of our indigenous peoples who did
not know that their lands had to be registered under their name, these lettered Christians sought control
of the lands our Moro and other indigenous peoples called home. This, in turn, led to a struggle of our
Moro brothers to reclaim what was rightfully theirs. Given the many deaths, which were the result
of the conflict that raged and festered for generations, one cannot help but wonder: If a law had been
passed to protect the marginalized, like the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) we have now, could
bloodshed have been avoided? Is it not right that as one of my predecessors once said: That those who
have less in life should have more in law? I wondered: With all the hostility and animosity that once
existed between brothers, how could one achieve the trust crucial in forging an agreement? (Speech
at the International Conference on the Consolidation for Peace for Mindanao on June 24, 2014)
This statement underscores the reason why President Aquino has insisted on the passage of the
Bangsamoro Basic Law not only as a means of implementing the peace agreement with the MILF,
but also as a concrete manifestation of the Philippine governments commitment to address Moro grievances.
V. Taking a Political Decision
The TJRC is aware that it will take time to address the issues underlined in its mandate in a coherent
and comprehensive manner and to bring durable peace to the Bangsamoro as well as in the Philippines.
Therefore, it proposes an incremental and flexible approach that combines mutually reinforcing
efforts in the fields of truth, justice, reparations, and guarantees of non-recurrence, while
promoting reconciliation initiatives on the national, regional, and local levels.
To this end, the TJRC developed a number of recommendations based on its Consultation Process.
Aside from the recommendations listed below, there is a list of recommendations, stemming from
the listening process sessions, the study group reports, the key policy interviews, and other
reports mandated by the TJRC; these are included in the TJRC report. These recommendations
xv
xvi

must be discussed and further developed as a joint effort between the Government of the Philippines
and the Bangsamoro authorities, on the one hand, and between government and civil society, on the
other.
A sound political decision needs to be taken at the highest level by both parties to set the stage for a
strategic approach to dealing with the past for the Bangsamoro. Indeed, dealing with the past must
be fully integrated into the peace process to ensure its sustainability. As an intrinsic part of the Bangsamoro and
national peace agenda, dealing with the past shall be implemented through a series of short-term, mediumterm, and long-term measures to be undertaken independently and co-jointly by the Bangsamoro
and national authorities with the support of Philippine civil society and the international community.
VI. The TJRC Recommendations
The TJRC submits the following recommendations to the GPH and MILF Peace Panels for their
consideration and action. All of these recommendations shall be informed by gender and cultural
sensitivities and include a perspective for healing and reconciliation.
( Mark Navales)
The TJRC recommends the following, in addition to the list of specific recommendations listed in the
main TJRC report:

A. To the President, to create the National Transitional Justice and Reconciliation

Commission on the Bangsamoro (NTJRCB)
1. The overall mandate of the NTJRCB shall be to implement the dealing with the
past framework, to promote healing and reconciliation, and to ensure that the
following tasks are undertaken by four separate Sub-Commissions in cooperation
with relevant existing institutions and actors:
a. To realize public and confidential hearings with the participation of victims

of the conflict, to investigate serious violations of international human rights
and international humanitarian law, and to implement remedies;
b. To contribute to the resolution of outstanding land disputes in conflict-affected

areas in the Bangsamoro, to address the legacy of land dispossession, and
to implement remedies;
c. To contribute to the dismantling of impunity, to the promotion of accountability,

to the strengthening of the rule of law in relation to past and present
wrongdoings, and to implement remedies;
d. To promote healing and reconciliation among the different communities

affected by the conflict.
2. The NTJRCB shall operate for six years with the possibility of extending its mandate
for another three years.
3. The NTJRCB shall ensure the implementation of the dealing with the past framework
and promote healing and reconciliation. Among other things, it shall operate by co
operating with existing institutions and building on existing local and national best
practices in conformity with international standards, while taking into account lessons
learned from other experiences. The NTJRCB shall establish memoranda of
understanding (MOUs) to regulate the cooperation between its Sub-Commissions
and the relevant existing institutions and organizations in their respective fields
(see Figure ES-2 for the recommended structure of the NTJRCB and Figure ES-3
for the NTJRCB Sub-Commission structure and operation).
xvii
xviii
Figure ES-2
NTJRCB Overall Structure
STRATEGIC
NTJRCB Chairperson, 4 Commissioners

2 Civil Society representatives (ex officio)
Advisory Board
Civil Society Forum
OPERATIONAL
NTJRCB
Executive Office
(Secretariat)
Sub-Commission
on Historical Memory
(in the Bangsamoro)
Sub-Commission
against Impunity, for the
Promotion of Accountability,
and Rule of Law
(in the Bangsamoro)
Figure ES-3
Sub-Commission on Land
Dispossession (in the
Bangsamoro)
Sub-Commission on
Healing and Reconciliation
(in the Bangsamoro)
NTJRCB Sub-Commission Structure and Operation
NTJRCB Sub-Commission:
- Commissioner as convener
- Technical experts
- Support staff provided by
Secretariat
Ad Hoc Working Group including

institutions and actors, relevant
to specific issues
(cooperation regulated by a MOU)

4. The NTJRCB shall consist of seven persons, five of whom are voting members,
appointed by the President: the Chairperson and the four Commissioners,
who are responsible for convening the Sub-Commissions. Two representatives of
Bangsamoro civil society are members of the NTJCRB with a status of ex officio,
nonvoting members.
5. All of the members of the NTJRCB shall be of Philippine nationality. The Chairperson
and at least two of the four voting members of the NTJRCB shall be a Philippine
national of Bangsamoro ancestry. At least one of the nonvoting civil society
representatives shall be a Philippine national of Bangsamoro ancestry.
B. To the President, to call upon civil society organizations to create a Civil Society
Forum for Transitional Justice and Reconciliation in the Bangsamoro. The
objective of the Civil Society Forum is to monitor and support the implementation
of the NTJRCB mandate with a view to enhancing the satisfaction of victims
and strengthening the guarantee of non-recurrence. The Civil Society Forum
shall recommend a list of five names, from among which the President will
choose two representatives to serve as nonvoting members of the NTJRCB.
C. To the President, to authorize the NTJRCB to create an Advisory Board, composed

of eminent national (and, if deemed useful, international) persons with proven
expertise in the field of dealing with the past and reconciliation. The
objective of the Advisory Board is to provide advice to the NTJCRB and
support to the overall process of transitional justice, healing, and reconciliation.
The TJRC strongly recommends that decisions be taken as soon as possible. With or without a
Bangsamoro Basic Law, a solid, consistent dealing with the past strategy shall be implemented in an
incremental manner with a view to addressing the deepest pains and hurts of the Bangsamoro people
and of Filipino society at large.
The TJRC regards this as necessary to prevent a resurgence of armed conflict and to provide
conditions for a durable peace.
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 10 February 2016
xix
xx
An old rundown school at Maguindanao turned

into an evacuation site for more than 200 refugees.
( Leonard Reyes)

Recognition is due to both the Government of the
Philippines (GPH) and to the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front (MILF) for their commitment to the peace process
during 17 years of protracted negotiations. As a result
of their engagement, they were able to sign the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB) on October
15, 2012 as well as the Comprehensive Agreement on the
Bangsamoro (CAB) on March 27, 2014, which includes
the Normalization Annex (signed on 25 January 2014)
that provided for the creation of the Transitional Justice
and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC). The decision to
create an independent body to study and formulate
recommendations on issues related to transitional
justice and reconciliation as a central element of the
normalization process is one of the innovations of the
Bangsamoro peace process. The negotiators are to be
commended for their foresight and appreciation of the urgent
need to address the painful legacy of the violence and the
root causes of the conflict, in order to ensure a successful
transition to peace and the rule of law in the future
Bangsamoro region.
INTRODUCTION
The negotiators are to be commended for
their foresight and appreciation of the
urgent need to address the painful legacy
of the violence and the root causes of the
conflict, in order to ensure a successful
transition to peace and the rule of law in
the future Bangsamoro region.
Indeed, the issue of transitional justice and reconciliation

in other peace processes has often been treated as an
afterthought, introduced to the postconflict agenda only
at the instigation of the international community and civil
society. This has certainly been the case in peace negotiations
in the past that have involved mainly, if not exclusively,
the armed protagonists and have proceeded without
consulting representatives of the victims and communities
affected by conflict and without the participation of
relevant civil society organizations. In recent years,
progress has been made in the design of more inclusive
peace processes. In Colombia, for example, victim
associations have been given a voice in the negotiations.
In South Sudan and in Mali, however, affected communities
have still been largely left aside. As a result, the transitional
justice mechanisms established in such contexts fail to
benefit from the advantages of impartial and consultative
processes, which are vital to building trust and reconciliation
in fragmented societies.
Thus, the GPH and MILF Panels can be said to have set
a new standard by including the establishment of the
TJRC as an integral provision of the peace agreement.
As such, it signals a consensus among the parties to the
conflict to address by peaceful means what they agree to
Human Rights Workshop, May 2015
be some of the most contentious issues fueling the conflict: legitimate grievances of the Bangsamoro
people, historical injustice, human rights violations, and marginalization through land
dispossession. As a consequence, the TJRC has received a clear mandate to examine these
issues and to make concrete recommendations regarding how they should be addressed.
Operationally, the TJRC opted for a problem-solving approach that combined a broad-based process
of listening at the community level with an expert review of relevant academic literature and field
studies, as well as with a series of key policy interviews. In total, more than one hundred personswomen
and menfrom the Bangsamoro region and the national level actively engaged with the TJRC
as facilitators, experts, or key informants in its consultation process. The profile of those who
collaborated with the TJRC includes peacebuilding, conflict transformation, and human rights
practitioners, community and religious leaders, academics and experts in Mindanao and Bangsamoro
studies, public servants, and representatives of the security and private sectors.
This elaborate process of consultation shaped the TJRCs understanding of the social, cultural,
political, economic, and historical factors that gave rise to the conflict and have sustained
it over decades. Moreover, it provided insight into the clan structure, institutional architecture,
and means of governance in the Philippines and in the Bangsamoro. Additionally, the TJRC developed
its own conceptual framework and analysis that informed its understanding of the results of the
consultation process and crafted its recommendations accordingly, so that they would be at once
realistic, feasible, sustainable, andnot the leastmeaningful to the Bangsamoro people, to
other affected communities in Mindanao, and to Philippine society at large.
The work of the TJRC was guided by several key principles that were practiced and respected
in the course of carrying out its mandate: building local and national ownership, developing a
Filipino and Bangsamoro approach to transitional justice and reconciliation, being sensitive to gender
and culture, contributing to the process of conflict transformation and trust building, and keeping pace
with the ongoing peace process.

It is important to note that other initiatives that could be associated with the universe of transitional
justice have been previously attempted in the Philippines. These could be relevant to the pursuit
of transitional justice in the Bangsamoro in the same manner that the way in which the past is dealt
with in the Bangsamoro context could contribute to the countrys capacity to provide justice, healing,
and reconciliation.
For the TJRC, the four issues of its mandate are interrelated and intertwined: The Bangsamoro
narrative of historical injustice frames their experience of legitimate grievances, particularly
in relation to their social, political, and economic marginalization through land dispossession and
their sense of victimhood in the face of widespread human rights violations committed against them.
Moreover, the TJRC came to the conclusion that these issues have arisen as the consequence of three
interlocking phenomenaviolence, impunity, and neglectthat, in turn, are rooted in the imposition of a
monolithic Filipino identity and Philippine State by force on multiple ethnic groups in Mindanao and
in the Sulu archipelago that saw themselves as already preexisting nations and nation-states.
At this juncture in the peace process, it is important to emphasize that initiatives in transitional justice
and reconciliation are not only crucial to the future of the affected communities in the Bangsamoro,
but to Philippine society at large as well. By addressing these sensitive issues in a constructive manner,
the Philippine government can indeed contribute to a sustainable peace based on the rule of
law. Although the two parties signed the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB) and
the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB), at the time of the completion of the
TJRC report, the Sixteenth Philippine Congress had not yet ended its deliberations on the proposed
Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) that would provide the necessary political and institutional framework
to implement the agreements. In the meantime, the situation on the ground remains volatile. Other
armed actors continue to be active in Bangsamoro areas, and many communities in the region still
lack access to basic services.
This report is based on the findings of the TJRCs in-depth and broad-based consultations. It is also
the product of the deliberations of the Commission itself, an independent body composed of an
equal number of Philippine Government and MILF delegates and two international (Swiss)
experts who came to common conclusions. The TJRC assumes shared responsibility for the
analysis of the findings as well as for the recommendations contained in this report.
The report itself is structured as follows:
Chapter 1
The Transitional Justice and Reconciliation Commission: Its Mandate, Composition,
and Consultation Process Methodology. This chapter discusses the TJRC mandate, conceptual approach, and consultation process.
Chapter 2 Results of the TJRC Consultation Process: Main Findings. The key issues and challenges that emerged from the consultation process on the four areas of the TJRC mandate are summarized in this chapter, including how gender is implicated in legitimate grievances, historical injustice,
human rights violations, and marginalization through land dispossession in the Bangsamoro.
Chapter 3 Violence, Impunity, and Neglect: The Imposition of a Monolithic Filipino

Identity and Philippine State. In this chapter, the TJRC analyzes the main findings of the
consultation process in light of the overriding themes of violence, impunity, and neglect,
and their root causes in the imposition by force of a monolithic Filipino identity and
Philippine State on the Bangsamoro.
Chapter 4
Recommendations. The conclusions drawn from the main findings and their analysis
form the basis of the TJRCs proposals for addressing the four issues of its mandate with a view to
promoting lasting reconciliation. It suggests a holistic approach to dealing with the past that
shall be undertaken by the national and Bangsamoro authorities in cooperation with civil
society. The recommendations focus on the creation of a National Transitional Justice
and Reconciliation Commission on the Bangsamoro (NTJRCB).1 The TJRC has formulated the
mandate of the Commission, keeping in mind the legacy of many other transitional justice and
reconciliation initiatives in the world.
In accordance with its mandate and in fulfillment of its terms of reference, the TJRC submits
this report to the GPH and the MILF Peace Panels for their consideration and action.
CHAPTER 1
The Transitional
Justice and
Reconciliation
Commission:
Its Mandate,
Composition,
and Consultation
Process
Methodology
1.1 The TJRC Mandate

The Transitional Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) was officially launched in Kuala Lumpur
on September 27, 2014. As formulated in its Terms of Reference2 and with reference to the Framework
Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB) on the legitimate grievances of the Bangsamoro, the
TJRC is mandated to undertake a study and to recommend to the Panels the appropriate
mechanisms with regard to the following:

To address legitimate grievances of the Bangsamoro people;

To correct historical injustices;
To address human rights violations;
To address marginalization through land dispossession.
In addition, the TJRC is requested to recommend programs and measures to promote the reconciliation of
the different communities that have been affected by the conflict.
Within its mandate, the TJRC can also recommend immediate interventions in support of
reconciliation and the healing of the physical, mental, and spiritual wounds of the conflict.
In this regard, the TJRC did undertake confidential initiatives, which were reported to the Panels. The
latter are not part of this report.
1.2. The Composition of the TJRC
The TJRC is composed of the following members:
Chair: Ms. M Bleeker, Special Envoy, Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs
GPH Delegate: Atty. Cecilia Jimenez- Damary
MILF Delegate: Atty. Ishak Mastura
GPH Alternate Delegate: Atty. Mohammad Al-amin Julkipli
MILF Alternate Delegate: Atty. Abdul Rashid Kalim
Senior Adviser: Mr. Jonathan Sisson, Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs
Senior Gender Adviser: Dr. Ma. Lourdes Veneracion-Rallonza
Office staff based in Manila and in Cotabato City support the TJRC.
1.3 The Methodology of the TJRC
As a means of implementing its mandate, the TJRC designed a complex consultation process that
included academic research, expert and community consultations, and key policy interviews in
different phases and in parallel with one another. The design of the consultation process was
informed throughout by a gender approach. In addition, the TJRC developed its own website and
scheduled meetings with different governmental and nongovernmental stakeholders associated with the
peace process, as well as with concerned members of the international community.3 The Chair regularly
informed the Panels of the progress of the TJRC.
1.3.1 The TJRC Consultation Process

The main constituent elements of the TJRC consultation process are described in Table 1 below.
Table 1. TJRC Consultation Process
TJRC
Listening Process
TJRC facilitator teams conducted consultations in 211

local communities affected by the conflict in the Bangsamoro
region. During the consultations, the facilitators elicited the
opinion of the community members concerning the four
issues of the TJRC mandate and inquired about how they
believed the issues should be addressed.
TJRC
Study Groups
Some three dozen national experts, a majority of whom

are Mindanao-based, worked in four separate study
groups to compile, assess, and summarize existing
research related to the four outstanding issues of the
TJRC mandate with a view to identifying the main findings
and potential gaps in existing research and in the
implementation of recommendations.
Dealing with
the Past
Assessment (DwP)
An analysis was undertaken by the TJRC Senior Adviser

of what has been done and with which results in the field
of transitional justice in the Philippines. A separate study
conducted by the Swiss Peace Foundation as part of the
DwP Assessment was devoted to a mapping of archives
documenting human rights violations. Both studies focused
on the resources available and the challenges to be faced
when engaging in process of dealing with the past in the
Bangsamoro.
Key Policy
Interviews
The TJRC conducted lengthy interviews with more than a

dozen policy makers in different fields to hear their views
on the issues of the TJRC mandate and to gain their
assessment of the recommendations proposed to address
those issues.

In all, the TJRC sought and listened to the opinions of more than 3,000 individuals: men and women
from rural farming and fishing communities, MILF and MNLF combatants and their wives, Muslim
and Christian clerics as well as traditional spiritual leaders, business and legal professionals, government
officials, teachers and health providers, and members of the Philippine security sector such as the
military and the police.
In the course of the consultation process, the TJRC reviewed numerous academic studies and agency
reports published on the Moro issue, including early newspaper articles and other sources
reporting on the conflict. Moreover, the TJRC sought the opinion of t h o s e w i d e l y
r e c o g n i z e d as knowledgeable about the situation in Mindanao and, as a consequence, held
in-depth conversations with many public servants and distinguished members of civil society,
including the business sector.
Figure 1. Locations where the TJRC Listening Process took place (Data indicated are approximations)

A broad-based Listening Process was conducted in communities located in Basilan, Central Mindanao,
Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, SoCSarGen (South Cotobato, Sarangani, and General Santos City),
Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, and Zamboanga Peninsula. Listening Process facilitators also visited communities of
indigenous peoples in Central Mindanao and in the MILF camps (Figure 1 shows where the TJRC
Listening Process took place). Of the total number of participants in the Listening Process coming from
Muslim, indigenous, and Christian communities, 68 percent were men whereas 32 percent were
women. The participants, many of whom reside in conflict-affected areas, represented a broad range
of perspectives from rural and urban backgrounds. The Listening Process also engaged with members
of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), but was not able to involve representatives of
Bangsamoro expatriate communities.
10

The TJRC is neither a truth commission nor an ad hoc official fact-finding body; it is an independent
commission mandated to make a report and propose holistic measures to deal with the legacy of the
past. Nevertheless, in the course of its consultation process, the TJRC received solid, concrete
information about events, which can be categorized as serious violations of international human
rights law (IHRL) and international humanitarian law (IHL). Some of this information is based on
survivor testimony; other information is stored in archives and refers to atrocities that were committed
several decades ago. In some cases, the testimonies described violent incidents that remain unknown to
the public to this day. The majority of witness statements and records are backed up by previous
reports, but some of them would require further investigation for confirmation. The TJRC shall
address this issue in connection with its recommendations.
For the purpose of this report, however, the TJRC decided that the testimonies given and the information
gathered would not be evaluated according to judicial standards. Rather, it would suffice if the
information and testimonies were coherent with acknowledged literature and research on the
subject matter. In particular, the TJRC paid attention that the statements associated with the Listening
Process cited in its report are typical of the sentiment expressed by persons in different communities
in different regions of Mindanao (Figure 2 shows a Listening Process in Bongao, Tawi-Tawi).4
Figure 2. TJRC Listening Process in Bongao, Tawi-Tawi (30 March 2015)
1.3.2 Developing a Context-Specific Approach to Transitional Justice and Reconciliation

Transitional justice is a political and legal concept that needs to be adapted to, appropriated by, and
eventually transformed in accordance with the cultural patterns and socio-economic structures of each
context in which it is practiced. The TJRC developed its own conceptual approach to transitional justice
and arrived at a framework with its own vocabulary and cultural references, including attention to and
practice of gender sensitivity, which the TJRC believes measures up to international standards and yet is
close to the heart and the reality of the Bangsamoro people.
The TJRC bases its approach on the principles against impunity, which were developed in the 1990s at
the United Nations (UN) Sub-Commission on the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights and
now enjoy the status of emerging customary law.5 It also takes into account norms and standards
in the field of transitional justice, as elaborated in other UN reports and resolutions.6 Moreover, the
TJRC approach takes into consideration the framework of international human rights and humanitarian
law and addresses root causes of the Bangsamoro conflict.
The TJRC used the Swiss Dealing with the Past (DwP) framework based on the Joinet/Orentlicher
principles against impunity as a conceptual scheme that is both practice- and process-oriented and
includes conflict transformation as an important element.7 The four key principles that constitute the
framework complement one another thematically and practically: the Right to Know, the Right to
Justice, the Right to Reparation, and Guarantees of Non-Recurrence. The framework, as such, offers a
constructive manner to deal with past wrongdoings, while supporting and strengthening the peace
and conflict transformation process. Significantly, the framework suggests that some form of dealing
with the past on a societal level is a prerequisite for reconciliation.
The principles against impunity acknowledge and define the rights of victims to claim and the obligation
of the State to provide remedies for serious violations of IHRL and IHL.
11
12
Taken together, the principles against impunity form the components of a holistic strategy to address
grievances and past abuses. Moreover, the TJRC sees a potential framework for dialogue and trust
building between State institutions and disaffected sectors of society through the acknowledgment
of the rights of victims to assert and of the obligation of the State to provide remedies.
The TJRC prefers to use the expression dealing with the past rather than transitional justice because
it is convinced that dealing with a legacy of violent conflict is not onlyor even primarilythe
the task of legal professionals. On the contrary, just as a majority of the population in
the Bangsamoro has been affected by the conflict in some form, so also everyone should be able
to contribute in some way to the process of reconciliation. In this sense, dealing with the past is both a
top-down and a bottom-up process. Nevertheless, both terms, dealing with the past and transitional
justice will be used interchangeably in this report.8
Transitional justice is not new to the Philippines; yet the country has not been successful in addressing
the many forms of injustice stemming from impunity and other factors, nor has it been able to achieve
reconciliation.9 For example, in the area of truth seeking, there have been a number of formal commissions
of inquiry that were established to investigate specific events and wrongdoings. An infamous example
are the two fact-finding commissions set up by President Marcos to investigate the assassination of Senator
Benigno Aquino, Jr. in 1983.10 Two mechanisms were also initiated by President Corazon Aquino
with a broader mandate to address the corruption and human rights violations that marked the Marcos
dictatorship: the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG)11 and the Presidential
Committee on Human Rights (PCHR).12 More recently, President Benigno S. Aquino III, on his part,
attempted to set up a truth commission to investigate corruption under the previous administration
of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.13 While the PCHR was superseded in 1987 by the Commission on
Human Rights, the PCGG continues to operate, but has had limited success in recovering ill-gotten
assets and fighting corruption. The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, on the other hand,
was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.14 In the field of reparations, Republic Act
(RA) 10368, known as the Human Rights Victims Reparation and Recognition Act of 2013,

established the Human Rights Victims Claims Board (HRVCB) to provide compensation and recognition to
the victims of human rights violations during the Marcos dictatorship.15 As of 30 May 2015, the closure
date for filing claims, the HRVCB had received some 73,000 submissions, a significant number of which
from claimants residing in Mindanao.16 Due to the limited scope of the time frame cited in its mandate,
the Claims Board cannot provide compensation for conflict-related human rights violations that took
place before or after the Marcos period.
Taking note of such examples, it is important to draw lessons from the experience of transitional justice
in the Philippines, as this has bearings on any future transitional justice initiatives in the Bangsamoro.
One such lesson is that the lack of a holistic, comprehensive approach has limited the effectiveness of
the individual mechanisms established, which often have an ad hoc character or are created without
the support of complementary initiatives. In the aftermath of the Mamasapano incident of January
25, 2014, for example, at least eight different fact-finding investigations were undertaken, each of which
conducted its own analysis of the event and produced its own set of recommendations. Likewise, the lack
of an official truth-seeking body set up to examine the scope and nature of the human rights violations that
occurred during the Marcos era and to determine the number and identity of the victims has severely
hampered the effectiveness of the HRVCB. Another important lesson concerns the acknowledgment of
responsibility for wrongdoings committed by the State, which calls not only for some form of individual
or collective reparation, but also for concrete measures to prevent the recurrence of such violations.
Indeed, often enough, individual measures are not enough in themselves; significant change in the
prevailing political, social, and economic structures and institutional culture is required as a preventive course
of action. These lessonsalso supported by international experiencecannot be overemphasized. Given the
less than desirable performance of past transitional justice measures, the country needs to improve its
capacity to deal with the past. In this regard, the report of the TJRC and its recommendations with
respect to dealing with the past in the Bangsamoro should be seen as an opportunity.
13
14
1.4 Dealing with the Past and the Management of Diversity

The tragic Mamasapano incident and other violent events in the Bangsamoro region have triggered
strong emotional reactions in the public sphere. These reactions reveal a deep division in
Philippine society rooted in historical prejudice and mistrust among different ethnic and
religious communities and exacerbated by the failure of the modern State to manage diversity
constructively. The persistence of prejudice and mistrust is evident in the profound ignorance
on the part of the majority population of the life and reality of the Bangsamoro and indigenous
peoples and reflects an intolerance based on a rejection of ethno-religious differences. Forty years of
armed conflict have only deepened the divisions on all sides. Unfortunately, despite its recent efforts to
highlight the peace process, government policy has not been able to address this us versus them
mentality effectively.
The TJRC notes with great preoccupation that there seems to be a deep indifference in Philippine
society at large as to the situation of victims suffering the effects of protracted war, social and
economic exclusion, and political marginalization in the Bangsamoro. Recent events and public
posturing have considerably added to the complexity of the ongoing peace process and contributed to
the current impasse in Congress concerning the proposed Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) bills.17
The passage into law of a BBL bill is a prerequisite for the creation of a new political entity in the
Bangsamoro. Notwithstanding the current status of the proposed BBL legislation, dealing with
the past is, in any case, a joint endeavor, a shared task between the national and Bangsamoro authorities
and institutions together with the Bangsamoro people. It will require the capacity to constructively
manage ethno-religious diversity. This a challenge, but also an opportunity, which, if successful,
augurs well not only for the Bangsamoro, but also for the inherently diverse nature of Philippine
society. The recommendations of the TJRC are thus addressed to both the national government and to
the Bangsamoro authorities and institutions.
CHAPTER 2
Results of the
TJRC
Consultation
Process:
Main Findings
15
16
From the outset, the TJRC regarded as its first priority clarifying the issues of its mandate
not simply on a theoretical or abstract level, but concretely with a view to understanding
what the issues of legitimate grievances, historical injustice, human rights, and marginalization through
land dispossession might mean to affected communities. In this way, the TJRC hoped to develop
conceptual and analytical handles that would enable it to craft a strategy for transitional justice
and reconciliation that would have meaning for the Bangsamoro people and to the country at large.
As a result, the TJRC devised and put into practice a complex consultation process that produced
a wealth of information and insights, which in turn provided the basis for the evidence-informed
analysis that guided the TJRC in formulating its recommendations.
In this chapter, the TJRC will present its main findings in the sequence in which the issues are named in
its mandate, namely legitimate grievances of the Bangsamoro people, historical injustices, human rights
violations, and marginalization through land dispossession. Although the presentation of the
findings occurs topic by topic, the TJRC emphasizes that in practical terms the issues often overlap and
intertwine thematically and historically.
Notwithstanding the intensive data collection process that the TJRC undertook, the Commission does
not claim to deliver information in its findings that is fundamentally new or that would
contradict or even differ significantly from earlier studies and reports. Nor, for that matter, can
the Commission claim that its findings are particularly wide-reaching or profound, given the limited
time frame and resources with which it operated. Yet, it does claim to have conducted an extensive
community-based listening process during which, as community members themselves expressed
it, they were asked their opinion on these matters for the first time.
In sum, the TJRC does believe that the combination of a top-down and bottom-up approach
undertaken during its consultation process produced results that represent a broad consensus in the
Bangsamoro. In this regard, it claims a high degree of credibility and legitimacy for the findings
presented below.
2.1 Legitimate Grievances of the Bangsamoro

We lost the opportunity to develop as

peoples; [this is] the reason why we are
still marginalized until now
Listening Process participant, Tuburan,
Basilan, 25 April 2015
2.1.1 Defining Legitimate Grievances

In formulating the mandate of the TJRC, the Peace
Panels identified the legitimate grievances of the
Bangsamoro people as one of the key outstanding
issues and placed it first among the matters to be
addressed.
For the TJRC Study Group on Legitimate Grievances,
the issue refers to grievances that are rooted or
grounded on objective conditions and circumstances
(i.e. objective grievances) like landlessness, poverty,
unemployment, widespread discrimination and
abuses, ethnic dominance, inter-group hatred,
political/economic exclusion or injustice. 18
According to the TJRC Listening Process Report, grievance can be an act creating an injustice,
an unjust act that can cause resentment.19 In its various Listening Process sessions, the TJRC
uncovered the meaning of grievances as an expressed litany of wrongs, hurts, and harms that
can be expressed as hinanakit in Tagalog and kaligutgot in Cebuano-Visaya; for the Maguindanao,
it is akin to lat a ginawa or a broken self, which is a consequence of the feeling of resentment or
pain towards others because of (harmful) actions they have done; while for the Maranao, it means
sesekaten a kabnar or claiming rights. In the case of indigenous peoples, the term is understood
as ketete fedew or bad feeling (Teduray), maktan kabilahi-an ni angan-angan or legitimate
aspiration that was negated through the commission of unjust acts against them (Sama), peddi
atey/sukkal pangateyan or something hurtful done against ones heart (Yakan), and karukkaan sin
pangatayan or intense harm caused on ones heart (Tausug).20
Throughout the Listening Process sessions, respondents associated legitimate grievances
with issues arising from social exclusion, marginalization, and even v iolence as a
consequence of State policies, weak governance, non-recognition of distinctive identities
and histories, and religious intolerance.21
In relation to the Bangsamoro struggle, the term legitimate grievances surfaces as an issue tied to
government neglect and inaction in the face of Moro protests and grievances, which in
turn is perceived to be one of the foundational causes of the Moro problem.22 In this regard,
the TJRC Study Group on Legitimate Grievances notes that the term gained conceptual currency
in the Bangsamoro peace process following the response of the government of the United
States (US) to a letter by Chairman Salamat Hashim, the late founder of the MILF, addressed
to President George W. Bush, which conceded that the Muslims in Southern Philippines
have serious, legitimate grievances. 23 T h i s a c k n o w l e d g m e n t c o m i n g f r o m t h e
U S G o v e r n m e n t p a v e d t he way to frame the redress of the legitimate grievances of
the Bangsamoro people as an integral part of the overall framework for peace, namely in the
recognition of the right to self-determination.
In light of the discussions held during the Listening Process, the TJRC has come to the conclusion
that grievances may be considered to be legitimate when they are shared by a large number of the
population affected by the conflict. In this case, a joint legacy of painful experience unites them in a
common narrative vis--vis a State that is viewed as not having addressed their grievances or indeed as
having ignored them.24
2.1.2 Link with the Struggle for Self-Determination
Throughout the Consultation Process, the lack of recognition by the State of the
Bangsamoro as a people with their own distinct social and cultural heritage and,
politically and historically, as an independent nation-state was cited as a legitimate grievance. At
various stages in modern history, the lack of recognition of a separate Moro identity has led to
attempts at assimilation of the Moros, including the cooption of their traditional political leaders.
Nevertheless, the perception of Moro otherness persists, both as internalized self-awareness on
the part of the Moros themselves and as an imposed identity marker by the State and the majority
population. Together with the experience of discrimination, marginalization, and injustice, the
lack of recognition of their autonomous existence as a people and a nation has fueled the struggle
17
18
for Moro self-determination.25

In this regard, the TJRC observes that the logic of protracted armed conflict in the Bangsamoro
is based on an inherent contradiction in self-understanding. On the one hand, the Bangsamoro
regard the armed rebellion as a struggle to restore their stolen sovereignty, to uphold their dignity
as a people, and to respond to what is perceived as the States disregard and neglect of the needs
of marginalized communities. On the other hand, the violence orchestrated by the State is
understood as the legitimate use of force against those that threaten its existence and security.
This dichotomy is a reflection of the so-called clash of imagined nations, whereby the Moro fight for
the Moro homeland and nationhood, while the Philippine government defends territorial integrity
and national sovereignty.26
During the TJRC Consultation Process, it became increasingly apparent that the political struggle
of the MNLF and the MILF has come to represent the legitimate aspirations of the Bangsamoro in
response to their grievances. Their struggle builds its legitimacy on the separate and distinct history
of Moro proto-states over centuries, particularly the Sultanate of Sulu and the Sultanate of
Maguindanao. As the late MILF founder Hashim Salamat said in an interview:
The main reason behind the struggle of the Bangsamoro Muslims is the illegal usurpation of
their legitimate rights for freedom and self-determination. The Bangsamoro Muslims
are the native inhabitants of the islands of Mindanao, Basilan, Sulu, and Palawan. They
were independent hundreds of years before the creation of the Philippines by Spain and the
USA, her colonial masters.27
Listening Process in Maguindanao

In 2003, Orlando Cardinal Quevedo, Archbishop of Cotabato, acknowledged the link between
the Moro grievances and the Moro struggle for self-determination when he stated: It is on the
basis of the historical record that I come to the following conclusion: for the Bangsamoro, the gradual
loss of their sovereignty to the American government and later to the Philippine government was
a fundamental injustice, even though some of their leaders who served in government might have
acquiesced.28
2.1.3 Legitimate Grievances and Traumatic Experience
During the Listening Process when discussing legitimate grievances, it became evident to the TJRC
that many members of the communities visited had undergone experiences that were severely
traumatic in nature and, accordingly, have a very specific manner by which they call to mind
and narrate their memory of those events. In a number of cases, the participants actually acted
out scenes of violence that they had experienced in the past. It is crucial, therefore, in the view of
the TJRC, to be aware of the differences between assessing facts and understanding how people
perceive such experiences, when addressing the legacy of such a painful past. The distinction
made by transitional justice bodies in other contexts between truth based on fact-finding and
forensic evidence and truth related as the subjective narrative of victims has been useful to the TJRC in
assessing the veracity of individual and collective grievances based on traumatic experience.
2.1.3.1 Intolerance toward Religious and Cultural Practices
In the Listening Process, the most common stories shared were experiences involving the intolerance for
the beliefs and way of life of the Bangsamoro and indigenous peoples. Some told stories of
discrimination: while growing up they were teased for being a Muslim, pejoratively called
muklo by Christian neighbors, schoolmates, and the larger neighborhood.29 In some communities,
the use of a hijab was strongly discouraged, if not banned outright. Indigenous peoples would commonly
hear insulting remarks, describing them as dirty and nitibo or nativenot in celebration of their
rootedness to the land, but as a derogatory term meaning uncivilized. 30 The Tboli spoke of public
school policies, prohibiting their children from speaking their native tongue while at school.31
On the surface, these taunts appear to be nothing more than what they are, namely vicious everyday
expressions of ridicule toward Muslim and indigenous peoples. In fact, they are expressions of a prejudice
that is deeply embedded in the psyche of Philippine society at large and, particularly, among many
civil servants.
Another very disturbing example mentioned was the occupation and desecration of mosques by
government soldiers, as documented, for example, in photojournalistic reports on the government
assault against the MILF Camp Abubakar al-Siddique in Matanog town, Maguindanao in July 2000.32
Intolerance toward cultural practices, however, is not limited to actions against the Moros by
government or the majority population. Some indigenous participants in the Listening Process
shared their experiences of older, traditional religious practices being heavily criticized, if not
discouraged, for being un-Islamic. Intolerance in the Bangsamoro was thus found to have both
vertical and horizontal dimensions. Not only does the majority population take a prejudicial attitude
towards minority cultures, but some segments in the minority culture also discriminate against other
representatives of minority culture, in this case against certain religious practices of the indigenous
peoples.33 A Key Policy Interview respondent referred to this as double marginalization. 34
19
20

2.1.3.2 Misrepresentation and Commercialization of Cultural Practices
During the TJRC consultation in Tboli, South Cotabato, some participants lamented that they feel
a double violation in the fact that, on one hand, they are discriminated against, and, on the other,
their material culture is being commercialized and exploited in cultural exhibitions. Traditional
dances and clothing are presented for the purpose of entertainment without the necessary recognition
of their being grounded on Tboli belief systems. There is indeed a deep contradiction between the
commercialization of their culture and their daily lives. Instead of as a form of acknowledgment,
public presentations of their culture as folklore are perceived as acts of blatant disrespect and
disregard of the sanctity of their culture. This is true in particular for the Tboli, for whom
cultural practice is a marker of identity or sacredness and indeed is an integral part of their way of
living and being in the world.35
The commercialization of traditional culture or its misuse as a consumable item without their
consent or full participation was cited by the Tboli in the Listening Process as a grave assault
against their dignity and identity.
2.1.3.3 Narratives of Mistrust and their Historical Roots
The TJRC Study Group on Legitimate Grievances concluded that the conditions that created
mistrust among people are deeply rooted in the history of the region. They observed that the
historical roots can be traced back to the period when traditional leadership structures of the Moro
and indigenous communities were dismantled as a consequence of the strategy of integration into
a single monolithic Filipino community.36 The Listening Process confirmed this perception. What
remained of traditional authority was considerably marginalized and became increasingly
irrelevant. Eventually, even the structures themselves were forgotten. They were replaced
by the popular narrative that described the Moro areas as wild, dangerous, and ungovernable
except by force.37 This would become, in turn, the justification used by the central government to mobilize
military resources to handle tension in the region.
The TJRC Consultation Process identified the imposition of an exclusive, single nation model on
politically and culturally diverse communities, nations, and ethnicities as one of the most powerful drivers
of resentment and ultimately of the armed response. Over the past 40 years, the conflict in the
Bangsamoro has had devastating consequences on community life, creating a deep-seated mistrust
on horizontal level, pitting Christians against Muslims, Christians against fellow Christians,
Muslims against Muslims, indigenous peoples against Christians and Muslims, and Muslims
against Christians and indigenous peoples.38
2.1.3.4 Legitimate Grievances and Gender
The TJRC Consultation Process revealed that the experience of legitimate grievances in the
Bangsamoro has a pronounced gender dimension. Men and women have been traumatically
affected by the conflict in their everyday lives during decades.
Often enough the traumatic experience is associated with traditional gender roles. Men bear the
burden of their role as the main provider for the family and suffer when they fail under the stress of
poverty. In addition, they are challenged in their male identity by the predominant masculinity model,
which imposes the figure of the hero or warrior

as a role model. Furthermore, women and
We have to lie about our religion to be hired.
men suffer from culturally specific forms
of discrimination. Moro women are recognized
TJRC Listening Process participant,
as Muslim because of their visible identity markers
Zamboanga City, 28 May 2015.
(e.g., wearing of hijab and niqab), while young
Moro men are often stereotyped as potential
terrorists. As a result, they encounter difficulties
in finding jobs, accessing higher education, and other opportunities. As the TJRC Listening Process
disclosed, some Moro women, who stopped wearing a hijab because of discrimination, are afraid of
gradually losing their identity.39
The gender dimension becomes even more pronounced in periods of open armed conflict. Women
are left alone with the responsibility for their family and household when their husbands leave
to look for work elsewhere or join the armed rebellion. When fighting breaks out, they are often
forced to take shelter in IDP camps alone with their children. Women and children are vulnerable to
sexual abuse while living in the open space of the shelters and numerous cases of human trafficking have
been reported.40 In all of these situations, women carry the multiple burden of being left behind
to care for their children and earn a living for their families. According to a woman participant in the
Listening Process:
We live in poverty. When [our] husbands joined the revolution, the women were
left to tend our farms. Some of us were widowed because their husbands were
martyred. Only the wives were left to take care of the family. We could not ask
support from the government, because they [would] know that our husbands were
MILF members. The government will not help us.41
The Consultation Process confirmed the well-documented connection between armed conflict
and poverty in the Bangsamoro and shed additional light on the gender dimension. With respect to
the level of poverty experienced, a male participant in the Listening Process spoke about a scene that
he saw and can never forget: Moro women and children during harvest time picking up pieces
of palay that fell to the ground, so that they would have rice to pound and feed their families.42
21
22
As a consequence of the recurrence of the armed

conflict, we were not able to finish our studies
pushing us to work as OFWs.
For Moro women, poverty is associated

with a lack of both livelihood and education,
a circumstance that is aggravated by armed
conflict. In the case of young indigenous
TJRC Listening Process participant,
women, their parents inability to send them to
school has forced many of them to seek work in
cities as domestic helpers.43 On the other hand,
young Moro girls are often married off at an early age to escape poverty; others have been pushed
into trafficking by their own families.44 Additionally, women are also denied education because their
parents fear that if they go to a formal school, they would end up either marrying a Christian or
converting to Christianity.45
Some Moro women also joined the armed struggle and fought for their rights because of their perception
of experiencing legitimate grievances.46 According to a Listening Process participant:
For us women who joined the struggle, we should have been given livelihood projects,
educational opportunities, support [for a] source of income and support [for] a way we can
live straightforwardly.47
A group of college students at Cotabato City.
( Leonard Reyes)

The question of whether the participation of women as combatants has had an effect on gender
relations and roles in their communities (e.g., challenging gender stereotypes) was not an issue
that the Consultation Process addressed, but could be of value for further study.
2.1.4 Summary and Conclusions
The term legitimate grievances, as elaborated above, covers a wide range of disparate issues
which have fed and continue to feed the discontent and dissatisfaction of the Bangsamoro
people. Accordingly, the legitimate grievances of the Bangsamoro people may be understood as a
collective designation for harms suffered whether they be political, economic, social, or cultural
in nature.48 These grievances have historical roots and are deep-seated. As such, they require the
attention of a multifaceted, strategic approach that will meet the needs of a population living in a
war-torn society. The Aquino administration has made efforts in this direction, providing what the
President has called legitimate responses to legitimate grievances.49 In a speech delivered by President
Benigno Aquino III, he declared:
This is the truth: our brothers and sisters in Bangsamoro are not asking for something
unreasonable; what they wanta decent and peaceful lifeis what every Filipino desires.
We also need to admit that we have had our own shortcomings. It is not written in our
religion or laws that we should perpetuate the ills of the past. Today, we are given a new
opportunity to right the wrongs, and I ask: Will we walk away now?50
Recognizing and responding to legitimate grievances is key to rebuilding trust between the State and
its citizens, between the Bangsamoro people and Philippine society at large, and specifically between
the different communities affected by conflict in the Bangsamoro. There are, in fact, some recent
initiatives that may serve as a precedence. A few months after the signing of the FAB, the Aquino
administration inaugurated the Sajahatra Bangsamoro as a concrete effort to address the socio-economic
situation of the Bangsamoro, in order to uplift the health, education, and livelihood conditions of MILF
communities.51 Prior to this, the Bangsamoro Development Agency (BDA) was created in 2002 as part
of the implementation of the Humanitarian, Rehabilitation and Development Aspects of the GPH MILF Tripoli Agreement signed in 2001 to facilitate development of Mindanao conflict-affected
communities. The establishment of institutions and mechanisms within the ambit of the peace
process is important; even more, people need to feel their impact and results.
2.2 Historical Injustice
We need to unburden ourselves. What happened to us years back cannot

be forgotten, but we can at least hear similar stories from others, which
can help us.
Listening Process participant. Basilan, 9 June 2015
23
24

2.2.1 Defining Historical Injustice
The legitimate grievances of the Bangsamoro, as discussed above, can only be fully understood
in light of the historical injustices that the Bangsamoro have suffered. The TJRC Historical
Injustice Study Group suggests that historical injustices are wrongdoings (may pagkakamali in
Tagalog; damipaginontolan ko miyanga iipos a masa in Meranao; kasaan ta masa in Sinama; kedusa
or kedufang in Teduray) committed or sanctioned by governments (Spanish, American, and Japanese
colonial governments and the Philippine Government) that hurt or harmed people (may nasaktan/
naagrabyado), affected relationships (nawalan ng pakiramdaman/malasakit) repeatedly over time
and were not (properly) addressed.52 Such pain or hurt is no ordinary feeling, as it cuts deep
into a peoples identity.53 In this regard, the TJRC Historical Injustice Study Group and the TJRC
Listening Process posit that, in relation to the Moro identity, historical injustices are manifested in
the following manner:54

As experienced: The Bangsamoro experienced life as a proud and distinct people being
unconquered, but colonized at the turn of the 20th century and suffering
dispossession from their lands (paglapastangan at pag-isantabi ng
karapatan ng sinaunang mamamayan sa lugar or abuse and disregard of the
rights of original inhabitants in places) which impacted on their survival and wellbeing needs;
As perceived: Referring to the phenomenon of otheringbeing erased and

excluded from public spaces and being associated by negative labels (pagwalang
galang ng dignidad bilang isang natatanging grupo bilang Sama Dilaut or
disrespect for the dignity of the distinct group of Sama Dilaut) that affected
the Moros sense of self and culture, behavior, and relationship with others;
As imagined: Pertaining to the Moros exclusion from the national narrative

(pagbura ng mahalagang istorya ng mga ninuno or erasure of important stories of
our ancestors) that influenced the Bangsamoros collective imagination and
narratives of the ideal and the future.
2.2.2 Patterns in Historical Injustice

The Historical Injustice Study Group identified several collective entities and groups that were
perceived to have perpetrated and continue to perpetuate historical injustices: (a) State institutions;55
(b) culture-bearing organizations like educational institutions as well as historians and media;56 (c)
Christian settlers; and (d) armed groups such as the Ilag/Ilag-ilag and Barracudas. Each of
these entities may have acted in support of or as directed by an official/State policy or out of their own
volition. They each bear the responsibility for historical injustice, but on different levels and in different
respects.
Pre-colonial southern Philippines was home to
many ethnolinguistic tribes, 13 of which were
Islamized and 32 others, which are known
collectively as IPs or the indigenous peoples
of Mindanao. These diverse groups produced
thriving economies and polities. The sultanate of
I think the war was purposely done to grab our

lands.
Listening Process participant, Tamapkan,
Tawi-Tawi, 21 May 2015
Focus Group Discussion with Historians,

April 2015
Sulu functioned as a sovereign state that maintained trading and diplomatic relations with countries
such as China and other foreign entities. At the time of the arrival of Spanish colonizers, Muslims
were in the process of expanding their territory and influence to Luzon.
In the course of colonial and postcolonial history, the political boundaries in Mindanao
were reconfigured by such instruments as the Treaty of Paris of 1898 and acts of Congress,
which resulted in the curtailment of the power of established Moro and indigenous political leaders and,
accordingly, of their influence and importance. Orchestrated and gradual demographic shifts defined
and solidified religious and ethnic divides among the people. The distinctiveness and diversity of the
Bangsamoro and indigenous peoples of Mindanao were not recognized and celebrated nor
were they harnessed and managed constructively. Instead, over the decades, State policies have
excluded distinctiveness and diversity.
The policy of assimilation has been a root cause of land dispossession (through resettlement,
corporatization, militarization), of suppression of the Moros and indigenous peoples
ability to govern, and of the negation of their right to self-determination. The message conveyed
to the TJRC through its Consultation Process has been that, throughout history in Mindanao, the
Philippine State has endorsed warfare to protect territorial integrity over peoples security. It has
deployed State mechanisms to diminish self-governance, instead of promoting it; it used State
security forces to harm, rather than to protect the population; it constructed a polity based on exclusion,
rather than inclusion.
Several government administrations have undertaken measures to address these symptoms of malgovernance.
Some initiatives showed promise of success, but none of them ever succeeded in addressing the root
causes.
Historical injustices are not simply dramatic events that occurred in the past; they continue to exert
influence upon Bangsamoro society in the present. The systematic nature of the harm done and the
means necessary to realize such harm over decades and even centuries suggest that historical injustice
is structural and is embedded in political policies and state institutions. Indeed, it shapes the social
25
26

structures and the cultural mindset of the country. Many of these injustices persist to this day,
although their manifestations have taken other forms in the course of history.
Some of the concrete manifestations associated with historical injustice shared during the TJRC
Listening Process sessions may be listed as follows:
Non-recognition, exclusion, and sidelining in the Philippine national historical
narrative of the real or actual historical accounts of local Bangsamoro and
indigenous heroes or personalities, who fought valiantly against foreign invaders
and colonizers;
Negative description of the exploits themselves, confirming the stereotypical images
of the Moro and indigenous peoples as wild savages who are both undesirable
and untrustworthy;
Failure to preserve historical sites associated with local heroes or local history or
even the destruction thereof, as well as the deliberate exclusion of the memory of
Moro leaders in localities currently dominated by Christian majorities, resulting in
the erasure of a group of people in local history;
Naming and renaming of places (and the associated celebrations thereof) in different
parts of the ARMM and its contiguous areas in honor of colonial masters, foreign
invaders, and settler families who have unjustly wrested control of the lands of the
indigenous and Bangsamoro peoples;
Repeated and prolonged experiences of enforced displacement;
State-sponsored land-grabbing, rapacious and illegal exploitation of natural
resources by foreigners or by the State, destruction of natural resources;
The long-term, negative effects of atrocities committed during the Martial Law era
on the well-being of the Bangsamoro peoplemany of whom are now displaced
from their places of origin, marginalized and impoverished, hindered by low
educational levels that perpetuate their poverty, deeply traumatized and
psychologically disturbed;
Forced integration into the Philippine political system, replacing traditional justice
and governance structures with the present system that is highly vulnerable to
corruption;
Non-recognition of the madrasah system;
Decisions regarding territorial matters, such as foregoing territorial claims on Sabah on
behalf on the Sultanate of Sulu, that, as a result, affect certain sectors of the population
like the Sama Dilaut, who are now considered as illegal aliens in Sabah.

The indigenous peoples claim to be in a worse
position concerning the injustices they suffered
Occupying the land of the people, looking down
compared to the Moros. They point out
at the culture and the identity of the people is not
that they are regarded as an insignificant
a democracy.
other and are treated accordingly by the
majority populations in Mindanao. For the
Listening Process participant, Bongao,
Moro, they are kapir or non-believers.
Tawi-Tawi, 20 March 2015
As such, historically and even until recent
times, they have been subject to slavery and
forms of indentured servitude. During the
Listening Process sessions conducted among indigenous peoples, participants shared their
belief that their marginalization and vulnerability as a community were consequences of
colonial and postcolonial rule on their lives: Even their inclusion in the Sultanates has
highlighted their subordinate position vis--vis the Bangsamoro. 58
For both the Moro and indigenous peoples, State policiesparticularly those related to landwere
central to their experiences of historical injustice, as these laws led to the disenfranchisement
of the Bangsamoro and indigenous populations of their ancestral lands and their bases of social
formation. 59 As confirmed by a Key Policy Inter view respondent, such policies of
disenfranchisement did indeed emanate from the State.60 Additionally, abuses committed by State
agents (i.e., police and military) allegedly in support of these policies, inflicted deep harm on the
Moro and the indigenous people and deepened divisions between them.
2.2.3. Misrepresentation and Profiling: Undermining Muslim and Indigenous Peoples Narratives of
History
A particular strand in the articulation of
historical injustice during the Listening
Process was a range of stories pertaining to the
pinawalang saysay ang kasaysayan
denial and misrepresentation of the lives, fates,
(devaluation of the essence of history)
and martyrdom of Moro leaders and warriors
who resisted firstly Spanish rule and later
TJRC Study Group on Historical Injustice
American rule beyond the years when the
Draft Report, p. 10.
Filipino anticolonial wars officially ended in
1902.61 What frustrates those who spoke in the
TJRC consultations is that the Moro political
resistance, rebellion, martyrdom, and continuing struggles are either denied or represented
as irrational acts of banditry and criminality in the mediain the past, for example, during
the resettlement campaigns of the 1950s and during the years of the current armed conflict. This
persistent denial and revisionist interpretation of history contradicts the foundational Moro narrative,
which links their current armed struggle for justice and freedom with their historical anticoloniala
struggle that, in their view, not only paralleled, but also in some instances even surpassed historic
acts of anticolonial resistance in other parts of the Philippines.62
27
28
Numerous testimonies bitterly recalled how the

stories of fearless acts of resistance by Moro datu
and warriors were left out of history books and
consigned into oblivion.63 Even worse, instead of
depicting Moro martyrs and fighters as heroes,
they are portrayed as villains in the few books
that feature them and circulate as part of the
national curriculum for public schools.64
pagbura ng mahalagang istorya ng mga

ninuno (erasure of important stories
of our ancestors)
TJRC Study Group on Historical Injustice Draft
Report, p. 10.
The media narratives about the Moro and indigenous peoples further reinforce negative perceptions,
for example, when they highlight the religious identity of criminal suspects as Muslims.65 In the
few occasions when heroic Moro constituents are featured in print and electronic media
accounts, their portrayal still comes across as that of villainous characters out to tear
apart the delicate fabric of social relations in Mindanao. The entertainment media are also
responsible for portrayals of the Bangsamoro as villainous characters in cinema and radio.
2.2.4 Silencing of Womens Agency and Victimization
The different manifestations of historical injustice also have a profound gender dimension.
Listening Process participants cited numerous cases of gender discrimination in
the disregard for established customs, for example in dismantling the Panglima system
together with traditional forms of governance, such as the Moro Sultanates, the Timuay
system of the Tedurays, and the Sama system of leadership. Starting in 1946, the Americans mobilized
the Panglima, who had traditionally served as counselors of the Sultan, to serve as barangay heads.
In the process, men replaced the female Panglima, whose role in the community was then limited
to that of a traditional healer.66
Other narratives of historical injustice with gender undertones pertain to the economic
insecurity of women. Traditional patriarchal culture has assigned them roles in the domestic
realm. Their families do not see the need for them to pursue higher education since they will be
married off anyway. In conflict-affected communities, however, women are often forced to seek
means of livelihood elsewhere, requiring skills that are not limited to their familiar domestic roles.67
The situation of armed conflict, as many women respondents in the Listening Process stated,
increased their vulnerability. 68 Stories of Moro women being abducted, raped, sexually
abused, and killed by State security forces are numerous. During the Listening Process, participants
told stories of women who defaced themselves and otherwise spoiled their appearance, so that the
soldiers would not find them attractive; others tried to keep their children close to them as
a deterrent factor, thinking that the soldiers would not take an interest in them because they
were mothers. These strategies proved to be ineffective, as even the mothers were not spared;
soldiers took them away for sexual pleasure and later returned them to their respective husbands
and families.69 The victimized womens own families and communities now stigmatize them for
having brought shame upon them. The women themselves can only suffer in silence.
It is important to note as well that most of trafficked women from Mindanao come from conflictaffected communities.

Viewing the patterns of historical injustice as a whole, it becomes apparent that the Moro
narrative is excluded from the national discourse that serves as the justification for the existence
of the Philippine nation-state. The Philippine colonial experience, as revealed in the writings
and teaching about the pivotal episodes of history, politics, society and culture, is silent about it.
Participants in several Listening Process sessions pointed to the exclusion of the history of resistance
to colonial rule by the Bangsamoro in the official national narrative of nation making as an act of
historical injustice by itself.
The question of Bangsamoro history and culture is, in fact, addressed in the draft Bangsamoro
Basic Law (BBL).70 In Article IX, Section 20 of the draft BBL, a provision exists that would create
a Bangsamoro Commission for the Preservation of Cultural Heritage. The Commission is
granted the primary responsibility of writing the history of the Bangsamoro people. That same
body is also given the task of managing Bangsamoro historical and cultural sites. Moreover, in February
2015, Senator Juan Edgardo Angara filed Senate Bill 2474, the proposed Bangsamoro History,
Culture, and Identity Studies Act, as a measure that would introduce Bangsamoro history and
culture into the formal school curriculum in the Philippines. In addition, it would introduce the teaching of
the Arabic language as an elective course at the high school and university levels.
As the public debate in the aftermath of the Mamasapano incident has shown, prejudice and
mistrust toward the Bangsamoro is deeply ingrained in Philippine society. The bill submitted
by Senator Angara is intended to confront that legacy and is, as such, a positive development.
Yet, there are many practical issues that need to be addressed before such a program could be
implemented. There is not only the challenge of producing a pedagogically sound textbook
on the history of the Bangsamoro and indigenous peoples, but also the problem of training
a new generation of teachers to work with it. The standard of education in the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) is admittedly low, and the teaching of Bangsamoro history and
culture must be seen as part of the challenge in reforming the educational system as a whole in
accordance with the K-12 curriculum. Politically and culturally, the challenge is one of identity.
After decades of war, there are deep divisions among different population groups living within the
boundaries of the future Bangsamoro region. It remains to be seen whether the idea of a Bangsamoro
people can be framed in a way which transcends the ethnopolitical divisions that have frustrated past
attempts to unite the regions inhabitants around a shared vision of the common good.
29
30

2.3 Human Rights Violations

People [were] so stressed with house burnings and by the deaths and
disappearances of family members. I wanted to end [my] life as well
rather than live in the army evacuation camp
Listening Process participant, Sarangani, 23 March 2015
Human rights, as set forth in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR), are
basic rights and freedoms inherent to all without distinction of any kind, such as race,
color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property,
birth or other status as well as nondistinction of the political, jurisdictional or international
status of the country or territory to which a person belongs, whether it be independent, trust,
non-self-governing or under any other limitation of sovereignty.71 Human rights are inherent,
indivisible, and inalienable. Every human being has civil, political, economic, social, and cultural
rights that must be observed, guaranteed, and upheld at all times whether in times of peace and,
even more so, during periods of war and armed conflict.
In the course of the research of various TJRC Study Groups as well as during the Listening Process,
the violation of economic, social, and cultural rights of the Moro and indigenous peoples figured
prominently in the discussions on legitimate grievances, historical injustice, and marginalization
through land dispossession. Additionally, the Listening Process confirmed that mass atrocity
crimes had been committed in the past, and that these crimes should be acknowledged and
acted upon. Moreover, it uncovered narratives of violence, involving serious violations of
international law, that have not been made public until now.
The violations of political and civil as well as economic, social, and cultural human rights of the
Bangsamoro and the indigenous peoples are a significant part of their historical experience and
continue to be part of their current narratives. The cumulative effect of historical injustices and
continuing human rights violations should not be underestimated, as it has had a dramatic impact
on the life and consciousness of the Moro and the indigenous peoples.
2.3.1 Defining Human Rights Violations
The Study Group on Human Rights Violations focused on violations of International Human Rights
Law (IHRL), particularly civil and political rights, as well as on violations of International
Humanitarian Law (IHL) in the context of armed conflict in the Bangsamoro. In legal terms, the
context of armed conflict has a particular significance. According to international law, a distinction
is drawn between international and non-international armed conflict. In Mindanao and the
Sulu archipelago, armed conflict is non-international in character, in that it involves fighting between
governmental forces and nongovernmental armed groups or between such groups alone.

The commission of IHRL and IHL violations in the Bangsamoro must therefore be understood in light
of the complex dynamics of non-international armed conflict. In this case, the Philippine state
bears legal responsibility for vertically-sourced, top-down direct violence and may be held
accountable for violations perpetrated by its armed forces and by any affiliated non-state actors or
paramilitaries. Violations of this kind against the Bangsamoro and indigenous peoples can
be regarded as institutionalized violence generated by, in connection with, and in support of
state policies.73 On the other hand, vertically-sourced, bottom-up direct violence is that which
emanates from non-state armed groups like the MILF, which are involved in separatist and rebel
movements against the state. These groups can also be held accountable for IHRL and IHL
violations, stemming from their actions. 74
It is important to note that, in the conflict in Mindanao, there are other forms of violence that are
horizontal in nature, which means that they consist of acts of violence committed by members
of the same or different communities against one another, i.e. non-separatist, inter- or intra-ethnic,
clan or gang violence. In addition, more complex forms of violence emerge when vertical and
horizontal types of violence intersect, for example when actors involved in vertical conflicts (both
top-down and bottom-up) engage in a horizontal conflict or vice versa. In Mindanao, there are not
only numerous cases of clan violence that fit this description, but also cases of separatist violence.
2.3.2 Patterns of IHRL and IHL Violations
2.3.2.1 By State Actors: Disproportionate Use of Force75 and Commission of Mass Atrocity
Crimes
There are claims that the Philippine state employed disproportionate use of force and committed
mass atrocity crimes against the Moro civilian population both before and during the period of Martial
Law, purportedly in connection with the efforts of the military to quell armed resistance by the
rebels. One of the most infamous early incidents is the so-called Jabidah massacre that allegedly
took place on March 18, 1968 on Corregidor Island. This event, which involved the execution
by government forces of at least 23 young Muslim recruits, is generally acknowledged to have
sparked the beginning of the armed Moro resistance in Mindanao.76 A number of cases are well
documented by witness testimony during the period of Martial Law, for example the socalled burning of Jolo in Febr u ar y 1974, in w hich t he m i lit ar y com mand ordere d
a g rou nd of fe ns ive, accompanied by massive aerial and naval bombardments, against
MNLF forces deployed in the city. The result was the flight of thousands of refugees and the
destruction of two-thirds of the city. Another serious case concerns the so-called Malisbong
massacre that took place some few months later in September 1974 in a coastal village located
in Palimbang town, Sultan Kudarat province. It is alleged that the Philippine military and
paramilitary forces killed an estimated 1,500 Moro men and boys, who were held in a local
mosque, and raped an unknown number of women and girls on a naval vessel anchored offshore.77
In addition, some 300 houses were burned to the ground by government forces. On September 24,
2014, 40 years after the events, the Chairperson of the Commission on Human Rights officially
acknowledged the massacre in a visit to the site and proposed that the survivors file claims for
compensation with the HRVCB.78
During Listening Process sessions, stories were told of mass atrocities allegedly committed by
government forces against the Moro civilian population. Two events, known to local people as
31
32
Listening Process in Tawi-Tawi
the Tran incident and the Tong Umapuy massacre, but little known to the wider public, stand
out. The Tran Incident refers to a large-scale military campaign against the MNLF in central
Mindanao in June-August 1973. In the Listening Process session, participants spoke of the massacre
of Moro civilians from the Barangay Populacion in the town of Kalamansig, Sultan Kudarat province
by military forces during that campaign. The soldiers separated the men and women; the men were
confined in a military camp, interrogated, and tortured, while the women with their children were
taken aboard naval vessels and raped. In the end, the men as well as the women and children were
killed.79 At a Listening Process session in Tawi-Tawi, participants shared their memory of what
they called the Tong Umapuy massacre.80 In 1983, a Philippine Navy ship allegedly opened fire
on a passenger boat and killed 57 persons on board. The passengers were reportedly on their way
to an athletic event in Bongao.
2.3.2.2 Violations Committed by State-affiliated Armed Groups
In the case of violations committed by State-affiliated armed groups prior to Martial Law, the
TJRC is in possession of testimonies related to widespread atrocities allegedly perpetrated by
the Ilag against the Moro and indigenous civilian population with their specific signature
the mutilation and desecration of bodies, including acts of cannibalism.
The campaign of the Ilag in Mindanao in 1970-1971 involved indiscriminate killings and burning
of houses with the intention of terrorizing and expelling the Moro and indigenous population
from their homes and ancestral territories. Violent incidents took place chronologically in
a progressive fashion over a widespread area, occurring among ot her pl a ces i n Upi,
Magui nd ana o (March and September 1970); Polomok, South Cotabato (August 1970);
Alamada, Midsayap, and Datu Piang, Cotabato (December 1970); Bagumbayan and Alamada, Cotabato
(January 1971); Wao, Lanao del Sur (July and August 1971); Ampatuan, Cotabato (August
1971); Kisolan, Bukidnon (October 1971); Siay, Zamboanga del Sur81 (November 1971); Ipil,
Zamboanga del Sur (December 1971); and Palembang, South Cotabato (January 1972).82

The armed bands of Christian paramilitaries, primarily Ilonggo settlers, that comprised the Ilag,
maintained ties with state authorities, including local and national politicians, the Philippine
Constabulary, and the military. 83 In most cases, the paramilitaries acted on their own
initiative; on other occasions, however, it is believed that their attacks were conducted in close
coordination with government authorities. This was allegedly the circumstance in the case of
the mass killings of Moro villagers that took place in a mosque and outlying houses in a rural
barangay of Carmen, (North) Cotabato on June 19, 1971. 84 Known as the Manili massacre,
this event spurred the Moro armed resistance and was one of the few incidents that received
attention in international media.85
During the TJRC Listening Process sessions, allegations of other brutal killings perpetrated
against Moro civilians were shared. Participants in a Listening Process session in Basilan related that
massacres had taken place in Lamitan City and in Tuburan.86 Similarly, it was reported that eighteen
Moro women and men were massacred and their bodies mutilated in Bagumbayan, a municipality in
Sultan Kudarat.87 Incidents such as these have been largely unreported in the media and are
difficult to verify from other independent sources. Indeed, the pattern of Ilag violence
seems to point to a systematic effort to drive the Moro and indigenous away from their lands
and, in this way, to secure these areas for resettlement.
Throughout the TJRC Consultation Process, the presence of state-sponsored paramilitaries
and private armed groups was judged to be one of the most disturbing human rights legacies
of the 40 year-old conflict.
During the early period of Martial Law, paramilitary groups affiliated with the state were
established to meet the threat of the National Peoples Army (NPA) and the growing Moro
insurgency in Mindanao. In 1976, Marcos transformed the existing Barangay Self-Defense Unit
(BSDU) into the Integrated Civilian Home Defense Forces (ICHDF), which in turn were replaced
by the Civilian Home Defense Forces (CHDF) two years later in 1978. By the end of Martial Law,
the CHDF had become a 70,000-strong army with a record of human rights violations which was so
abhorrent that the 1987 Constitution banned private paramilitary forces, specifically mentioning the
CHDF.88 Shortly thereafter, however, the Civilian Armed Force Geographical Units (CAFGU)
were created as a means of placing all auxiliary forces under the command of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP). In addition, the Civilian Volunteer Forces (CVO) were created
and placed under the command of the Philippine National Police (PNP) to assist the CAFGU in
policing areas cleared of insurgents.89 Moreover, the volatile situation of the insurgency gave rise
to anti-Moro vigilante groups,90 including a reemergence of the Ilag.91
During this same period, numerous private armies emerged linked with local clans and politicians
for the promotion of their own political and business interests. The most dramatic example
of politically inspired paramilitary violence in recent years was the so-called Maguindanao/
Ampatuan massacre. In November 2009, a convoy of supporters and family members of
a political rival of the Ampatuan clan was forced off the highway near the town of Ampatuan
by some two hundred armed men and brought to an isolated spot, where they were killed and buried
in mass graves. The massacre drew public attention because of its sensational nature and its
scale, resulting in the murder of 58 people, including some thirty journalists.92 Yet, the use of
paramilitary violence by political families and wealthy landowners in the region to further their
personal ends is not unusual.
33
34

Corporate controlled real estate covers vast, sprawling tracts of land and yet is among the most
heavily secured property in Mindanao. In recent years, there has been a significant increase in the
number of armed groups that provide security services to private companies, which hold logging and
mining concessions, and to publicly owned utilities, e.g., geothermal power plants. In Maguindanao
alone, some twenty-five private armies are known to exist, while in the ARMM as a whole the
number is estimated at forty-five with an additional number of at least 105 paramilitary groups
in rest of Mindanao.93 The use of private corporate armies, known as Special CAFGU Armed
Auxiliary (SCAA) is well known.94 Like members of the AFP and PNP, they enjoy extensive impunity
for their actions.
Testimony provided during the Listening Process bears witness to the devastating effect that
paramilitary operations have had on the lives of the Moro and indigenous population and, indeed, on
all communities in Mindanao. Government-sponsored armed groups allegedly burned houses,
stole peoples farm animals and other sources of livelihood.95 The role of the CAFGU in spreading
terror among Moro communities was cited in particular.96 Private corporate armies, including
the SCAA, are also responsible for violence committed against the Moros and indigenous
peoples. 97 According to testimony received during the TJRC Listening Process, SCCA
employed by the David M. C onsunji, Inc. (DMCI), a logging and mining company in
based in Sultan Kudarat, allegedly killed forty-four Moros and indigenous civilians over a
period of four years from 1986 to 1990. Moreover, the Tunda Force was said to have committed
the Tingin-Tingin massacre in July 1992.98
2.3.2.3 Violations Committed by Non-State Armed Groups
Due to the limitations of time and resources, the TJRC Consultation Process could not focus on the
category of vertically-sourced, bottom-up direct violence committed by non-state armed groups.
However, this issue does exist as a human rights concern and it did arise in connection with the

TJRC Listening Process and other research conducted by the TJRC. In the following, brief mention
will be made of alleged IHRL and IHL violations committed by Moro-affiliated vigilante groups
and by Moro rebel forces, both by the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and by the
Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF) of the MILF. A broader, more thorough investigation
is warranted.
As the conflict escalated in the period before Martial Law, the Moro communities
established their own defense forces, and atrocities were committed on all sides.
During the Listening Process sessions, participants cited the role of Moro paramilitaries, known
as the Blackshirts and the Barracudas, who were responsible for violent acts committed against
Christian settlers. In Maigo, Lanao del Norte, the confrontation between the Ilag and the
Barracudas was apparently triggered by the assault and murder of a Christian woman, whose
reproductive organs and extremities were mutilated.99
There are two well-known cases which involve the violation of IHL norms by Moro rebels, in this
case by MNLF fighters, during the Martial Law period. In both cases, namely the so-called Patikul
massacre on October 10, 1977 and the Pata massacre on February 9, 1981, MNLF fighters fired
on unarmed AFP officers and soldiers. These massacres are well documented and were also
mentioned during the TJRC Listening Process.100
Concerning the role of the MILF, the following incidents deserve mention. During the AFP
Buliok offensive in 2003, MILF-BIAF counter-attacks, particularly in the towns of Maigo and
Kolambugan in Lanao del Norte and in the town of Siocon in Zambuonga del Norte, resulted
in significant casualties among the resident civilian population in the two regions. 101 The
MILF rebels allegedly used civilians as human shields and engaged in looting and
cattle rustling. Notably, MILF Chairman Hashim Salamat assumed responsibility for the
abuses and apologized. In August 2008, during the fighting that broke out after the Supreme Court
decision rejecting Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD), MILF-BIAF
forces operating in North Cotabato and Lanao del Norte were allegedly responsible for serious IHL
violations, including targeting the civilian population for attack, torturing civilians and using them
as hostages, as well as looting and burning houses, schools, and businesses.102 In May 2009,
MILF forces attacked the village of Basak in Lebak, Sultan Kudarat. This attack caused approximately
two hundred families to flee their homes; additionally, it is alleged that the MILF fighters looted stores,
set houses on fire, stole farm animals, and took some twenty civilians hostage. 103 Moreover, the
TJRC received (unverified) allegations concerning the murder of indigenous people in the
towns of Kabacan and Carmen, Cotabato by Moros/MILF fighters.104
More recently, in September 2013, in an attempt to seize strategic locations in the center of
Zamboanga City, the MNLF took up positions in coastal neighborhoods and allegedly took civilians
hostage and used them human shields.105 The so-called siege of Zamboanga led to the destruction
of the homes and livelihood of many thousands of residents, a large number of whom remain
displaced to this day.
2.3.2.4 Patterns of Violence against Women
Incidents relating to violence against women ranked second to massacres in terms of the frequency
of their being mentioned during the TJRC Listening Process.106 In most Listening Process accounts,
35
36
Study Groups-Listening Process Convergence

Workshop in Davao, August 2015
there is a gendered pattern of direct violence. On the one hand, the men and boys are killed;
women and girls, on the other hand, are raped before being killed. This pattern reflects the
gender roles of men and womenmen are killed because they pose a threat of being able to fight
back and defend their communities, whereas women, being regarded as the bearer/nurturer of
family and community honor, are raped in order to dehumanize the collective to which they
belong.107 As the TJRC Listening Process report observed:
During Martial Law, womens bodies became the last frontier in subduing a small
but formidable group of Bangsamoro mujahideen (freedom fighters). Women
were made targets of soldiers and paramilitary groups impunitythrough
rape and other forms of sexual abuseas a way of weakening the resolve of
the Moro mujahideen.108
Sexual and other acts of violence against women have a specific gender and cultural connotation.
During the height of Ilag atrocities, womens bodies were mutilated by cutting off their nipples and
breasts,109 ripping babies out of pregnant womens wombs,110 and disfiguring their reproductive organs.111
Each of these acts in itself represents a symbolic form of denigrating womanhood.
The widespread commission of rape and other acts of violence by government armed forces and
auxiliaries against Moro and indigenous women was a wanton display of power meant to
demoralize enemy men for their failure to protect their women. In this context, rape, in
particular, was more than an act of sexual violenceit signified power over the other as Moro.
Women were victimized, not just because they were women, but because they were Moro women. A

stark, but not unique illustration of this principle
is provided by the Malisbong massacre,
mentioned above. An unknown number of
women and girls aged 7 to 60 years oldwere
taken as hostages on board naval vessels, where
they were raped and then killed, after which
their bodies thrown overboard into the sea.112
Those who survived the ordeal and were able to
return to their communities never managed to
live a normal life again. They were haunted by
the brutality of their experience and the shame
that they carried.113
We women were not respected. There were

instances when women were taken from their
homes and raped. There was an incident when
a wife was taken by a soldier, was impregnated
and returned to her family when she gave birth.
Listening Process participant,
In the same vein, sexual violence against women and girls in many instances was meant to destroy
the moral fabric of the Moro society where women are seen as bearers of honor and culture. For
example, during the TJRC Listening Process, there were accounts of women being raped by Ilag
and soldiers in front of their families114 or of women forced to have sex with their husbands in front
of and for the amusement of soldiers.115 Many Moro women and young girls who were abducted
and raped were never seen again; others were allowed to return home.116 According to the TJRC
Listening Process report, incidents of sexual violence took place during the period of Martial Law
that amount to military sexual slavery:
between 1972 and 1974, Ilag and soldiers alike made Bangsamoro women
in Labangan and Ipil, Sibugay become sex slaves of navy men, whose boat was
docked at Labangan and Ipil ports. For more than a week, soldiers rounded up
a group of at least ten women from Labangan and forced them to the naval
boats to serve the sexual needs of the navy men. The following day, they
were released; only to be replaced with another group of women, and so
on.... More than 200 women were [believed to be] enslaved in this way.117
Those who were allowed to return to their families and communities were shunned and stigmatized.
What is worse, in some cases, to save their honor they were forcefully married to their
perpetrators. 118 Some of the women, who had been abducted and sexually abused, became
pregnant and were forced to marry their captors, only to be abandoned later.119 In other instances,
in order for families and communities to protect their young Moro and indigenous women and
girls, many of them were just simply married off (early/forced marriages), often to older men.120
Among the Bangsamoro and indigenous peoples, as in other societies, rape and other forms of
sexual violence are treated as a taboo subjectan unspeakable crime. Victims rarely speak out and
instead suffer in silence, usually, on their own, for years on end. In the meantime, gender-based
sexual abuse is assuming new forms. During a TJRC Listening Process session, allegations
were made that some women were being trafficked after having been abused by the military
in connivance with men working at the local mayors office. 121 According to a Key Policy
Interview respondent, as a human rights violation, we can raise the issue of rapewe should raise
it. However, in Moro culture, rape is shameful and agitating for the [victims], especially when it
comes out.122
37
38
Listening Process in Sultan Kudarat
The testimonies and research in connection with the TJRC Consultation Process suggest that
violence against women was used systematically against the Moro and indigenous population
both before and during the Martial Law period. Incidences of gender-based and sexual
violence associated with armed conflict have also been recorded in the post-Martial Law
period. In the view of the TJRC, a formal investigation of this matter is warranted to ensure
accountability for past abuse and to prevent the recurrence of such violations in the future.123
2.3.2.5 Continuing Patterns of Direct Violence by the State
From the 1990s onwards, developments in the nature of the armed conflict affected the pattern
of human rights violations in the Bangsamoro region. The most significant development in
this regard was the US-led war against terror that became the dominant narrative internationally.
Simultaneous with the emergence of Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)-led terrorism, this new narrative
led to a paradigm shift in the way in which the Philippine government viewed and addressed
the rebellion in Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago.124 The global fight against terrorism linked
the ASG with foreign jihadis, thereby adding an international dimension to the direct vertical
violence in Mindanao, which in turn expanded beyond the region to include terrorist
attacks in Manila as well. 125
Within this evolving national security framework, the Philippine government implemented new
policies in Mindanao, such as President Joseph Estradas all-out-war against the MILF in 2000
and President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyos declaration of a state of lawlessness in Basilan
in 2001,126 a state of emergency in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato in 2009,127 and
the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao the same year.128
As the shift in paradigm developed, the pattern of human rights abuse shifted as well. Listening
Process participants narrated that, in this new context of the war against terrorism, the
human rights violations allegedly committed consisted of abductions, arson, summary
executions, killing, torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, Moro profiling, artillery shelling and
bombardment of communities, as well as massive enforced internal displacements of civilian Moro
populations.129 In Listening Process sessions in Zamboanga City, people told stories about a range of
IHRL and IHL violations allegedly committed by State forces between 2012 and 2014, including
bombardment of Moro communities and raids on Moro properties, arbitrary arrests of Muslims
and killings inside mosques,130 as well as illegal detention and targeted killing of suspected members of
ASG, including cases of mistaken identity.131
2.3.2.6 Direct Violence in the Context of Horizontal and Intersectional Vertical-Horizontal
Conflicts
Decades of direct violence have had a dramatic impact on the life of the Moro and indigenous
populations in their communities. The spread of horizontal violence is one of the most
serious consequences of that violence. In a land systematically divided along ethnic and
religious lines, where traditional forms of conflict resolution are disappearing, pocket wars
tend to erupt between different communities. Moreover, violent conflict also occurs within
communities. In many cases, the families or communities affected call upon armed groups
for help and when violence erupts, State forces may intercede, transforming what began as a horizontal
(people-to-people) conflict into a vertical (State-to-people) one.132 According to the preliminary
report of the TJRC Study on Land Dispossession, [m]any clan feuds become intertwined with
vertical conflict when warring parties are linked either to the government or to major insurgent
groups.133
Clan warfare or rido is a complex phenomenon
When the victims comprised Christians, the authat is occasioned by a feud between Moro
tomatic suspects were the Muslims. Subsequently,
families. In the context of decades of armed
when the victims were Muslims, the Christians
conflict in Mindanao, it reflects the interplay
were automatically blamed. We were uncertain
of various factors associated with prevailing
as to who were behind these attacks and counterpower structures and alliances. For example,
attacks. What is certain is that it really created a
clans that are affiliated with the authority of
gap between Muslims and Christians.
the State can call upon paramilitaries working
within the ambit of State mechanisms to defend
their interests. Those clans, however, which
Lanao del Norte, 21 May 2015
do not have affiliation or access to such
resources, normally seek the support from
non-state armed groups. On the surface, rido
may seem to be a horizontal conflict. Yet, in the context of armed conflict in Mindanao, purely
horizontal violence is rare. The multi-textured layers (vertical and horizontal) of the conflict reproduce
a combination between horizontal and vertical violence.
It is not surprising, therefore, that rido is capable of provoking internal displacement on a large
scale in the region and is regarded as the greater source of violence and insecurity especially
by Moro communities in the conflict areas of Mindanao. Rido events, however, are not driven
39
40

by the propensity of local communities to resort to violence. On the contrary, the phenomenon
of clan violence can be understood as the result of the failure of the rule of law to address longstandingsometimes even intergenerationalproblems deriving from conflicting land
and resource claims. Incidents of rido are also triggered by electoral-related tensions, by
the breakdown of government-administered as well as traditional and religious justice systems,
and by the lack of or the collapse of trust in the security sector in the eyes of the people.134
2.3.2.7. Internal Displacement
Both IHRL and IHL contain provisions that address the prevention of internal displacement,
the protection of internally displaced persons (IDPs), as well as their right to return
voluntarily to their place of origin. As citizens of the country in which they are displaced,
IDPs are legally under the protection of the State and their rights are guaranteed under IHRL
and IHL.135
Internal displacement in the Philippines is pervasive in regions characterized by
militarization and armed conflict. 136 As such, the contested areas in Mindanao and
the Sulu archipelago have been the focus of decades of internal displacement. When fighting
erupted in Upi and in Cotabato in 1970-71, the conflict led to widespread displacement.
Many of the displaced persons at that time died of starvation and disease while living in
makeshift shelters in isolated areas. 137 The number of the internally displaced increased
dramatically, as the conflict spread and intensified after the Ilag, supported by the
Philippine Constabulary, launched its campaign of terror against the Moro and indigenous
civilian population and again when the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) clashed with
the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). By 1977, four years after the imposition of Martial
Law, the government estimated that there were as many as one million IDPs in Mindanao and
at least 200,000 refugees who had fled to Sabah.138 As the conflict subsided in the years following the
ceasefire brokered by the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (Tripoli Agreement) in 1976,
the total number of IDPs decreased, but displacement continued in the wake of ceasefire
violations and clan violence. A dramatic increase in the number of IDPs took place
after the peace agreement with the MNLF in 1996 when clashes between government forces
and the MILF escalated over a three-year period, culminating in the declaration of all-out
war by the government in March 2000. 139 Subsequent fighting between the military and
rebel forces in February 2003,140 in August 2008,141 in September 2013,142 and most recently
in February 2015143 were marked by mass displacement of the affected civilian populations.
In total, it is estimated that as many as 3.5 million people have been displaced by armed
conflict in the last fifteen years.144
The sheer number of persons displaced as well as the frequency and length of displacement
are indicative of the vulnerability of the population residing in the areas affected by armed conflict in
Mindanao. Research has shown that some 41 percent of the Moro adult population in
contested areas of Mindanao, especially in Maguindanao and Lanao del Norte, has
experienced forced displacement at some time during the last decade. Of these, nearly 30
percent of the affected communities report having been displaced multiple times and for an
average length of six months to a year or more.145
The living conditions in situations of protracted or cyclical displacement are of particular
concern. Displaced persons in Mindanao are provided with emergency relief in the form
Refugees clamp up in an old school complex at

Maguindanao ( Leonard Reyes)
of food and health care and are housed in evacuation centers, which are often located in school
buildings, in bunkhouses, or in temporary outdoor encampments. Overcrowding in the centers is
common and the hygienic conditions are often substandard with adverse effects on the health
and wellbeing of those who reside in the centers for extended periods of time. Children and
the elderly are especially prone to illness and disease under such conditions. Prolonged displacement
can also have grave effects on the mental health of IDPs. Faced with the loss of their homes and
personal possessions as well as their means of livelihood, depression is a common reaction
among the displaced. Moreover, women and children are vulnerable to sexual abuse while living
in the open space of the shelters and numerous cases of human trafficking have been reported.
In some cases, it is the family members themselves who provide young women to traffickers in the
expectation that their employment as domestic servants or as sex workers would compensate for
the loss of livelihood due to displacement.146
Decades of conflict-related displacement in the Bangsamoro has had a profoundly negative
impact on the welfare of the affected population and on the development of the region as a
whole. Numerous studies have posited a relationship between the armed conflict and poverty
in Mindanao. It is estimated that the conflict may have caused in an overall economic shortfall
of more than $10,000,000 due to the loss in agricultural activity and investments over a 27-year
period from 1975 to 2002.147 Not surprisingly, the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM) has consistently demonstrated the highest level of poverty incidence of all the regions
in the Philippines.148 Nearly half of the population vulnerable to displacement in the conflictaffected areas of the ARMM has no reliable source of food and significant levels of malnutrition
have been measured for displaced children under five years of age. Access to clean water and
sanitation facilities and to social services such as education and health care is generally very
41
42
limited and particularly so in remote areas. The most vulnerable 10 to 20 percent of households
are headed by single parents including widows.149
In fact, the relationship between displacement, poverty, and migration is mutually reinforcing:
Just as displacement has reduced large sectors of the rural population to subsistence level, the
resulting impoverishment has led to large-scale voluntary migration to urban areas. Poverty and
displacement are conditions that sustain the emergence and continuation of armed conflicts in
Mindanao.150
2.3.2.8. Recruitment of Children for Use as Soldiers
The TJRC Study Group on Human Rights Violations drew attention to the recruitment of
children and their use as combatants by the MILF.151 Although there are no current estimates
available for the number of child soldiers, it appears that children as young as 13 years old have
been recruited as conscripts in the past.152
Historically, the MILF has recruited its combatants from its social base in Moro communities
in Mindanao and in the Sulu archipelago. Many of its military base camps are, in fact, staffed by
militia who live in the surrounding agricultural communities. The distinction between combatant and
noncombatant status is often fluid. Moreover, according to Islamic tradition, youths older than
thirteen years old are permitted to protect their home, if it comes under attack. In this context,
the campaign against child soldiers faces particular challenges. The MILF has acknowledged the
recruitment of children in the past and is working with UNICEF to end the practice. As a
consequence, although MILF children continue to live in combat zones, it seems that they are
no longer being trained and serving as active fighters.153
In summary, it can be said that, in the context of armed conflict, mass atrocity crimes did take
place before and during the period of Martial Law. The main patterns of human rights violations
point to targeted and systematic direct violence against the Moros and indigenous civilian
population. Direct violence and deployment of terror campaigns against the Bangsamoro
were meant to cleanse lands of their original inhabitants and, in this way, to produce conditions
for the private and corporate acquisition of forcefully abandoned territory, while creating homogenous
settler communities in the affected regions. Most of the human rights violations committed
at that time have yet to be fully documented, formally investigated, and addressed.
This is true for IHRL and IHL violations since the era of Martial Law as well. As observed by
the Study Group on Human Rights Violations, human rights violations, including extrajudicial
killings, enforced disappearances, torture, arbitrary arrests, rape, mistaken identities, etc., continue
to unfold within the context of the war against terrorism to this day.154 Horizontally, clan
violence remains a source of serious human rights abuse, including internal displacement. As
of yet, however, with some notable exceptions, the State either has failed to investigate the pattern
and gravity of these violations or its efforts in this regard have been insufficient.155 As a result, the
State is remiss in its obligation to elicit the facts behind allegations of abuse, to ensure the
accountability of perpetrators, and to provide reparation for the victim and survivors.

The major exception to the above, is, of course, RA 10368 or An Act Providing for the Reparations and
Recognition of Victims of Human Rights Violations During the Marcos Regime with the mandate of
providing financial compensation to the victims of Martial Law and satisfaction through the creation
of a museum and library that will honor their memory. Yet, even this important effort faces
serious limitations.156 Normally, some form of truth seeking would precede the establishment of
a reparation program.157 The Human Rights Victims Claims Board (HRVCB), however, has been set
up without such preparation. As such, the two-year time frame initially foreseen for it to complete
its task has proven to be unrealistic.158 Another major concern pertains to the compensation of
those victims who do not fall under the Martial Law period. This is of great significance in relation
to the Bangsamoro struggle. Not only does the issue of victim compensation predate the Martial Law
period, but it remains an issue with respect to the ongoing conflict to the present date. Moreover,
the question of victim compensation in Mindanao is also associated with other reparation issues
such as restitution or compensation for loss of land and livelihood.
It is crucial, therefore, that any future transitional justice mechanism on the Bangsamoro act in
complementarity and in coordination with the HRVCB. In so far as the period of Martial Law is
concerned, it would be important to crosscheck existing data from other sources with data
gathered by the HRVCB, in order to establish the scope and nature of the violations that
occurred. 159
In conclusion, the TJRC is adamant that a formal investigation must be undertaken to gain a fuller
understanding of the extent and range of the human rights violations that have occurred
during the four decades of armed conflict in the Bangsamoro. Allegations of serious human rights
violations on the part of all parties to the conflict must be the focus of this investigation. In this
regard, attention shall be given to those events and their consequences mentioned in
this report that represent the findings of the TJRC Consultation Process and of the
Listening Process sessions, in particular. Moreover, those individuals and institutions which are
responsible for abuse in the past must be held accountable. This is essential in addressing the legacy
of impunity that has fueled the conflict for so many years and in providing the conditions for
reconciliation among the affected communities.
The TJRC takes note of the fact that the combination of ongoing human rights violations and the
specific violations occurring within the context of armed conflict has mutually reinforcing
consequences. In the view of the TJRC, a formal investigation of the combined effects
is warranted to ensure accountability, to provide redress, and to prevent recurrence of such
violations in the future.
43
44

2.4 Marginalization through Land Dispossession
Now that we have no lands, who are we?

Listening Process participant, Lanao del Sur, 26 May 2015
2.4.1 Defining Marginalization through Land Dispossession

The Study Group on Marginalization through Land Dispossession160 regards land dispossession as a
complex phenomenon characterized by policies such as enforced privatization and titling as well as
government-led settlement and enforced colonization through land laws. Marginalization as a result
of land dispossession is understood as the impact of such policies on cultural identities and ways of
living, on political, social and economic conditions, on ancestral domains, and on migration. The
policies resulting in marginalization through land dispossession have largely been State-led and have
been employed since the late colonial period until the present time.
The research conducted by the Study Group confirmed the land dispossession of the Moro and indigenous
peoples and their ensuing political, social, economic, and cultural marginalization as a historical fact.
The land dispossession itself has been systematic and is embedded in laws and institutions. The
marginalization of the Bangsamoro has resulted in a cycle of poverty that reproduces
insurgency, internally displaced peoples, environmental degradation, and severe distress among
women and children.161
2.4.2 Waves of Land Dispossession
According to the TJRC Study on Land Dispossession Preliminary Report, land dispossession occurred in
four waves:
1. The first wave, occurring in 1898 up to the Commonwealth period, laid the
foundation for the systematic land dispossession of the Moro, IPs and other
original inhabitants of the country through the affirmation of the Regalian
doctrine, imposition of the Torrens land titling system, the passage of a number
of laws that were patently discriminatory against Moro and IP ownership of
land, and the active promotion of settlement of Mindanao by American-owned
plantations and Christian settlers from the northern islands to increase
agricultural productivity and to promote the socio-cultural integration
of various ethnic groups in the country.
2. The second wave from 1946 up to the late 1960s saw the massive influx of
northern migrants to Mindanao, particularly areas occupied by the Moro and
IPs, as a result of a series of government-sponsored resettlement programs.
3. The third waveearly 1970s up to mid-1980switnessed the systematic land

dispossession of Moros and IPs, intensifying with the imposition of the Marcos
Martial Law regime in 1972 along with the shift in the demographic composition
of Mindanao led to the gradual conversion of settlers communities into
barangays and municipalities, and the creation of new provinces.
4. The fourth wave, mid-1980s up to the present, further complicated the land
ownership and land dispossession situation in Mindanao through the passage
of a number of land-related laws (i.e., CARL in 1988, Mining Act of 1995, and
IPRA in 1997). This resulted in overlapping claims to the same piece of
land, titling of most lands in Mindanao, even in the Bangsamoro area
(though subject to validation) as part of the process of modernizing land
ownership, establishment of the ARMM and the creation of a new set of Moro
elite who also accumulated large tracts of land while in office, major outbreaks
of armed conflict and horizontal conflicts (i.e., rido), which continually caused
displacement and occupation by another set of dwellers, and growing land
scarcity and the cultivation of high-value crops (e.g., oil palm, coffee, cacao,
rubber, etc.), which has triggered a spate of land claims.162
2.4.3 Roots of Dispossession: Corporate and

Resettlement Land Laws
Moros became tenants of their own lands.

Sultan Kudarat, 20 April 2015.
A legal concept dating from the Spanish colonial

period underpins the existing legal framework
for land relations in the Philippines. Known
as the Regalian Doctrine or jura regalia, it
refers to the feudal principle that private
title to land must emanate, directly or indirectly, from the Spanish crown with the latter retaining
the underlying title. 163 The US colonial successors to Spain continued to operate on the basis of this
principle, as demonstrated by two early land laws. The US Philippine Commission Act No. 496 of
November 1902 required the registration of all occupied private and corporate lands across the
Philippines. It was followed by the US Philippine Commission Act No. 926 of 7 October
1903, which declared all lands that were not yet registered, implicitly referring to the interior
and frontier regions occupied by Muslim and IPs, as unexpropriated public lands. The two laws
were issued a mere eleven months apart, a short but critical time period that essentially
excluded the Moro and indigenous peoples, who were living in inaccessible and yet unintegrated
interior regions,164 from engaging in the land registration process in Manila. 165 In the period
between the passage of the two laws, the US Philippine Commission passed Act No. 718 on
April 4, 1903, deeming void all land grants extended by Moro sultans, datus, and other leaders to
non-Christian tribes without the explicit consent of the colonial authority.166
45
46
On the back of this legislation, the US Philippine Commission, in tandem with a Philippine Legislature dominated by landed politicians, enacted two distinctive sets of land and resource
expropriation laws that progressively undermined traditional land ownership and disposition
in the Moro and indigenous communities.167 One set of laws (Table 2 below) governed corporate ventures needing vast land holdings for plantation-scale cultivation and natural resource extraction
operations. The other set (Table 3 below) constituted the creation of some dozen agricultural resettlement programs, specifically designed to spur massive movements of landless peasantry from the
Visayas and Luzon to Mindanao.168
The most significant factor driving the development of the resettlement legislation was the agrarian unrest that emerged in Central Luzon in the decade after WWII, known as the Hukbalahap or
Huk rebellion.169 The Philippine government introduced resettlement programs in Mindanao in an
effort not only to address the demand for land reform, but also as a counter-insurgency measure.
The goal was to undermine the Huk rebel forces and induce them to surrender by engaging their
social base of landless peasants in rehabilitation programs and resettling them in Mindanao.
This twofold approach was the focus of the Economic Development Corps (EDCOR) program:
Designed to answer peasant grievances about inequality in land distribution, EDCOR
usurped the Huks slogan, land for the landless, in direct competition with
the Huk political agenda. The EDCOR plan, formally instituted by [President]
Magsaysay on 15 December 1950, offered Huk guerrillas an incentive to surrender: Fifteen to twenty-five acres of free land on the major island of Mindanao (well
away from the war), a house, a carabao (water buffalo), seed, farm implements, police
protection, education, medical aid, electricity, and free transportation to the site.170
Ironically, the solution to the unrest and rebellion of the Huk in Luzon led to the unrest and rebellion of the Bangsamoro in Mindanao years later.
Postcolonial Philippine administrations, from the declaration of the Philippine Republic in 1946
onwards and into the early years of the Marcos government, expanded and modified both sets of land
laws, intensifying corporate activity and the growth of agricultural resettlement enclaves
in Mindanao. 171
The combined impact of colonial and postcolonial land laws on the social order of Mindanao is staggering. Government policy has spurred a dramatic transformation of the demographic and natural
landscapes of Mindanao, which in turn has fueled the development of the corporate and resettlement sites into economic enclaves that make up todays densely populated provinces of Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur, Lanao del Norte, South Cotabato, North Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Basilan, and Tawi-Tawi.
Tables 2 and 3 provide a chronological overview of the legislation on land and resettlement that
pertains to Mindanao.
Table 2. Land Laws that pertain to Mindanao172
YEAR
LAWS/POLICIES
FEATURES AND IMPACT
1903
Public Land Act No.

926 (Oct 1903)
Ceiling set for corporate landholdings at 1,024 hectares
1904
Forest Act No.

1148
A colonial Bureau of Forest Land grants power to timber concessions

for woodlands covering about 20 million hectares.
Philippine
Commission Act
No. 1544
Mining Law of 1905
Exempts all timber and other forest products intended for railway
construction and equipment in the Philippine islands.
1905
1919
Opens all public lands for exploration, occupation and purchase by

US and Philippine citizens
Act No. 2874 of

1919
Retains 1,024-hectare ceiling for corporations, but sets lower ceilings

for Christian Filipinos and even lower for Moros and IPs.
1925
Act No. 3129 of

1925
Insular government established the National Development

Corporation to acquire lands for plantation ventures and promote
corporate investments
Raises ceiling for public lands purchased to 144 hectares but retains
1,024-hecare cap for private individuals and corporate land leases
1935
Commonwealth
Constitution
Set corporate leasehold ceiling at 1024 hectares; and 2000 hectares

for grazing areas.
1995
Philippine Mining
Act (RA 7942)
Amends 1905 mining law and provides a new legal framework for
mining industry development in the Philippines.
47
48

Table 3. Resettlement Laws that pertain to Mindanao173
YEAR
1913
LAWS/POLICIES
Philippine Commission
Act No. 2254
Act No. 2280
FEATURES AND IMPACT

Creates "agricultural colonies by awarding settlers 16 hectare land
tracts in Pikit, Silik, Peidu-Pulangui (North Cotabato); Dulawan and
Talitay (Maguindanao); Buayan (Gen. Santos); Glan, Kiamba and
Malungon (Sarangani); Momungan or Nonungan (Baloi)
1920
Act No. 2206
Authorizes provincial boards to manage colonies. Provincial colonies

open in Lamitan (Basilan), Sulu, Tawi-Tawi; Bukidnon, Marilog (Davao),
and Salunayan and Maganoy (Maguindanao).
1935
Act No. 4197
Finances road construction and public land surveys in areas targeted

for resettlement
Legislative Act No.

4177
Provides full government support to the land resettlement program

including road and other infrastructure development for the resettlement
sites
1936
Commonwealth Act
No. 141
Reduces homestead land ceiling to 16 hectares for Christians and 4

hectares for Moros and IPs
1939
Commonwealth Act
No. 441
Creates a National Land Settlement Administration (NLSA) that opens

resettlement sites in in Koronadal (Lagao, Tupi, Marbel and Polomok),
and Allah Valleys (Banga, Norallah and Surallah) in South Cotabato
1949
1950
Establishes the Rice and Corn Production Administration (RCPA),

which in turn sets up new agricultural settlements in Buluan
(Maguindanao), and areas straddling Maramag (Bukdinon) and Wao
(Lanao del Sur).
Executive
355
Order
No.
1951
The Land Settlement Development Corporation (Lasedeco) takes over

the NLSA and RCPA functions, spurring the opening of resettlement
sites in Tacurong and Isulan, Bagumbayan (Sultan Kudarat); Buluan,
Sultan sa Barongis, and Ampatuan (Maguindanao)
Establishment of the Economic Development Corporation (EDCOR)
replacing Lasedeco. EDCOR manages the resettlement of landless
farmers including a contingent of Central Luzon peasant rebels who
moved to sites in Sapad (Lanao del Norte); Alamada (North Cotabato),
and Buldon (Maguindanao)
1954
Republic Act No. 1160
National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA)

replaces EDCOR and pursues resettlement operations for almost a
decade (1954-1963), opening new sites in Ala and Koronadal Valleys
(South Cotabato); Bongao-Balimbing (Tawi-Tawi); Carmen, Columbio,
and Tulunan (North Cotabato); Cotabato (Maguindanao), Daguman
(Sultan Kudarat); Maramag-Pangantukan, Bukidnon; Sto. Tomas
(Davao); and Wao (Lanao del Sur)
1963
Agricultural
Reform Code
Establishes the Land Authority (LA) and, through the Bureau of

Resettlement, accelerates the implementation of the resettlement
program. The code awards about 500,000 hectares of lands in the then
undivided Cotabato and Lanao provinces from 1963 to 1975
1971
RA 6389
Land
The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) replaces the Bureau of

Resettlement and assumes all resettlement tasks. The agency
administers 18 resettlement sites in 10 Mindanao provinces, namely
Balimbing-Bongao (Tawi-Tawi), Liloy, Salug and Sindangan
(Zamboanga del Norte), Maramag, Pangantukan and Kalilangan
(Bukidnon), Prosperidad and Talacogon (Agusan del Sur), Sto Tomas,
Panabo, and Asuncion (Davao del Norte), Sapad, Nunungan and
Karomatan (Lanao del Norte), Wao, Lumba-A-Bayabao, Bubong, Butig,
Lumbatan, Bayang, Binidayan, Pagawayan And Tubaran (Lanao del
Sur); Carmen and Alamada (North Cotabato), Buldon and Upi-Dinaig
(Maguindanao), and Columbio, Tulunan, Isulan, Bagumbayan and
Surallah (Sultan Kudarat)
Local famers at Ampatuan prepare

wood to sell ( Leonard Reyes)
2.4.3.1. Dispossession from Corporate Lands

The case below, narrated during the TJRC Listening Process, serves as an example of the way in which
the legal framework has been used to dispossess native inhabitants from their ancestral homes after
the lands they lived on became registered as corporate lands.174
In Malabang, Lanao del Sur, residents explained how they were expelled from the old sultanate lands
that came under the control of the Matling Corporation, Mindanaos oldest corporation founded in
1928. The Matling Corporation stands partly on lands that belonged to the ancient domain of the
Maranao Sultan of Tubok, occupied for generations by the sultanates subjects. Through one of the
corporate land programs, a person from Cebu was able to secure titles for 533 hectares in the
old sultanate. Subsequently, the Matling Corporation bought the land from the titleholder
and took possession, expelling the people living there and destroying their homes, the madrasah
(Koran school), and the masjid (mosque) in the process. The descendants of the Tubok sultanate sought
legal redress by filing a petition for land redistribution under a succession of land reform programs during
the 1970s and 1980s. But they failed on all counts. Notwithstanding the claims of the Tubok sultanates descendants, parts of the property were converted into industrial zones and land for commercial
crops, shielding them from redistribution, whereas those pieces of land that were redistributed went
mostly to non-Moro corporate employees as agrarian reform beneficiaries.
49
50

2.4.3.2 Dispossession from Resettlement Lands
I think the war was purposely done to grab our

lands.
A case of dispossession related to resettlement

policies was related by indigenous peoples during
the TJRC Listening Process in Tupi and in
Tampakan, South Cotabato.175

Tupi, South Cotabato, 19 May 2015
Settlers from the North began arriving in

Tampakan, the ancestral domain of the
Blaan, in increasing numbers in the period
between the late 1920s and the 1970s as a result of government resettlement programs.176 Initially,
they lived peacefully alongside the Blaan.177 As the settler population grew and eventually surpassed
the Blaan in numbers, reports spread that the dreaded Ilag were rampaging across Cotabato, targeting
Muslims and indigenous peoples. The Blaan, heeding advice from the settlers, fled the town and took
refuge elsewhere.178 Upon their return a few years later, they discovered that new groups of settlers had
occupied their lands.179 As revealed in testimonies during the Listening Process, it was the older group of
settlers, the ones who had advised the Blaan to leave in the first place, who had in fact titled the lands
through the resettlement programs and then sold them off once Ilag violence had driven the indigenous
population away. Some Blaan tried to recuperate their land by lodging agrarian reform
applications. The government, however, awarded these lands to another group of settlers
from another town.180 Some of the Blaan subsequently moved deep into the forests, where they had to
face another form of dispossession, namely forced displacement due to mining concessions that began
occupying the area in the 1990s.181
A family of refugees settle in discarded shanties
in Maguindanao ( Leonard Reyes)

The Tampakan example is a case in point, but only one example of a larger phenomenon. The
dispossession of the Moros and the indigenous peoples was the result of a massive influx of
c or p orate laborers and landless farmers who were drawn to Mindanao through
government resettlement programs and who then resorted to violence, subterfuge, andin many
caseslegal means, in order to secure and expand their holdings. The impact of dispossession has
been profound. It has altered fundamentally the Moro and indigenous ways of life and provoked a
far-reaching social and political upheaval in Mindanao that has not only led to the marginalization
of Moro and indigenous communities from the mainstream, butwithin the marginalized
communities themselveshas also given rise to a serious increase in violent events associated
with clan feuding and to the growth of shadow economies.182
Accounts of these dramatic events permeate the testimonies on marginalization through land
dispossession heard during the TJRC Listening Process. For the dispossessed Moro and
indigenous peoples, the government-initiated corporate and resettlement programs are
perceived as acts of illegitimate occupation of their lands. 183 Although initially welcomed
in many places, settlers and corporations used the favorable circumstances of resettlement
and government regulations on land titling to their advantage and are now perceived by the
Moro and indigenous peoples as land grabbers.184
2.4.4. Reconfiguration of Traditional Political Order and Gerrymandering
The TJRC Study Group on Marginalization through Land Dispossession took note of the fact that
large-scale, government-sponsored resettlement programs precipitated changes in the demographic
landscape and political culture in Mindanao and, as a consequence, led to the dissolution of
traditional forms of leadership and governance structures in Moro and indigenous communities.
In particular, its attention was drawn to the phenomenon of gerrymandering by political elites
and their use of patronage and clientele-based politics to ensure electoral victory.185 In the course
of the redivision and reconfiguration of what were originally areas of Moro suzerainty, the Moro people
were politically and economically marginalized.
2.4.4.1. The Colonial Legacy of Political Reconfiguration
The origins of political reconfiguration and the attendant loss of political autonomy on the part of
the Moros and indigenous peoples can be traced back to the brutal, decade-long campaign to
impose US sovereignty in Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago waged by American colonial
authorities from 1903 to 1913. Soon after they had quelled Moro and indigenous armed resistance, the
American authorities dismantled or reduced what was remaining of the suzerains of the sultanates
in Sulu, Maguindanao, Kabuntalan, and Buayan, and the principalities of Lanao (Pat a Pangampong ko
Ranao).186 In addition, they replaced what had been designated in 1903 as the Moro Province with
the new Department of Mindanao and Sulu, consisting of five administrative districts, Cotabato,
Davao, Lanao, Sulu, and Zamboanga that supplanted the existing political entities, undermining
older political power structures. 187 The Americans subsequently opened up the districts
for resettlement and agricultural development by foreign corporations, sparking extensive settler
migration and the eventual reconfiguration of the administrative districts into political
districts. 188 During the first twenty years of the Philippine Republic, the provinces were
divided and redivided, as new towns were built. Later they were redivided in accordance with
the electoral opportunities that the fast growing settler populations brought.
51
52
A more contemporary manifestation of what can be understood as political gerrymandering took place
when Moro-majority provinces, the Province of Lanao and the Empire Province of Cotabato, were
divided and reconfigured in order to create provinces inhabited by a majority of settlers. The
reconfiguration left the Moro population politically in control of lands that are geographically
and economically marginal, i.e., the mountainous parts of Lanao and the swampy parts of Cotabato.
During the period of Martial Law, this practice continued without the consent of the respective
populations through a proper plebiscite.
Table 4 contains examples of political gerrymandering that took place in Mindanao from the late
1950s through the early 1970s.
Table 4. Political Gerrymandering in Lanao and Cotabato189
22 May 1959
Republic Act No. 2228 divided the province of Lanao into two distinct
geographical and political units, known as Lanao del Sur and Lanao del
Norte, with Marawi City as the designated capital of Lanao del Sur and
Iligan of Lanao del Norte. The majority of the southern province was
Muslim, while Lanao del Norte had a Christian majority with Cebuanospeaking residents constituting 80% of the population and outnumbering
the Muslim population by 4 to 1.
18 July 1966
The municipality of Maganoy, Cotabato was created through Executive

Order No. 47. It was carved out from the municipality of Ampatuan, which
itself had been separated from Datu Piang in 1959. The municipality of
Datu Piang, known originally as Dulawan, had been renamed in 1954.
Dulawan was the old core of the Buayan datus domain sa raya.
Maganoy, todays Sharif Aguak, was a central Buayan settlement, which
originally encompassed Mamasapano, the homeland of Datu Ampatuan
Mamasapano, nephew of Datu Piang, aka. Amai Mingka (ca. 1850 1933).
18 July 1966
Republic Act No. 4849 created the Province of South Cotabato from
territory carved out of Cotabato, which had been established by the
American colonial authorities in 1914 as the largest province in Mindanao.
The Province of South Cotabato has a majority population of settlers. It
encompasses the municipalities of Norala, Surala, Banga, Tantangan,
Koronadal, Tupi, Polomolok, Kiamba, Maitum, Maasim, Tampacan and
Glan and the City of Rajah Buayan (General Santos)all the traditional
homelands of the Blaan and Tboli peoples, with the Buayan
Maguindanao traditionally exerting power over the river systems
and coasts. Koronadal, the epicenter of migration into Mindanao for half
a century, became the capital of South Cotabato.
22 November
1973
Presidential Decree No. 341 divided the remaining territory of Cotabato

into three provinces: North Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, and Maguindanao.
This presidential initiative was understood by Mindanao-based politicians
at the time as yet another example of political gerrymandering, the intention
of which was to create additional political units in Mindanao with a Christian
majority that would guarantee a succession of Christian leaders in both
elective and appointive positions.
In March 1984, Batas Pambansa No. 660 changed the name of the Province
of North Cotabato to Cotabato.

2.4.4.2. The Marginalizing Politics of Demographic Shift
Census records show a dramatic shift in the population ratio between Moros and
indigenous peoples, on the one hand, and settler communities and other groups, on the
other hand, over a period of 70 years in the 20th century. Whereas the ratio of Moros and
indigenous to settlers stood at 52 to 48 percent in 1903, when the first census figures in Mindanao
were taken by American colonial authorities, it had swung sharply to reach 18 to 82 percent by the
early 1970s, when the current period of armed conflict broke out.190 In 1903, the Moros and
indigenous peoples inhabited a broad swath of territory that included vast areas of what
became known as the districts of Cotabato,191 Davao,192 Lanao,193 Zamboanga,194 and Sulu.195
At that time, the Moro population accounted for 69 percent of the total population in these areas,
whereas the indigenous peoples stood at 10 percent.196
Amid the rising population numbers and shifting demographics in Mindanao favoring the Christian
settlers, the original five districts were reconfigured first by the American colonial authorities and later
by successive Philippine administrations into large provincial administrative and legislative
enclaves that elect their own provincial leaders and congressional representatives. In the 1960s
and 1970s, marking the rapid increase of the Christian population and declining demographic share
of the Moros and indigenous peoples, the provinces were subdivided in a way that reflects their
diminished status. Moro communities were confined to Lanao del Sur, a province carved out of
Lanao, to Maguindanao, a province taken from Cotabato, and to Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi from
what was once the undivided province of Sulu. Indigenous communities, meanwhile, were pushed
deep into the remaining frontiers in the hinterland areas or the interstices of the provinces.
2.4.5. Land and Identity
Traditionally, the concept of land ownership as a private commodity and factor of production does not
exist for the Moro and indigenous peoples of Mindanao, as it does in the Western world. For centuries,
the indigenous peoples in the southern Philippines had other ways to assert the ownership of lands
they tilled for generations. In their understanding, they consider themselves to be stewards of the
creation order, i.e., as Gods vicegerents or khalifah (stewards) on earth.
According to this conception, land is not a commodity that can be titled and then bought and
sold; it is regarded as that which nourishes a community and provides it with its distinctive
identity. In indigenous communities, people are closely tied up with their surroundings: the
land, seas, and skies make up the environment from which they believe that they have originated.
The Maguindanao are called such because they are the people of the flooded plains. The plains refer
to the alluvial low-lying areas in the former undivided Cotabato Province that are submerged by the
overflowing of the Rio Grande or Pulangi during the monsoon and rainy seasons. The Maranao are
people of the lake, since they live in the fertile banks along Lake Lanao. The Tausug, (tau people;
and sug current) are called this, because they are from the island that is surrounded by the sea that
periodically swells as a reaction to climatic changes, producing high waves and strong currents.
A common thread thus unites the experiences of land dispossession for the Moro and indigenous
peoples. Dispossession is perceived as an utter disrespect for the deep relationship that bind
the Bangsamoro and indigenous peoples to their lands (or to the sea, in the case of the Sama
Dilaut), which at the same time is the source of their identity as a people. This underlines another
important, distinctive element of this conception, namely that relationships of people to their
land are largely dictated by a communal perspective; that everyone in the community who shares
a common ancestry with each other collectively own their lands.197
53
54
2.4.6 Gender Dimensions of Marginalization through Land Dispossession

Gender roles and access to resources emerged as an important aspect in the dynamics of land
dispossession during the TJRC Listening Process. Property relations, in general, l argely
privilege men over women. In the context of armed conflict, this has become problematic
for Moro and indigenous women who are left behind as widows or as household heads by
their husbands. These women have no legal basis to assume ownership of land that is held in
their husbands name.198 Some cases were reported, in which indigenous women became victims
of predatory strategies of entrepreneurs and Christian settlers who persuaded local communities
to exchange vast tracks of land for a paltry sum. In other cases, participants explained that those
who want to take their lands resort to courting the daughters of families of indigenous leaders and
later convince them to become their wives.199
From the perspective of the Bangsamoro and indigenous peoples, land dispossession and the
resulting marginalization of their communities is a form of historical injustice of such gravity
that it would justify secession from the Philippines, according modern legal norms. The resettlement
programs involving migrants from Luzon and the Visayas have taken on such dimensions as to be
qualified as ethnic flooding201 and have resulted in the minoritization of the native population.202 In
so many instances, land dispossession has become the contemporary flashpoint of conflict in
Mindanao. Moreover, land dispossession has not only resulted in political and economic
marginalization, but also in loss of social and cultural identity, land being the source of life of
the community and the basis for collective identity.
CHAPTER 3
Violence,
Impunity,
and Neglect:
The Imposition
of a Monolithic
Filipino Identity
and Philippine
State
55
56
As the review of the TJRC Consultation Process findings has shown, the four elements that are the
focus of the TJRC mandate are intertwined: the Bangsamoro narrative of historical injustice frames
their collective experience of legitimate grievances, in particular as they relate to the far-ranging
effects of marginalization through land dispossession and widespread human rights violations.
In the view of the TJRC, legitimate grievances, historical injustice, human rights violations,
and marginalization through land dispossession are the consequences of three mutually
reinforcing phenomena:
Systemic violence by the State expressed in terms of political, socioeconomic, and
cultural exclusion and in the disproportionate use of direct violence;
A pervasive culture of impunity that undermines the practice of the rule of law;
Deep neglect by the State combined with the lack of vision for the common good.
These phenomena have their root cause in the imposition of a monolithic Filipino identity and
Philippine state by force on multiple ethnic groups in Mindanao and Sulu that saw themselves
as already preexisting nations and nation-states. The attempt to integrate these diverse groups
into a unitary Philippine nation-state has been met with different forms of resistance that continue
to this day.
The convergence of these three phenomena has not only had a profoundly negative impact on the
people of the Bangsamoro, both historically and currently; it has also affected the ability of the
Philippines to address other pressing political and socio-economic issues.
In the following, the TJRC will share its analysis of these three phenomena in some detail, as they
form the basis for the main recommendations of this report.
The analysis follows the flow of history. It begins with violence: the forced incorporation of the
Bangsamoro into the Philippine nation-state with a single Filipino identity, initiated by the colonial
powers and pursued by and under the Republic. This process of forced assimilation continues,
accompanied by different forms of impunity endemic to Philippine society, as injustices
persist and remain uncorrected. The process as a whole is marked by exclusion, failed development
schemes, and malgovernance: long-standing realities that constitute what is perceived as systematic
neglect by the Bangsamoro people.
Finally, the TJRC report suggests that violence, impunity, and neglect are expressed through
structural-institutional as well as through cultural-ideological means.
3.1 On Violence
We saw many scattered [corpses]
of animals and humans with bullet
wounds; some were charred. Everywhere
I looked, [there] were blazing houses, rice
and animals. During the chaos, families
lost each other. The army hauled people
like animals, beating them with guns
from time to time. Everyone was gone
what was left were charred houses, ashes
of rice and animals. It really hurts to
remember what happened to my village
and family. I am still very hurt and angry,
but I dont show itI have to live with it.
Sarangani, 23 March 2015
( Leonard Reyes)
The experience of multiple forms of violence is one of the most pervasive narratives emerging from the
TJRC Consultation Process. The manifestations of violence associated with legitimate grievances and
historical injustice expressed in the violation of political and civil, as well as of economic, social, and
cultural rightsnotably through land dispossessionare manifold. Nevertheless, it is possible
to discern three distinctive, yet intimately connected forms of violence that affected the Bangsamoro:
structural, cultural, and direct violence.
3.1.1 Forms of Violence in the Bangsamoro
For many of the TJRC interlocutors, structural violence is implicit and emanates from the laws and
systems of political and economic governance in the Philippines that resulted in immense gaps and
inequalities among the Moro and indigenous peoples.
Violence has also assumed a cultural nature with the construction of the Bangsamoro as the strange,
unfamiliar, to-be-feared other in both colonial and modern Philippine settings. Cultural violence
has had very deep impacts, fostering discrimination and hostile attitudes and beliefs toward the
Bangsamoro and downgrading self-esteem and trust among the Moro people themselves.
Finally, individuals and communities among the Bangsamoro have experienced violence, in its most
direct or explicit form through violation of the rights to life, to physical integrity, and to mental
health.
57
58

In the experience of the Bangsamoro, these three forms of violence have shown themselves to be
complementar y and mutually reinforcing. The structural violence manifest in land
dispossession and in the erosion of indigenous governance systems has been rationalized
and reinforced by the civilizing claim of development on the part of the State. Brute force has been
directed at those who have resisted structural and cultural forms of violence.
3.1.1.1 Structural Violence
The involuntary absorption of the Bangsamoro and indigenous peoples into the Philippine mainstream
has involved systematic, structural forms of violence initiated by colonial regimes and continued
under the Philippine Republic.
In the sixteenth century, the Spanish forces colonized what would later be called the Philippines.
Many of the peoples and much of the territory in Mindanao and in the Sulu archipelago
remained unconquered by the Spaniards, but were assimilated in the American colonial period
following the Treaty of Paris in 1898. At the onset of the Spanish colonial era, the existing proto-states,
such as the Sultanates of Sulu, Maguindanao, and Buayan, had functioning governance systems,
economic relations, and socio-cultural practices. These were dismantled or eroded by subsequent
political decisions, economic programming, and social reconfigurations. The traditional
governance systems and power structures of the Bangsamoro and indigenous peoples
became marginalized and irrelevant, as other institutions were foisted on them. This resulted in
their social, economic, and political disenfranchisement and marginalization.
Colonialism imposed the private property model over traditional usufruct stewardship-based land
use and management. This had a devastating effect on the economic life, social forms of organization,
and the cultural identity of the inhabitants of Mindanao. The resettlement laws of the Philippine
Government in the 1960s and 1970s and the gerrymandering that continues to this day
actively promoted dispossession of Moro and indigenous peoples lands and territories, resulting in
the eventual disintegration of their communities and ways of life.
The structural violence that provoked massive disenfranchisement, marginalization, and
dispossession has been regarded over time as normal, instead of being recognized as a
historic injustice, deserving of condemnation and redress.
3.1.1.2 Cultural Violence
The dominant public discourse in the Philippines alternately disparages, ignores, and denies the
historical and sociocultural claims for a distinct Bangsamoro identity and does not recognize
the right of the Bangsamoro to self-determination.203 Culturally, this is expressed as prejudice
against Muslims and indigenous peoples, denigrating them to the status of second-class citizens,
and by the exclusionist ways, in which they have been treated in historical writings and in other
narratives about Philippines society by the media and in the formal educational system.
The State, by action or omission, failed to curb and sometimes even encouraged deeply ingrained
prejudices among the majority population towards the Bangsamoro and indigenous
peoples. As a result, the distinct expression of identity that is the basis for acknowledgment
AFP Clearing Operations

( Mark Navales)
and respect of minorities was devalued and denied. This lack of acknowledgment and respect
contributed to legitimize the Bangsamoro claim for the right to self-determination in their own
eyes.
The right to self-determination itself, which has been central to both the Filipino nationalist struggle
and to Bangsamoro separatist rebellion, reveals another dimension of cultural violence that underlies
the clash between the competing nationalist ideologies of the Philippine State and the Bangsamoro.
Nationalist discourse per se has a progressive/positive aspect as well as a conservative/negative one.
As a progressive force, nationalism encouraged the development of anticolonial, anti-imperialist,
self-reliant, and protectionist manifestations of independence. Its conservative aspects, however,
can foment colonial/imperialist, chauvinist, racist, and exclusionary forms of governance. A nonseparatist or non-independence approach to the quest for self-determination, as presented in the
Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) and in the proposed Bangsamoro Basic Law
(BBL), cannot be based on giving full play to either Bangsamoro nationalism or Filipino nationalism. It
will require a sensitive and constructive engagement of all stakeholders and the capacity to analyze
the multifaceted understanding of nationalism in such a way that mutually acceptable common
ground between the Bangsamoro and Filipino discourses can be found and their negative impulses
towards one another are contained and transformed. An example of such common ground could
be based on a comparative analysis of anticolonial struggles of the Filipino and the Bangsamoro,
both of which are and have been based on an understanding of the right to self-determination as
fundamental to all peoples.
Other challenges to management of diversity and the redress of cultural violence include a similar
claim by the indigenous peoples to self-determination and ancestral domain in areas that are
regarded as Moro territories.
59
60
Listening process in Tawi-Tawi
3.1.1.3 Direct Violence

The forms of direct violence formulated in connection with the TJRC Consultation Process
involve violations of international human rights and humanitarian law related to the Bangsamoro
conflict. In this regard, the TJRC notes with regret that there is no consolidated database or generally
accepted record of human losses that documents those who were killed or went missing during the
decades of conflict.204 This is especially troubling, as the absence of systematic documentation
of human rights and IHL violations is conducive to revisionist arguments and denial and
makes redress more difficult.
However, historical evidence does exist that documents the commission of serious human rights
violations of a systematic nature against the Bangsamoro that date back to the colonial
period. The Spanish, the American, and the Japanese colonial governments used military
force in an attempt to pacify and assimilate the inhabitants of Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago.
In the case of the Americans and the Japanese, military force was also combined with the set-up of
an institutional colonial administration. Furthermore, the resistance to this kind of incorporation on
the part of the Moros was always overwhelmed by the coercive power of the State, at first through
the instrumentality of the United States Army and later on part of the Philippine Scouts and
Philippine Constabulary.205
Disproportionate use of force and commission of mass atrocity crimes against the Bangsamoro
during the time of the Philippine Republic have been documented mostly in media accounts and
by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) engaged in human rights monitoring. Acts of genderbased violence and, in particular, sexual violence against Bangsamoro women and girls, committed by
State security forces and their affiliates have also been documented.

Although no party to the Bangsamoro conflict is innocent of accusations of human rights abuse
and of IHL violations, there is reason to believe that State security forces or paramilitary forces
under their control are responsible for the most heinous crimes and atrocities in the past.
3.1.2 Context of Vertical and Horizontal Violence
A further distinction that is relevant to the conflict in the Bangsamoro can be drawn between
vertical and horizontal forms of violence. Vertical violence is typically either a top-down or a
bottom-up form of direct violence between the State security forces or affiliated paramilitaries
and non-state armed groups, such as those involved in separatist and rebel movements. Horizontal
violence pertains to acts perpetrated by civilian or non-state armed actors against each other
within the same community or between communities. In the context of the Bangsamoro, nonseparatist, inter- or intra-ethnic clan or group conflicts, commonly known as rido, are the most
common forms of horizontal violence. Rido, for example, is the most common cause of displacement in
the ARMM aside from vertical types of armed conflict and is regarded as the greater source
of violence and insecurity especially among Moro communities.
Over the span of decades of conflict, a culture of violence has developed, in which the horizontal
use of violence to solve problems has become the norm. The spread of horizontal violence is also
tied to the absence of effective State services. During the TJRC Listening Process, participants
shared information about horizontal violence allegedly committed by the Moros against the
indigenous peoples and by Moro against Moro. Moreover, there were narratives of violations of
IHRL and IHL committed by Moro armed groups notably in connection with land disputes and
unsatisfactory court decisions.
The Bangsamoro authorities and the Bangsamoro people themselves are challenged to reflect
more intently on intra- and inter-Bangsamoro grievances. Grievances related to allegations of
corruption, impunity, and incompetence among leaders, as well as crimes like kidnapping for
ransom, illegal drugs, and human trafficking that are perpetrated by Moro against Moro are nascent
causes of deep social resentment among and within Bangsamoro communities.
61
62

3.2 On Impunity
Are soldiers really authorized

to kill people just like that?
Where is justice for us poor people?
We feel [that] the government
doesnt care for us. They send
killers to our peaceful barangay.
Sarangani, 23 March 2015
( Leonard Reyes)
Impunity, as the impossibility, de jure or de facto, of bringing the perpetrators of

violations to account208 is a problemit has even been described as a culturethat plagues
Philippine society as a whole. However, it has assumed particularly intense manifestations and has
had profound consequences on society in the war-affected areas in Mindanao. The historic
roots of violence and injustice in the Bangsamoro, many of which date back to the colonial
period, are among the factors that highlight impunity as a lived reality of the Moro.
Several factors enable and produce impunity in the context of armed conflict: policies of allout-war, abusive security and rebel forces, a dysfunctional justice system, the absence of
systematic documentation of IHRL and IHL violations, as well as the absence of efficient and
independent monitoring bodies. In more general terms, the practice of patronage, clientelism,
and corruption are intimately linked with impunity, as is organized crime and the proliferation of
an illicit economy. Thus, impunity in a context like the Bangsamoro is a complex phenomenon.
Impunity is not only an expression of the lack of rule of law; it is constantly produced through the
mutual reinforcement of these different factors.
The TJRC Dealing with the Past Assessment documented how impunity in the Bangsamoro is directly
associated with the failure to deliver timely and independent justice, security, and the rule of
law. In 2008, Philip Alston, the UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary
Executions, reported receiving information about abductions, arrests, and extrajudicial killings
in Jolo and about military operations involv[ing] inherently indiscriminate tactics, such as aerial
bombardment, artillery shelling, and helicopter strafing.209 The Alston report also mentioned allegations
of extrajudicial executions in Maguindanao and other areas of western Mindanao.210 Most of these
cases were rarely reported; the perpetrators were difficult to identify and few or none of the
cases were prosecuted. The TJRC Dealing with the Past Assessment notes that many cases
concern abuse by security forces, but few complaints have resulted in court trials and even
fewer have led to a conviction. 211 These examples document one aspect of impunity,
namely the failureby action and by omissionto protect and to provide redress to populations
in conflict-affected areas.
In the context of the Bangsamoro, patronage, clientelism, and corruption have also fueled impunity.
Hand in hand with the marginalization of the Moro and indigenous peoples, the Philippine State
nurtured a complex system of patronage down to the most basic level of governance, including
Muslim politicians and local elites who benefited from land dispossession212 and the illegal use
of public resources for self-aggrandizement. These vertical structures of patronage are sometimes
combined with horizontal alliances that drastically affect community relations, namely when Moro
clans contract State actors and their affiliated non-state armed groups to take sides in horizontal
clan-related violence.213
The massacre of 58 persons in the 2009 Maguindanao Massacre by elements of the security sector and
the private armed group of the powerful Ampatuan clan is an illustration of the complex nature
of impunity in Mindanao. The Ampatuan clan has been able to dominate local and regional
politics thanks to a complex web of political and military connections and large-scale corruption.
Efforts to obtain justice for the victims, mostly members of local media and the family of a
rival political opponent, remain inconclusive to date and are a source of continuing frustration
for the media sector and the families of the victims, some of whom have fled the country due to
threats to their safety.214
Another example of the production of impunity in the Bangsamoro are situations when state actors and
non-state actors cooperate and misuse their power for criminal purposes. In such cases, the lines
between war-associated violence and crime-related violence become blurred. In Basilan and
Sulu, for instance, local government and military officials have allegedly profited personally from
persistent criminal activities like kidnapping.215
It is important to note that the Philippines has all the working elements to protect human rights
and ensure the attainment of justice. The Philippines is a State party to the most important international conventions on human rights216 and humanitarian law.217 Moreover, international standards
have been nationally codified through domestic legislation.218 Yet a legal framework, consistent
with international standards, is not sufficient by itself to protect the rights of the people, punish
the wrongs committed, and ensure the full deployment of the rule of law.219 Sound policy decisions
together with the capability and capacity to implement them effectively are needed to address
impunity. This is admittedly not an easy task in a society emerging from decades of armed
conflict.
Nevertheless, impunity for wrongful acts of the past, unless addressed, will reproduce itself and
trigger further abuse. The combination of violence and impunity is, in the view of the TJRC, an
incubator for widespread, large-scale corruption and the capture of certain key public and private
sectors by criminal interests or parallel powers. Entrenched impunity is a major threat not only to the
sustainability of the Bangsamoro peace process, but also to the future of Philippine society at large.
63
64
3.3 On Neglect
Neglect emerged as a major issue during the TJRC Consultation Process. As a phenomenon of
malgovernance in Mindanao, neglect of the Bangsamoro and indigenous peoples has assumed
many forms, ranging from the failure of the State to provide basic public services, such
as access to clean water and reliable sources of electricity, to its collusion in removing the
means of sustainable livelihood through land dispossession. The problem of neglect is particularly
Kulang ang pagkatao (we lacked

humanity) because we are deprived.
This is an agony.
Lumbatan, Lanao del Sur, 6 May 2015
( Leonard Reyes)
evident in the exploitation and marginalization of indigenous communities and the dereliction of
the State of its duty to defend the integrity of ancestral domains. Neglect is also perceived to
be the reason for the lack of acknowledgment of Bangsamoro history and culture in public
spaces and in the public education system. Other forms of neglect are associated with the nonresolution of electoral-related tensions and the inadequate reaction by the State to the prejudices of
the dominant Christian majority and their intolerance toward different religious and cultural practices.
The result is a widespread feeling among the Bangsamoro of abandonment and discrimination.
Ironically, State neglect has gone hand in hand with intensive development efforts based on its
economic policy of promoting large-scale resettlement and agricultural production in Mindanao
in the 1950s and 1960s. Those programs, while benefiting landless poor from other parts of the
Philippines (including former Huk rebels), resulted in the dispossession of the local population of
their ancestral lands. The various waves of displacement not only impoverished many Moro
and indigenous peoples, but also increased their vulnerability. As competition for
available resources grew, resentment and mistrust increasingly divided Christian, Muslim,
and indigenous communities.
State neglect is perceived by the disaffected communities of the Bangsamoro to be the result of
intentional policy decisions that have, in turn, fueled their own struggle for self-determination.220
The sentiment of being neglected by the State has been conflated in the narrative of the Bangsamoro
with their experience of the failure by the State to protect them from the violent encroachments of
the settlers and their paramilitary forces. In fact, the State is seen as having actively colluded in
their marginalization through years of military occupation characterized by abusive force and
by their involuntary inclusion within a highly centralized, unitary political system grounded in the
ideology of Filipino nationalism and sustained by aggressive corporate development.
Paradoxically, what were originally attempts to suppress diversity on the part of the State served to
heighten resistance on the part of the Bangsamoro to assert their own identity and diversity.
3.4 Addressing Violence, Impunity, and Neglect as a Basis for Sustainable Peace
Cumulatively speaking, the peace agreement between the GPH and MILF is the result of more
than 40 years of negotiations.221 Lessons learned from the previous attempts at political settlement
provided the foundation for the negotiations that led to signing of the CAB and its mechanisms
of Normalization in March 2014. Unfortunately, the earlier efforts did not produce the desired
results and this fact poses its own particular challenge. For example, the future Bangsamoro
authorities will inherit an administration of the ARMM that, for most of its quarter of a century of
existence, has been regarded as a failed experiment.222 Additionally, both parties to the agreement
recognize that there are disaffected armed groups in Mindanao and political interest groups in Manila
that do not accept the peace agreement, as it now stands.
For all its real and perceived shortcomings, the CAB does address the need to respond to the
structural-institutional dimension of the conflict and, in the process, also acknowledges the legitimate
grievances of the Bangsamoro people in both their contemporary and historical manifestations as
injustice committed against them.
Nevertheless, much still needs to be done to deal with the cultural-ideological legacy of the conflict,
notably by acknowledging diversity as one of the most precious human resources of the Philippines,
while searching for mutually acceptable common ground between the Bangsamoro and Filipino
nationalist discourses. The constructive management of these diverse cultural identities
and traditions is the key to democracy, security, and development in the future. The
future Bangsamoro authorities and the national government at the local, regional, and national
levels are encouraged to consider these efforts as priorities in their agendas.
On the part of the Government of the Philippines, there is need for a clear, strong,
consistent and well-coordinated message about the legitimate grievances of the Bangsamoro,
historical injustice, human rights violations, and marginalization through land dispossession. There
is a need to hear from the highest voices in government that the Philippines recognizes and acknowledges
the history and culture of the Bangsamoro and indigenous peoples, that it apologizes for its
wrongdoings in the past, and that it commits itself to take responsibility for its future actions by
engaging in a collaborative partnership with the Bangsamoro people to ensure their future as citizens
and rights bearers.
65
66
This message is in the interest of the development, peace, and security not only of the Bangsamoro, but
for Philippine society at large.
In this regard, the TJRC believes that the Mindanao peace process, its peace agreements and their
proper implementation represent a unique opportunity for the entire nation:
To address the enforced monolithic model through active respect, practice and
promotion of the diversity of the peoples, including other indigenous peoples in the
Philippines. This includes tackling the need for proper legal frameworks to
promote the recognition of minority rights, their implementation, institutional
practices and education. For the Bangsamoro, through the passage of the
BBL and in the case of indigenous peoples, through further strengthening the
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA). The right to self-determination can enrich
the whole nation in its practice of democracy; acknowledging and protecting
this right is a gain for the Philippines.
To respond to neglect through the full deployment of public services to regions
that have been excluded and marginalized, in particular in the war-affected
regions of Mindanao. This entails the preferential allocation of public resources
to those regions, the pursuit of reforms of structures and policies to ensure that they
are compatible with peace, and that they serve the common good by promoting
fairness and equity for citizens, particularly for that part of the population that lives
below the line of extreme poverty not only in conflict-fraught zones in Mindanao,
but also elsewhere in the Philippines.
To take effective action against direct forms of violence committed against the
Moro and indigenous peoples by investigating and prosecuting cases of human
rights violations and ensuring that justice is granted to the victims, their families
and communities. These demonstrations of commitment to human rights will
contribute to the strengthening of the culture of rights promotion and rule of
law in the country and facilitate healing and reconciliation on a societal scale.
To stand firmly against impunity by reaffirming that no one is above the law and
that the rule of law and by law is central to justice and good governance. This strong
commitment to justice, security, and development will benefit not only the
Bangsamoro, but also those citizens all over the nation who do not belong to
the elite.
To support the peace process and the implementation of peace agreements, informed
by a genuine understanding of the legitimate grievances of the Bangsamoro, and to
address historical injustice, marginalization through land dispossession, as well as
the legacy of human rights violations.
A young Moro rebel standing infront of the sign

board at MILF out post, ( A special program from
USAID-GEM) inside the MILF Camp Darapanan
in Sultan Kudarat, Southern Philippines
( Mark Navales)
The TJRC Dealing with the Past approach offers the potentially transformative means to engage
in a future-oriented policy debate within Filipino and Bangsamoro society, while addressing the
painful legacy of the past. The TJRC Consultation Process has led to the identification of ninety
recommendations that will have to be studied further to address historical injustice, legitimate
grievances, human rights violation, and marginalization through land dispossession.
Fundamentally, the TJRCs framework for dealing with violence, impunity, and neglect in the
Bangsamoro hinges on the promotion and fulfillment of the rights of citizens and victims and of
the duties of the State in the fields of truth, justice, reparation, and the establishment of guarantees of non-recurrence, which will be elaborated on in the chapter on recommendations.
67
68
69
CHAPTER 4
Recommendations
70
4.1 Introduction
As mentioned above, the TJRC has been mandated to undertake a study and to make recommendations
with a view to promoting healing and reconciliation of the different communities affected by the
conflict.
For the TJRC, legitimate grievances of the Bangsamoro people, historical injustice, human
rights violations, and marginalization through land dispossession are the consequences
of three mutually reinforcing phenomena: deep neglect by the State (and lack of a vision for the
common good), violence (including systematic socioeconomic, political and cultural exclusion, and
disproportionate use of direct violence), supported by a deeply embedded (nationwide culture and
practice of) impunity. The root cause lies in the imposition of a monolithic Filipino identity and
Philippine State by force on multiple ethnic groups in Mindanao and Sulu that saw themselves
as already preexisting nations and nation-states.
4.2. The Bangsamoro Opportunity
Armed conflict in Mindanao has had many tragic consequences in the Bangsamoro and for
Filipino society at large. Over the past four decades, an untold number of people in Mindanao
and the Sulu archipelago have experienced immense sufferings. They have lost family members;
they have been driven from their homes; they have lost their lands and livelihoods. They are poor
and they are tired and they want peace. These incidents of violence and of systematic discrimination
and exclusion have become a transgenerational, collective experience and memory for the Bangsamoro
and indigenous peoples.
At the same time, the Philippines as a nation has not remained unscathed. The prolongation of
the armed conflict has generated pockets of malgovernance, violence, and corruption.
It has eroded the values of the nation and undermined trust between citizens and the State.
On another level, the conflict has cost the Philippines precious time and opportunities. It has
effectively hindered decades of potential social and economic development and weakened the quality
of democracy and of human security. As new armed groups and new forms of violence continue to
appear, an environment of multidimensional conflict begins to emerge in the Philippines.
Hence, solving the Bangsamoro situation in a durable manner offers a unique opportunity for the
Philippines, namely the opportunity for a modern polyethnic State to emergea State that manages
the diversity inherent in any modern democracy in a constructive manner based on equality
of opportunity and on the rule of law. Similarly, the Bangsamoro aspire to a political framework,
which will enable them to practice good governance, to develop their region and their people, to
proudly assert their identity, and to ensure a constructive engagement with their own multiethnic constituency.
The TJRC perceives a Bangsamoro opportunity rather than a Bangsamoro problem. Indeed, the
TJRC is convinced that the implementation of the CAB is a unique and extraordinary
opportunity not only for Bangsamoro, but also for the whole Filipino nation:
It offers an opportunity for the historical and cultural resilience of the

Bangsamoro and indigenous peoples to be recognized as a vibrant and
constructive part of the Philippines, based on the acknowledgment of plural
identities.
It offers an opportunity for the Philippine State to assume the political and
moral responsibility for all of its peoples by opening and strengthening spaces
for political debate and for the nonviolent management of conflicting
views and interests.
It offers an opportunity for the Philippines to join hands with the Bangsamoro
and indigenous peoples to promote the rule of law, security, and development
in the Bangsamoro as a potential model for the rest of the country.
It offers an opportunity for the Philippines to embrace diversity as one of the
key human resources of its society.
It offers an opportunity for the Philippines to become a champion of the
protection of diversity and of territorial integrity at the regional and
international levels.
4.3 Dealing with the Past towards Healing and Reconciliation
The recommendations of the TJRC are elaborated with the intention of opening the path for a
Bangsamoro and Filipino process that can address both root causes and their consequences
and that can build on the extraordinary Bangsamoro and Filipino capacity for resilience.
The TJRC is convinced that the dealing with the past framework, combined with a conflict
transformation perspective, is key to addressing the grievances of the Bangsamoro people,
historical injustices, human rights violations, and marginalization through land dispossession,
and to setting a solid basis for healing and reconciliation in the Bangsamoro, as well as between
the Bangsamoro and the Filipino society at large.
Inspired by the principles against impunity, the TJRC adapted a conceptual and analytical
framework to the Bangsamoro and Filipino context, which takes into a ccou nt
t he dynamic relationship between victims and perpetrators with a view to ensuring
redress and satisfaction for victims and accountability for perpetrators.223 In this regard, the
TJRC highlights the need to acknowledge the rights of victims and the obligations of the State as
a means of transforming conflict by addressing root causes, and to build trust between citizens
and the State.
Furthermore, the TJRC is convinced that initiatives related to truth, justice, reparation, and
guarantee of non-recurrence will provide a process-oriented and mutually reinforcing framework
that promotes healing and reconciliation.
71
72
As a methodology to address past abuse and the root causes of violent conflict, dealing with the past
is decidedly future-oriented. In practical terms, it aims to prevent the recurrence of serious human
rights violations and, in this way, to create a conducive environment for societal reconciliation. In
order to do so, it requires short-, medium-, and long-term interventions.
The goal of these interventions is to strengthen the rule of law and, thereby, to create conditions
in which it becomes possible to address the underlying causes of violent conflict. Even when the
root causes of conflict continue to persist, the institutions and mechanisms promoted by a process
of dealing with the past contribute to establishing democratic norms of tolerance and power
sharing that not only reflect the social, economic, and cultural diversity of a country, but also
create the trust necessary to address root causes through nonviolent means.
The restorative dimension of dealing with the past also finds its expression in the transformation of
social and political identities. If the sense of victimization among certain groups and sectors
of society was predominant at the beginning of a process of transitional justice, it should change
gradually as the process proceeds. The identity of being a victim may belong to ones personal
biography or collective experience, but it should no longer remain the only or even the
predominant social or political identity. Instead, it should be replaced by a new sense of belonging,
by which individuals enjoy rights and duties of citizenship as part of a new social contract.
In this way, the acknowledgment of past wrongdoing paired with a new sense of civic
purpose and responsibility can eventually eliminate historical patterns of discrimination and
exclusion.
4.4 Complementing Past and Existing Efforts and Ensuring a Strategic Approach
A number of initiatives have been undertaken in the Philippines at the regional and national

level to address the legacy of the past. There are several good examples, among them the
important endeavor by the HRVCB in the area of compensation for Martial Law victims and the
ongoing efforts of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) and others to honor their memory
in a museum. Important initiatives have been also launched to mainstream knowledge about IHRL
and IHL in the armed forces and national police. Examples include the creation of the Human
Rights Office and the institutionalization of its Human Rights Manual in the AFP, as well
as the identification and protection of relevant archives related to human rights violations during
the Martial Law period.
Though important in and by themselves, these initiatives have not had a significant impact on the
present conflict in the Bangsamoro. In particular, they have failed to provide satisfaction to
victims and to prevent of the recurrence of human rights violations. Past initiatives in the
Philippines related to transitional justice have been regarded as problematic and ineffective for
several reasons:
They did not adequately address root causes.
They were not implemented on the basis of a broad and transparent
consultation.
They promoted isolated measures, instead of a holistic strategy.
They were not able to draw a line before and after the period of
wrongdoings and injustices.
They did not contribute to the prevention of revisionist discourse
and denial about injustices committed.
The TJRC has captured many recommendations about dealing with the past through its Consultation
Process. The TJRC is aware that it will take time to address these issues and to bring durable
peace to the Bangsamoro. Therefore, it proposes that the recommendations resulting from the
TJRC Consultation Process be regarded as individual signposts and milestones in a broader,
more comprehensive approach to address the legacy of violence, impunity, and neglect
outlined above. To this end, the TJRC sees the need to combine efforts in the fields of truth
seeking, criminal accountability, reparations, and institutional reform on a national whole of
government level with multiple initiatives in the field of reconciliation at regional and local
levels, involving various sectors of civil society.
4.5 Taking a Political Decision
In conclusion, the TJRC believes that a sound political decision needs to be taken to set the stage
for a strategic approach to dealing with the past in the Bangsamoro. Indeed, a firm decision is
required, based on mutual consensus and taken at the highest level by both parties, to ensure that
the recommendations concerning dealing with the past outlined below shall be fully integrated into
the peace process as part of its short-, medium-, and long-term agenda for equitable power sharing,
social justice, and reconciliation. The TJRC calls upon the Philippine people, Philippine civil society
and the business sector, as well as the international community to support the national government
and the Bangsamoro authorities in achieving these goals.
The TJRC, therefore, submits the following recommendations to the GPH and MILF Peace Panels
for their joint consideration and action.
73
74
The TJRC Recommendations

All recommendations shall take gender and cultural sensitivities into consideration and be
informed by a perspective that promotes healing and reconciliation.
Part I Establishing a National Transitional Justice and Reconciliation Commission on the
Bangsamoro
A. Recommend to the President the creation of a National Transitional Justice and Reconciliation
Commission on the Bangsamoro (NTJRCB) that shall oversee and support the operations of
four Sub-Commissions named below, ensure the implementation of the dealing with
the past framework, and promote healing and reconciliation (see Figure 3 for the recommended
structure of the NTJRCB).
Figure 3. Structure of the NTJRCB and its Sub-Commissions

STRATEGIC
NTJRCB Chairperson, 4 Commissioners

2 Civil Society representatives (ex officio)
Advisory Board
Civil Society Forum
OPERATIONAL
NTJRCB
Executive Office
(Secretariat)
Sub-Commission
on Historical Memory
(in the Bangsamoro)
Sub-Commission
against Impunity, for the
Promotion of Accountability,
and Rule of Law
(in the Bangsamoro)
Sub-Commission on Land
Dispossession (in the
Bangsamoro)
Sub-Commission on
Healing and Reconciliation
(in the Bangsamoro)
1. The overall mandate of the NTJRCB will be to ensure that the following tasks
are implemented by the four Sub-Commissions named below in cooperation
with relevant institutions and actors:

a. To listen to the victims of the conflict, to investigate serious violations of

international human rights and international humanitarian law, and to
inquire into specific events of the war;
b. To contribute to the resolution of outstanding land disputes in conflictaffected areas in the Bangsamoro and to address the legacy of land
dispossession with concrete measures to provide redress;
c. To engage in the struggle against impunity, by promoting accountability

and strengthening the rule of law in relation to past and present
wrongdoings, including crimes identified under the Rome Statute and
under international conventions to which the Philippines is a signatory;
d. To promote healing and reconciliation among the different communities

affected by the conflict.
2. The composition of the NTJRCB shall be based on the following criteria:

a. The NTJRCB shall be composed of Philippine nationals of the highest

moral integrity and known independence with a high degree of
professional competence and expertise in the area of their
respective mandates.
b. The NTJRCB shall consist of a Chairperson and four Commissioners.

The Chairperson and at least two voting members shall be of Bangsamoro
ancestry.
c. Two representatives of Bangsamoro civil society shall be members of

the NTJCRB with the status of ex officio, nonvoting members.
d. The Executive Director of the NTJRCB Secretariat shall also sit as a

nonvoting, ex officio member of the NTJRCB.
3. The NTJRCB shall operate for six years with the possibility of extending its
mandate for another three years.
4. The NTJRCB shall ensure the implementation of the dealing with the past
framework and promote healing and reconciliation. Among other things, it shall
approve the working plans and reports of its four Sub-Commissions and shall
ensure that each of the Sub-Commissions and all the initiatives taken within
this framework build on existing local and national best practices in conformity
with international standards.
75
76
Figure 4. NTJRCB Sub-Commission Structure
NTJRCB Sub-Commission:
- Commissioner as convener
- Technical experts
- Support staff provided by
Secretariat
Ad Hoc Working Group including

institutions and actors, relevant
to specific issues
(cooperation regulated by a MOU)
5. The NTJRCB and its Sub-Commissions shall operate by cooperating with existing insti
tutions. The NTJRCB shall establish memoranda of understanding (MOUs) to regulate
the cooperation between its Sub-Commissions with relevant existing institutions
and organizations in their respective fields (see Figure 4 for the NTJRCB SubCommission Structure).
6. The NTJRCB has subpoena powers to summon persons to appear before the
Commission and to secure documents. It shall respect procedural fairness and
ensure the confidentiality of witness testimony and information received. It is authorized
to disseminate its reports and studies to a wider public.
7. The NTJRCB shall provide technical support, advice, or any other services on matters
concerning transitional justice and reconciliation within its competence and availability to
other bodies upon request.
8. The NTJRCB shall report to the President on a regular basis about achievements
and progress in the implementation of its mandate.
9. The NTJRCB and its Sub-Commissions shall have a budget at their disposal and
will be supported by a secretariat. The budget shall also cover the costs of at least
one meeting of the Civil Society Forum and of the Advisory Board per year.
10. The NTJRCB shall hire an Executive Director who shall establish an Executive Office
(hereafter the NTJRCB Secretariat) that will provide administrative, financial, and
technical support to the NTJRCB and to the four Sub-Commissions to implement
their respective mandates. The NTJRCB Secretariat shall include a gender adviser.
B. Recommend to the President the creation of four Sub-Commissions of the

NTJRCB as part of the institutional vehicle to realize all aspects of the dealing
with the past strategy:

Sub-Commission on Bangsamoro Historical Memory;

Sub-Commission against Impunity and on the Promotion of Accountability
and Rule of Law in the Bangsamoro;
Sub-Commission on Land Dispossession in the Bangsamoro;
Sub-Commission on Bangsamoro Healing and Reconciliation.
1. The Sub-Commission on Bangsamoro Historical Memory has the following mandate:

a. To contribute to confidence building in communities affected by the conflict

through fact finding and truth seeking, while ensuring their protection, safety
and dignity. In particular, the Sub-Commission shall listen to the testimony
of victims in closed or public hearings, in order to collect witness statements
and evidence related to specific violent events;
b. To investigate serious violations of international human rights and international

humanitarian law, focusing, inter alia, on specific emblematic cases of mass
atrocity crimes, of land dispossession, and of conflict-related sexual and
gender-based violence. In particular, the Sub-Commission shall investigate
to determine whether such forms of violence were practiced as a deliberate
strategy of war in the Bangsamoro conflict;
c. To publish a series of reports about the above mentioned events and cases
of IHRL and IHL violations, which include an analysis of the findings and
recommendations related to individual, collective, and symbolic forms
of reparations, accountability for crimes committed, institutional reforms,
and reconciliation;
d. To establish archives and a database on violations of international human

rights and international humanitarian law in the Bangsamoro from 1948 until
the present. In particular, the Sub-Commission shall create a database on
conflict-related human casualties.
2. The Sub-Commission against Impunity and on the Promotion of Accountability and

Rule of Law in the Bangsamoro has the following mandate:

a. To identify, investigate, and recommend policies, operational means, and

concrete measures to address and overcome practices of impunity at all
levels, whether of a technical, political, or financial nature and whether
related to past or present wrongdoings;
b. To request disciplinary procedures against public officials who fail to cooperate

or who obstruct justice and the rule of law.
77
78
3. The Sub-Commission on Land Dispossession in the Bangsamoro has the following

mandate:

a. To address issues related to land dispossession, use, and tenure in the conflictaffected areas in the Bangsamoro by developing and/or implementing a dispute
resolution mechanism for land conflicts, including indigenous peoples (IPs)
claims on ancestral domains, and for identifying lands where there are competing
claimants;
b. To create a database on actual land ownership in the Bangsamoro and on land

dispossession that can be used to support legal proceedings and restitution/
reparation programs, including cadastral, geo-tagged, and community-based
participatory mapping sets;
c. To support the overall redesign of land services in the Bangsamoro, including

changes in the legal framework and all procedures related to land titling, registration,
taxation, and management, including IP claims on ancestral domains.
4. The Sub-Commission on Bangsamoro Healing and Reconciliation has the following

mandate:

a. To identify and support traditional practices of reconciliation at the community

level;
b. To develop and promote a meaningful process for national reconciliation with a

view to encouraging cultural and attitudinal change;
c. To support the above mentioned Sub-Commissions in the implementation of

their mandate by shaping and promoting a reconciliatory vision for each of them.
Each Sub-Commission shall cooperate with relevant national, regional, and local institutions, both
governmental and nongovernmental, to implement its mandate (see Figure 3 for a model of the
Sub-Commission structure and operations).
C. Recommend to civil society organizations performing in fields related to dealing with the past
the creation of a Civil Society Forum for Transitional Justice and Reconciliation in the Bangsamoro
that shall be culturally and socially representative of the Bangsamoro and gender-balanced in its
composition.
1. The task of the Civil Society Forum shall be to monitor the work of the NTJRCB and to
support it in the implementation of its mandate. In particular, it shall enhance the voices
of victims to ensure that their needs in the area of rehabilitation are articulated and ad
dressed.
2. The Civil Society Forum shall meet at least once a year to review the work of the
NTJCRB based on reports by its representatives and to formulate any proposals or
recommendations in this regard.
3. The Civil Society Forum shall propose a list of five names on the basis of a transparent
nomination and selection process, from among which the President shall choose two
persons to represent civil society as ex officio, nonvoting members of the NTJRCB.
D. Recommend to the President the creation of an Advisory Board to the NTJRCB,
composed of eminent national and, if deemed useful, international personages with
proven expertise in the field of dealing with the past. The objective of the Advisory
Board is to provide advice and support to the overall process of transitional justice,
healing, and reconciliation.
Part II Specific recommendations for further discussion and implementation on dealing
with the past, healing, and reconciliation
The recommendations listed below arose in connection with the TJRC Consultation Process, in
particular during TJRC Listening Process sessions, as part of TJRC Study Group reflections, and
as results of the Key Policy Interviews.
They have been edited with the dealing with the past framework in mind and are complementary
to the proposed mandate of the National Transitional Justice and Reconciliation Commission on
the Bangsamoro (NTJRCB) and its Sub-Commissions. Existing institutions and organizations
can implement these recommendations within their existing mandates and, as foreseen in the
mandate of NTJRCB, they can cooperate with the NTJRCB to achieve this global endeavor.
The spirit of these additional recommendations reflects the profound awareness that
a process of dealing with the past, healing, and reconciliation is an endeavor that must engage
the whole society.
Reference is made in these recommendations to the future Bangsamoro authorities, as foreseen in
the proposed Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL). At the time when the recommendations were
formulated, the BBL was still under debate in the Sixteenth Congress of the Philippines. The
TJRC is of the opinion that the current impasse in the peace process should not be seen as an
obstacle, but rather as an opportunity to create a framework for normalization. Many, if not
all, of the proposals formulated below can be considered for implementation in the
circumstances prevailing under the ARMM administration.
The Right to Truth:
79
80
The right of victims and of society at large to know the truth

and the duty of the State to preserve memory
1. To the Commission on Human Rights (CHR), the Department of Justice (DOJ), and
the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) in cooperation with the
Sub-Commission on Bangsamoro Historical Memory:

a. Contribute to the investigations to be undertaken by the Sub-Commission.
b. Support the establishment of a national and Bangsamoro system of archives

and a database on IHRV and IHL violations (with disaggregation of data
according to gender, age, ethnic, religious, and other appropriate categories).
c. Promote community-based human rights education for all people.
d. Expand and strengthen the capacity of the ARMM Regional Human Rights
Commission (RHRC) in the inventory of past and present human rights violations
in the Bangsamoro.
2. To the future Bangsamoro authorities in cooperation with relevant institutions at the

national and regional levels, in particular the National Historical Commission of the
Philippines (NHCP), the CHR, the Department of Education (DepEd) and the
Commission on Higher Education (CHEd), the Philippine Commission on Women
(PCW), the National Commission for Culture and the Arts (NCCA), the Cultural Center
of the Philippines (CCP), the National Film Development Council (NFDC), the National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), and the National Commission on Muslim
Filipinos (NCMF) with the support of NTJRCB:

a. Establish a Bangsamoro Center for History, Culture, and the Arts with the
following mandate:
i. To collect and preserve oral history accounts, material and nonmaterial

artifacts, art and cultural objects of significance for the culture and
historical memory of the Bangsamoro and indigenous peoples;
ii. To cooperate with national, regional, and local entities in the elaboration
of new schoolbooks on history and culture of the Bangsamoro and
indigenous peoples and to realize public education campaigns;
iii.To promote cultural and historical markers within the territory of

Bangsamoro and, as appropriate, elsewhere in the Philippines.
b. Launch a national and international research program on the cultural and ethno
linguistic diversity of the Bangsamoro and indigenous peoples in Mindanao and
the Sulu archipelago.
c. Produce and disseminate information material and engage in public education

campaigns (including training for local and national media) about the history and
culture of the Bangsamoro and indigenous peoples at the national and regional
levels through school history books, museum exhibits, films, and the arts.
d. Realize new public programs to share the experience of the Bangsamoro

conflict from different perspectives, including debates on the topic of
coexistence and reconciliation, with a view to creating a vision for the
common good in the Bangsamoro and in the Philippines.
3. To the future Bangsamoro authorities in charge of education, the DepEd and CHEd, the NCCA,
PCW, and CCP:

a. Develop culturally and gender-sensitive educational material related to the

Bangsamoro and indigenous people for the national curricula in all regions and
at all levels.
b. Create an educational program, targeting schools at all a grade level that

explains the history of the Bangsamoro and indigenous peoples, their
culture and their contribution to the Philippine history and identity.
c. Strengthen Islamic education and the madaris system as an integral part of the
Philippine educational system.
d. Create joint, mixed, and gender-balanced technical working groups (Bangsamoro,

indigenous peoples, Philippine) in the field of education with a view to addressing
curricula and education issues and to promote mutual knowledge, diversity, and
exchange among schools.
e. Ensure continuing improvements in the quality of education, in particular through

teacher training in the use of state of the art educational resources.
81
82
Right to Justice:
The right of victims to a fair remedy
and the duty of the State to investigate and prosecute
1. To the President, the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the CHR:

a. Address impunity through the prosecution of perpetrators of grave,

nonprescriptive IHRL and IHL violations.
b. Conduct a mapping and an inventory of criminal cases related to the

Bangsamoro conflict; expedite the resolution and decision making on these
cases, including for purposes of amnesty.
2. To the GPH and MILF Peace Panels and the DOJ with the support of the SubCommission against Impunity and on the Promotion of Accountability and Rule of
Law in the Bangsamoro:

a. Complete the fact-finding research related to the cases of amnesty

mentioned in the Normalization Annex of the Comprehensive Agreement
on the Bangsamoro (CAB) as a confidence-building measure. The DOJ shall
take appropriate and timely decisions related to these cases in conformity
with Protocol II of the Geneva Convention.
3. To the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), including its Judge-Advocate Generals
Office (JAGO) and Provost-Marshal; the Witness Protection Program within the
DOJ; the Office of the Ombudsman; the Public Attorneys Office (PAO); the Philippine
National Police (PNP); the CHR; the Civil Service Commission (CSC), and the
Commission on Audit (COA) in cooperation with the Sub-Commission against
Impunity and on the Promotion of Accountability and Rule of Law:

a. Identify, investigate, and recommend ways, policies and initiatives to over

come practices of impunity at all levels whether related to past and present
wrongdoings or to war crimes. Particular attention shall be paid to those
involving civilian police or military personnel with records of pending
unresolved cases.
b. Request disciplinary procedures against public officials who fail to cooperate

or obstruct justice and the rule of law.
c. Identify potential areas for corruption and ways to prevent and redress
corruption.
d. Propose and monitor the implementation of stringent measures against

abuse of power.
e. Propose capacity training to support officials and institutions to address

impunity and corruption.
f. Develop programs to identify and vet corrupt, elected public officials and civil
servants and monitor their implementation.
g. Review the policy of bounty/reward that leads to miscarriages of justice,

including prosecutions reliance on lone witnesses, and make recommendations
for action.
4. To the DOJ, and the CHR and the Regional Human Rights Commission (RHRC) of
the ARMM with the support of Sub Commission against Impunity and on the
Promotion of Accountability and Rule of Law:

a. Address the proliferation of paramilitary groups and private armies and their
commission of human rights violations by thorough investigations and by
prosecuting them to the full extent of the law.
5. To the DOJ, the future Bangsamoro authorities, the PNP, Department of Social
Welfare and Development (DSWD) and local government units (LGUs) in the
ARMM, the PCW, the NCMF, and NCIP in strong cooperation with the
Sub-Commission against impunity and on the Promotion of Accountability and Rule
of Law:

a. Identify the challenges and failures in the Philippines justice system and
formulate proposals as to how these can be overcome.
b. Make recommendations to ensure the efficient delivery of culturally and

gender-sensitive public services at community level.
The Right to Reparation:
83
84
The right of individual victims or their beneficiaries to reparation

and the duty of the state to provide satisfaction
1. To the GPH and MILF Peace Panels, the future Bangsamoro authorities, the Office of
the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP), the DOJ, the CHR, the
NCIP, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), representatives of nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) and civil society organizations (CSOs), justices of the Supreme
Court, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Land
Management Bureau (LMB), Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), Department
of Agriculture (DA), Department of National Defense (DND), the AFP, the Department
of Budget and Management (DBM), and the National Economic and Development
Authority (NEDA) in cooperation with the Sub-Commission on Land Dispossession in
the Bangsamoro:

a. Address issues related to land dispossession, use, and tenure in the

conflict-affected areas in Mindanao by developing and/or implementing a
dispute-resolution mechanism for land conflicts, including indigenous
peoples claims on ancestral domains.
b. Identify lands where there are competing claimants.
c. Retrieve and store data and build a database on actual land ownership in the
Bangsamoro.
d. Support the overall redesign of land services, including a unified cadastral

framework, changes in the legal framework and in procedures related to land
titling, land registration, land taxation, and land management within the
administrative territory, including indigenous peoples claims on ancestral
domains.
2. To the NHCP, DepEd and CHEd, NCCA, NCIP, NCMF, and PCW and to the future
Bangsamoro authorities:

a. Integrate in the curricula at all educational levels:
i. Subjects on Bangsamoro history, indigenous peoples history, and cor

responding lessons in art, literature, and language by promoting
intercultural exchange and cultural diversity;
ii. Peace education, gender studies, and nonviolent conflict management.
3. To the Bangsamoro Center on History, Culture and Arts with the NHCP, the DepEd
and CHEd, the NCCA, the PCW, the NCIP, the NCMF, and the future Bangsamoro
authorities:
a. Conduct an inventory of places that have been named or renamed to hon

or colonial personages and others who are perceived to have violated the
rights of the Bangsamoro and indigenous peoples, and suggest ways to
redress the situation through a consultative and participatory process.
b. Identify and memorialize the principal historical sites related to the Bangsamoro
and indigenous peoples.
c. Propose a global plan of memorialization in consultation with civil society with

a view to:
i. memorializing specific tragic events and events and honoring victims

(including women);
i. identifying and (re)habilitating specific sites as sites of conscience;
ii.identifying lost cultural assets and ensuring the recovery of cultural

items taken during the conflict.
4. The CHR and the ARMM Regional Human Rights Commission (RHRC) with the
Bangsamoro Centre on History, Culture and Arts, the NCCA, PCW, NCIP, NCMF,
HRVCB, the Memorialization Commission, and the Board of Trustees of the
Bantayog ng mga Bayani:

a. Include Bangsamoro and indigenous peoples who were victims of Martial

Law, while paying attention to the specificity (i.e. ethnoreligious, gender) of
their victimhood and to the root causes of their struggle in the memorialization
initiatives honoring Martial Law victims.
5. To the national and the future Bangsamoro authorities, the DSWD, the Department
of Health (DOH), PCW, NCIP, and NCMF:

a. Accelerate the provision of basic services as well as specialized health care services in
the ARMM/the Bangsamoro entity, including specialized care for individuals who
may have suffered physical and mental disabilities linked to conflict-, gender-,
and identity-based violence.
b. Develop cultural and gender-sensitive, psychosocial healing services for the

Bangsamoro and indigenous peoples who have suffered traumatic
experiences, in particular trauma associated with sexual violence.
c. Encourage the hiring of Moro and IP health care workers, especially women,
and provide support for traditional health care practices.
85
86
d. Issue an internal directive for the provision of preferential free access to

health and social services, as well as educational opportunities for widows
and orphans of war.
e. Elaborate a victim/survivor-oriented, conflict- and gender-sensitive

development plan with preferential measures for war-affected
communities.
6. To the future Bangsamoro authorities and appropriate civil society, cultural, and
religious leaders, with the support of the Bangsamoro Center on History, Culture
and Arts, NCMF, and NCIP:

a. Hold regular interethnic forums and dialogues especially among the various
Muslim ethnolinguistic groups, between Bangsamoro and indigenous
groups, and between Muslims and Christian settler communities in the
Bangsamoro.
b. Develop dialogue spaces for Bangsamoro and indigenous peoples to share

common stories and cultural practices/traditions that promote healing.
7. To the DepEd and CHEd, NCCA, CCP, PCW, and NFDC with the support of NTJRCB:

a. Encourage and disseminate specific film documentaries, feature films, and

artistic productions with a view to generating an understanding of and
positive awareness about cultural and religious diversity.
b. Generate film documentaries on the history of the Bangsamoro, their historical

grievances and human rights violations to be shown in schools to students
and in movie theaters to a general audience.
c. Promote Bangsamoro and indigenous culture through festivals of the arts

that are respectful of traditional world views and ways of living.
8. To the CHR and the ARMM RHRC, NEDA, the future Bangsamoro authorities, the
Mindanao Development Authority (MinDA), and the Bangsamoro Development
Authority (BDA) with the support of the Sub-Commission on Land Dispossession in
the Bangsamoro and the Sub-Commission on Bangsamoro Historical Memory:

a. Based on the findings of the Sub-Commission on Bangsamoro Historical

Memory, ensure the creation and implementation of a culture and gendersensitive reparation program guided by the UN Basic Principles and
Guidelines on the Right to Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross
Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law with particular attention given to restitution,
compensation, and rehabilitation.
9. To the Human Rights Victims Claims Board (HRVCB), CHR, and ARMM RHRC

a. Authorize the NTJRCB to access the database of the HRVCB and CHR
with respect to claims submitted by Martial Law victims or to cases of IHRL
and IHL violations in Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago, both prior to,
during, and after the Martial Law period.
10. To the AFP and PNP

a. Contribute to symbolic reparations by offering formal apologies for their

respective role in the commission of or failure to prevent human rights and
humanitarian law violations, as well as for specific incidents known to
Bangsamoro communities and to the AFP or PNP alike. In such a case,
the AFP or PNP shall contribute to material reparations, e.g., by rebuilding
homes, mosques, madrasahs, and other community infrastructure in
affected Bangsamoro communities.
b. Authorize the NTJRCB to access archival material and database information
that is relevant to its mandate. The AFP or PNP shall protect institutional
archives of all kinds related to IHRL and IHL violations.
11. To the future Bangsamoro authorities and DENR in cooperation with the SubCommission on Land Dispossession in the Bangsamoro:

a. Conduct an inventory of corporate firm leaseholds or grants for reforestation

projects that cut across ancestral domain and land claims.
b. Rationalize forest reservation at the regional level.
c. Authorize the NTJRCB to access data from the Presidential Commission

on Good Government (PCGG) on:

i. Cases involving concessions granted by the Marcos dictatorship

over State-controlled land in Mindanao for timber, mining, or other

natural resource exploitation to individuals or business entities

owned or controlled by those considered as business associates of

the Marcos family under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, and 13.

ii. Cases involving the purchase, lease, or takeover of coconut farms

or coconut oil production facilities in provinces within the ARMM,

using the Coconut Industry Investment Fund (CIIF) and related

coconut levy money.
87
88
Guarantees of Non-Recurrence:
The right of victims and society at large to protection from further violations
and the duty of the State to ensure good governance and the rule of law
1. To the President and the future Bangsamoro authorities and relevant institutions
such as the CHR, ARMM RHRC, DSWD, DOH, and LGUs:

a. Adopt policies to break the cycle of internal displacement by providing

means for return with accompaniment and durable solutions especially for
internally displaced peoples in protracted displacement situations.
2. To the future Bangsamoro authorities in cooperation with the Office of the President,
DSWD, and BDA with the support of the private sector:

a. Develop and ensure the availability of the full range of social services to
support inclusive economic growth and stable livelihoods for the population
in the Bangsamoro.
b. Engage in a sustained dialogue with the private sector and future Bangsamoro
authorities to search for ways to promote ecologically and socially
responsible development in the Bangsamoro region. Particular
attention shall be paid to the formulation of guidelines on ecologically
and socially responsible investments in war-affected areas.
3. To the ARMM Regional Reconciliation and Unification Commission (RRUC), ARMM

RHRC, and the future Bangsamoro authorities with the support of religious leaders
and civil society organizations:

a. Enhance the capacity of the ARMM RRUC in resolving conflicts through

partnerships with Moro and indigenous leaders.
4. To the national DepEd and CHEd and educational authorities at the Bangsamoro
level:

a. Develop curricula for higher degrees in law at universities, including training

in Shariah law as well as traditional mediation mechanisms and justice
procedures.
5. To the relevant institutions concerned with land issues in the national government,
the future Bangsamoro authorities or the ARMM Regional Government, and the
Sub-Commission on Land Dispossession in the Bangsamoro:
a. Address claims related to ancestral domains, implement IPRA, and devolve

NCIP in ARMM.
6. To the future Bangsamoro authorities, and the agency members of the National
Steering Committee on Women, Peace and Security (NSCWPS), namely, OPAPP,
PCW, the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), the Department of the Interior and
Local Governments (DILG), DND, DSWD, DOJ, NCMF, and NCIP:

a. Institutionalize capacity building for women in the Bangsamoro towards their

empowerment and the recognition of the integrality of their rights, including property
rights.
b. Support the future Bangsamoro authorities in continuing, strengthening, or

expanding existing structures and mechanisms for women at different levels (e.g.,
the Regional Commission on Bangsamoro Women or RCBW and provincial
womens councils).
c. Ensure the meaningful political participation of Moro and indigenous women in

national, regional, and local bodies.
d. Enhance the National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security to include
a Regional and/or Local Action Plan on UN Resolution 1325 and 1820 in
the ARMM.
7. To the Senate of the Philippines and House of Representatives:

a. Pass a Bangsamoro Basic Law to provide the political and institutional infra
structure to pursue the peace agreements.

b. Support the national dealing with the past and reconciliation process, through
the enactment of laws and amendments to ensure the implementation of the
TJRC recommendations and provide the NTJRCB with the needed funding
and resources to carry out its mandate.
c. Invite the NTJRCB, or the specific Sub-Commission in charge, to report regularly

on progress realized in the national dealing with the past and reconciliation
process.
d. Request the Sub-Commission on Historical Memory to realize specific hearings

with victims in both the House and the Senate related to specific cases of
international human rights and international humanitarian law violations.
e. Adopt laws that contribute to reconciliation.
f. Support a Presidential apology with an official ceremony, including a minute of

silence each month for all the victims of the Bangsamoro conflict.
89
90
g. Encourage and create conditions for political parties to have informed positions
on Bangsamoro.
h. Create a Commission on the Promotion of Diversity in both the House and the
Senate, mandated to develop a legal framework that promotes intercultural
understanding based on the principles of exchange of knowledge, practice of
tolerance, and acceptance of diversity.
8. To the AFP:

a. In cooperation with Sub-Commission on Land Dispossession in Bangsamoro,

assess the process of appropriation and legal ownership of property
occupied by military camps and seek ways to restore that property
to its rightful owners or to provide adequate compensation, when
warranted.
b. Review the recruitment procedure of former MNLF combatants into the AFP
in terms of its quantitative and qualitative impact.
9. To the AFP and the PNP:

a. Strengthen cooperation with RRUC, the future Bangsamoro authorities or

ARMM, and justice institutions in addressing local conflicts.
b. Encourage recruitment of Moro women into the AFP or PNP.
10. To the AFP, the PNP, and related offices such as the Philippine Military Academy
(PMA), the National Defense College of the Philippines (NDCP), Philippine
National Police Academy (PNPA), and the Philippines Public Safety College
(PPSC):

a. Address the practice of military hamleting, including the destruction and/or

defilement of religious structures during military operations with a view to
rectifying or compensating for damages.
b. Review the system of assignment of security sector personnel (AFP and

PNP) to Mindanao (e.g., deployment as punishment; fresh recruits; deployment
without education on Mindanao).
c. Set limits in terms of duration and number of AFP personnel that can be
deployed for military operations in Mindanao, so that the problems arising
from the assignment of military units unfamiliar with Bangsamoro contexts
and not trained in law enforcement operations are minimized.
d. Review the results of previous recommendations related to security sector

reform put forward by earlier commissions, such as the Davide, Feliciano,
and Melo Commissions, and continue to pursue full-fledged security sector

reform, including capacity training and the deployment of a recruitment
program based on integrative values, reflecting diversity, inclusion,
and sensitivity to culture and gender (e.g., women, peace and security).
e. Include lessons about Bangsamoro history and culture in the curricula of the
military academy.
11. To the LGUs in cooperation with the future Bangsamoro authorities, NEDA, MinDA,
and BDA with the support of the Sub-Commission on Land Dispossession in the
Bangsamoro:

a. Set up a one-stop shop assistance center for Bangsamoro and indigenous

peoples to focus on the problem of landlessness and access to public services.
b. Create a moratorium on the distribution of public lands and prevent the

declaration of public lands as alienable and disposable.
12. To relevant civil society organizations in the Bangsamoro and in the Philippines:

a. Constitute and participate in the Civil Society Forum for Transitional Justice
and Reconciliation in the Bangsamoro with a view to monitoring the
implementation of the NTJRCB mandate.
b. Submit a list of five names of civil society representatives with the appropriate
moral standing and professional qualifications to the President for selection
to participate in the NTJRCB as ex officio, nonvoting members. Ensure that the
two persons selected are acting in representation of civil society and in the
interest of the victims of the conflict.
c. Support and cooperate with the NTJRCB in the implementation of

recommendations with a view to enhancing the satisfaction of victims and
strengthening the guarantee of non-recurrence.
13. To the International Community:

a. Create a Group of Friends of the NTJRCB based on the Paris and Busan
principles with a view to supporting the overall process towards reconciliation.
b. Support the work of the NTJRCB and its Sub-Commissions politically and
financially.
c. Integrate a victim-, gender- and conflict-sensitive approach into any project of

financial support to the NTJRCB and its Sub-Commissions as well as to the
Civil Society Forum.
91
92
d. Request information based on regular monitoring and reporting on the work of

the NTJRCB and its Sub-Commissions as well as on implementation of the
recommendations and efforts realized by the government and the future
Bangsamoro authorities towards reconciliation.
e. Request the Government of the Philippines to present regular progress reports

related to the work of the NTJRCB and its Sub-Commissions on the occasion
of the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) at the UN Human Rights Council.
recommendations and efforts realized by the government and the future Bangsamoro
authorities towards reconciliation.
e. Request the Government of the Philippines to present regular progress reports related to
the work of the NTJRCB and its Sub-Commissions on the occasion of the Universal
Periodic Review (UPR) at the UN Human Rights Council.
END NOTES
Endnotes
1
See below under TJRC Recommendations Part I for the proposed mandate of the National Transitional
Justice and Reconciliation Commission on the Bangsamoro (NTJRCB).
2
The Terms of Reference (ToRs) of the TJRC are included in this report as Annex One.
The list of organizations visited are found in Annex Two.
It is important to underscore that the TJRC bases its analysis and recommendations on the presumption
that facts cited in published research have been properly investigated and duly cross-checked, in
particular when referring to violations of international human rights (IHR) and international humanitarian
law (IHL). The TJRC decided that references to IHR and IHL violations should stem from multiple sources
to be regarded as credible for this report. These sources were considered to be sufficient for the TJRC to
form its general opinion and to propose recommendations.
5
The principles against impunity were developed by UN Special Rapporteur Louis Joinet at the behest of
the UN Sub-Commission on the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights and submitted as his part of
his final report in 1997. See: E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/20/Rev 1. Available at:
http://193.194.138.190/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/a0a22578a28aacfc8025666a00372708?Opendocument
(accessed on 20 October 2015).
The UN Sub-Commission mandated Special Rapporteur Diane Orentlicher to undertake a revision of the
principles some few years later. The revision (E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1) focused on identifying best
practices in combating impunity and did not significantly re-formulate the principles themselves. Available
at:
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G05/109/00/PDF/G0510900.pdf?OpenElement
6
The UN Sub-Commission also mandated a report on impunity in relation to the violation of economic,
social, and cultural rights. Known as the Guiss report, it was submitted by Special Rapporteur El Hadji
Guiss in June 1997. Available at: http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/impu/guissee.html (accessed on 20
October 2015).
Other relevant UN reports are the proposed guidelines on reparation submitted by Theo van Boven
included in the Report of the Independent Expert on the Right to Restitution, Compensation and
Rehabilitation of Victims of Grave Violations of Human Rights, E/CN.4/1999/65. Available at:
http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/TestFrame/c14e536f497cc6ee8025674c004fd5de?Opendo
cument (accessed on 28 November 2015); UN Secretary Generals Report on The Rule of Law and
Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, S/2004/616. Available at:
http://www.unrol.org/files/2004%20report.pdf (accessed on 28 November 2015); and the report of the UN
Special Rapporteur on the Promotion of Truth, Justice, Reparation and Guarantees of Non-Recurrence,
A/68/345. Available at: http://www.kpsrl.org/browse/browse-item/t/report-of-the-un-special-rapporteur-ontruth-justice-reparation-and-guarantees-of-non-recurrence (accessed on 28 November 2015).
7
See Annex Three on the TJRC conceptual framework for dealing with the past (DwP).
85
93
94
Dealing with the past (DwP) is used as a technical term throughout this report to connote a wide range
of activities to address past human rights abuses of a serious nature and, in some cases, also the root
causes of conflict. The TJRC chose to use dealing with the past in preference to the term transitional
justice, because transitional justice is often too narrowly identified with juridical mechanisms and because
DwP is a long-term process and not only limited to a transitional period.
9
See Carranza, Ruben. 2014. Transitional Justice in Mindanao and the Philippines. In: Moving Beyond:
Towards Transitional Justice in the Bangsamoro Peace Process, ed. Venus Betita, Manuel Domes,
Daniel Jaeger, Lotte Kirch, and Jeremy Simons. Davao City: Forum ZfD Philippines. Available at:
http://www.forumzfd.de/sites/default/files/downloads/forumZFDMoving_Beyond_Towards_Transitional_Justice_Bangsamoro_Peace_Process.pdf (accessed on 29
November 2015).
10
Sisson, Jonathan. September 2015. Dealing with the Past Assessment. A Draft Report, realized on
behalf of the TJRC. P. 1. (Hereinafter referred to as TJRC Dealing with the Past Draft Report). President
Ferdinand Marcos actually created two commissions: The first was a fact-finding commission called the
Fernando Commission which was short-lived; and the second, was an independent board known as the
Agrava Commission, established through Presidential Decree (PD) 1886. Text of the PD is available at:
http://www.chanrobles.com/presidentialdecrees/presidentialdecreeno1886.html#.VmLS93YrLrc
(accessed on 12 April 2015).
11
Executive Order No. 1, s. 1986 Creating the Presidential Commission on Good Government.
Available at: http://www.gov.ph/1986/02/28/executive-order-no-1-s-1986/ (accessed on 29 November
2015).
12
Executive Order No. 8, s. 1986 Creating the Presidential Committee on Human Rights. Available at:
http://www.gov.ph/1986/03/18/executive-order-no-8-s-1986/ (accessed on 29 November 2015).
13
Executive Order No.1, s. 2010 Creating the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010. Available at:
http://www.gov.ph/2010/07/30/executive-order-no-1-s-2010/ (accessed on 29 November 2015).
14
Dedace, Sohia. 7 December 2010. High Court Declares Truth Commission Unconstitutional. GMA
News Online. Available at: http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/207710/news/nation/high-courtdeclares-truth-commission-unconstitutional (accessed on 29 November 2015).
15
Text of RA 10683 is available at: http://www.gov.ph/2013/02/25/republic-act-no-10368/ (accessed on 4

December 2015).
16
See: TJRC Dealing with the Past Assessment Draft Report. P. 12.
17
The BBL version submitted by the Office of the President to the Sixteenth Philippine Congress on
September 10, 2014 came to be known as HB 4994 and SB 2408. These bills were viewed as the version
agreed on by the GPH and the MILF. The House of Representatives later introduced HB 5811, while
Senate submitted SB 2894. These were referred to as BLBAR (Basic Law on the Bangsamoro
Autonomous Region) bills and have been criticized by peace advocates for not being compliant with the
CAB.
18
TJRC Study Group on Legitimate Grievances Draft Report. October 2015. P. 11. (Hereinafter referred
to as TJRC Study Group on Legitimate Grievances Draft Report).
19
Guiam, Rufa. 17 October 2015. Transitional Justice from Below: Views and Voices from ConflictAffected Communities in Mindanao captured in the Listening Process P. 16. (Hereinafter referred to as
TJRC Listening Process Draft Report).
20
Ibid. Pp. 16-17.
86
21
The strong state-weak state dichotomy can also serve as a paradigm to understand the roots of
political grievance, whereby the strong state deploys an armada of laws and policies that disenfranchise
certain members of the polity, while the weak state fails to bring basic services and assistance to its
constituency. Marginalization of the Moros resulted from bothinstitutional performance in terms of
instrumentalizing and corrupting State mechanisms to support elite/dominant Christian interests and
institutional nonperformance in the context of neglecting the minoritized peoples.
22
Santos, Soliman, Jr. 2005. Evolution of the Armed Conflict on the Moro Front. A Background Paper
Submitted to the Human Development Network Foundation, Inc. for the Philippine Human Development
Report 2005.
Available at: http://hdn.org.ph/wp-content/uploads/2005_PHDR/2005%20Evolution_Moro_Conflict.pdf
23
See Mastura, Ishak V. 3 January 2003. Philippines: Bangsamoro, A Triumph of Western Diplomacy?
Small Wars Journal. Available at: http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/philippines-bangsamoro-a-triumphof-western-diplomacy (accessed on 22 October 2015).
See also: MILF Peace Panel and the Asia Foundation. 2010. GRP-MILF Peace Process, Compilation of
Signed Agreements and Other Related Documents (1997-2010).
To quote part of the letter of MILF Chairman Salamat Hashim to President George W. Bush, dated 20
January 2003:
() Your ambassador to the Philippines, His Excellency Francis J. Ricciardone, who recently addressed the
Foreign Correspondents Association of the Philippines, raised the question of the US Governments desire
to know what they (MILF) want or how its (the Problem) going to be resolved. We take this opportunity to
inform Your Excellency that the MILF is a national liberation organization, with leadership supported by the
Bangsamoro People, and with legitimate political goal to pursue the right of the Moro Nation to determine
their future and political status. As part of this process, we have an on-going negotiation with the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines to arrive at a negotiated political settlement of the Mindanao
conflict and the Bangsamoro problem, through the mediation and tender of good offices of the Government
of Malaysia. Your desire to be informed of the MILF goals reminds us of the historic, legal and political
relationship between the Moro Nation and the US Federal Government as borne out by documents, treaty
relations and instruments. Your official policy, under William McKinleys Instruction to the First Philippine
Commission of 1900, treated the Moro Nation initially as a Dependent Nation similar to North American
Indian Nations under treaty relations with the US Federal Government. Subsequently, the Moro Nation was
accorded the political status of a US protectorate under the Kiram-Bates Treaty of 1899, confirming the
Treaty of 1878 between Sultan of Sulu and Spain. Your policy to consider the Philippine archipelago as an
unincorporated territory of the United States paved the way for the US Government to administer affairs in
the Moro territories under a separate political form of governance under the Moro Province from the rest of
the Philippine Islands. Your project to grant Philippine independence obliged the leaders of the Moro Nation
to petition the US Congress to give us an option through a referendum either by remaining as a territory to
be administered by the US Government or granted separate independence 50 years from the grant of
Philippine independence. Were it not for the outbreak of the Pacific War, the Moro Nation would have been
granted trust territory status like any of the Pacific islands states who are now independent or in free
association with the United States of America. On account of such circumstances, the Moro Nation was
deprived of their inalienable right to self-determination, without waiving their plebiscitary consent. () We
are therefore appealing to the basic principle of American fairness and sense of justice to use your good
offices in rectifying the error that continues to negate and derogate the Bangsamoro Peoples fundamental
right to seek decolonization under the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1514 (XV) of 1960.
24
The Study Group on Legitimate Grievances took note that the term legitimate, when related to claims,
is often synonymous with what is considered legal and lawful and thus would have to be anchored on
legal instruments such as those codified in national and international law. However, in view of the
complexity of the collective grievances of the Bangsamoro, the LG Study Group defined as legitimate
those grievances which strongly relate to verifiable and identifiable causes, conditions, or circumstances
87
95
96
from which strong feelings of wrongs, hurts, protests, and resentments arise. TJRC Study Group on
Legitimate Grievances Draft Report. P. 11.
25
As quoted from the TJRC Study Group on Legitimate Grievances, Professor Abhoud Syed Lingga,
echoing the provision in Article 1, Section 1 of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), concluded that the secessionist movement in Mindanao was the right of peoples to determine
their political status and freely pursue their social, cultural, and economic development. However, this
right clashes with the principle of territorial integrity as embedded in the norm of state sovereignty. The
Philippines signed the ICCPR on 19 December 1966 and ratified it on 23 October 1986.
26
Santos. 2005. Obcit. P. 1.
27
An Interview with Hashim Salamat. Perhaps the Moro struggle for freedom and self-determination is
the longest and bloodiest in the entire history of mankind. Originally published in Nidaul Islam Magazine,
April-May 1998, Issue 23.
28
Quevedo, Orlando. 2003. Injustice: The Root of Conflict in Mindanao. A paper delivered by Cardinal
th
Quevedo, OMI, during the 27 General Assembly of the Bishops Businessmens Conference in Taguig, 8
July 2003. Originally published by Mindanews on 11 July 2003 and republished on 23 February 2014.
Available at: http://www.mindanews.com/mindaviews/2014/02/23/archives-quevedo-on-injustice-the-rootof-conflct-in-mindanao/ (accessed on 28 November 2015).
29
TJRC Listening Process. 13 May 2015. Lanao del Norte.
30
TJRC Listening Process. 13. May 2015. Lanao del Norte.
31
TJRC Listening Process. 20 April 2015, Sultan Kudarat; ibid. 19 March 2015, Jolo.
32
See: Philippine Daily Inquirer, 8 and 9 July 2000. P. 1. The TJRC also uncovered evidence that other
mosques have been desecrated. One example is the mosque in Manili, where the massacre took place in
June 1971. A photo taken during the Dealing with the Past Assessment field research also showed
another abandoned mosque with shell holes in Manili, which may have been desecrated during the 2000
all-out-war. For the TJRC, the evidence warrants further investigation.
According to a TJRC Key Policy Interview respondent, although there have been reforms in the security
sector, there still remains a mindset of ignorance and intolerance towards the Moros. TJRC Key Policy
Interview. 24 September 2015. Quezon City.
33
A Maranao elderly who attended the Listening Process in Iligan told a story of disrespect of not only the
living, but also the dead. For years, this Maranao family has been fighting to keep their ancestral
gravesite from being leveled and cut through by a road project by cement factories. The disputed burial
ground used to be part, centuries ago, of a larger enclave originally established by Sarip Makaalang and
his descendants. The bigger part of the enclave was granted to settlers who arrived in the 1950s. The
settlers then traded them off to real estate agents, who in turn sold them to cement corporations. The
burial sites are the last ground on which the community is standing firm. After a long standoff, the
companies relented, but built roads and quarry sites around and through the edge of the gravesite.
Finally, the hallowed ground was eroded by wind and rain, exposing the remains of their ancestors. This
is a total disrespect of our culture and tradition. Our ancestors will be angry at us, because we were not
able protect their remains, said an elderly descendant of Sarip Makaalang. TJRC Listening Process. 17
April 2015. Iligan City.
34
TJRC Key Policy Interview. 17 September 2015. Makati City.
35
TJRC Listening Process. 17 May 2015. South Cotabato.
88
36
Tan, Samuel. 2003. The Internationalization of the Bangsamoro Struggle. University of the Philippines,
Center for Integrative and Development Studies.
37
TJRC Listening Process. 20 April 2015. Sultan Kudarat; ibid. 18 May 2015. Nuro Upi, Maguindanao.
38
The TJRC Study Group on Historical Injustice, for example, cites the following studies that reflect the
negative perception toward Muslims: (1) a 1973 Filipina Foundation Study that showed strong bias and
prejudice of the Christian majority toward Muslims, indicating that they are the least likable ethnic group
in the Philippines; (2) a 1985 unpublished graduate thesis by Fredelino Caf that showed the negative
portrayal of Muslims in a national daily newspaper linked to terms such as rebel, terrorist, killer, and
outlaw; (3) a 2011 unpublished thesis by Vladymir Licudine on islamophobia in the Philippines; (4) the
results of an interfaith session with a prominent elementary private school in Metro Manila conducted by
the Institute of Islamic Studies, whereby sixth graders were found to associate Islam with known global
terrorist networks such as Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS); and (5) the results of a
study conducted on fourth year students at a State university depicting negative traits to describe Islam
and Muslims in the Philippines as violent, war freak, terrorists.
Earlier, in the context of the Philippines transitioning from colonial rule to self-governance, McKenna
(1998) observed that only Christian Filipinos were deemed entirely trustworthynon-Christian Filipinos
[were] deemed culturally suspectand regarded as socially and morally substandardMuslim-Filipinos,
comprising the largest single category of non-Christians, were judged to be dangerously disloyal because
of their long history of armed enmity toward Philippine Christians (Pp. 105-106). See: McKenna,
Thomas. 1998. Muslim rulers and rebels: Everyday politics and armed separatism in the Southern
Philippines. Berkeley/California: University of California Press.
39
TJRC Listening Process. 9 April 2015.Alamada, North Cotabato.
40
TJRC Dealing with the Past Assessment Draft Report. P. 21.
41
TJRC Listening Process. 29 April 2015. Lanao del Sur.
42
TJRC Listening Process. 08 April 2015. Kabacan, North Cotabato.
43
TJRC Listening Process. 19 April 2015. Upi, Maguindanao.
44
45
TJRC Listening Process. 08 April 2015. Sulu.
46
TJRC Listening Process. 20 April 2015. Darapanan, Sultan Kudarat, Maguindanao.
47
TJRC Listening Process. 07 April 2015. Simunul Municipality, Tawi-Tawi Island Cluster.
48
According to the findings of both Listening Processes and Study Group on Legitimate Grievances,
political grievances are those that pertain to disproportionate political representation and the
marginalization of the interests of their Muslim constituency as well as the Philippine States failure to
uphold and protect their rights, deliver critically needed services and assistance and guarantee the rule of
law. Legitimate grievances tied to economic disenfranchisement have been articulated to include the
loss/destruction of property and forced displacement due to armed conflict, development aggression, and
poverty, whereas social grievances are those relating to psycho-social impact of armed conflict and
transgenerational trauma, the phenomenon of othering, and widespread prejudice and discrimination.
Lastly, religious/cultural ignorance and disrespect, non-recognition of Moro contributions to the
national/mainstream narrative, and disregard for their own history and identity were identified as cultural
grievances.
89
97
98
49
Under the Benigno Aquino administration, the Philippine Government crafted the Philippine
Development Plan (PDP) for 2011 to 2016 that included peace and security in the development agenda.
Under PDPs intermediate outcome number 2cause of armed conflict and other issues that affect
peace process effectively addressedthe following items were listed as contributory to the realization of
this objective: (1) land disputes; (2) human rights violations; (3) good governance; (4) internal
displacement; (5) PAMANA Pillar 2 on establishing resilient communities; (6) PAMANA Pillar 3 on
addressing regional development; (7) peace and social cohesion; (8) security sector reform; (9) women;
(10) children in armed conflict; and (11) ancestral domain. See the full text of PDP at:
http://www.neda.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/pdprm2011-2016.pdf (accessed on 23 November
2015).
50
Speech of President Benigno S. Aquino III during the ceremonial turnover and decommissioning of the
MILF Combatants. 16 June 2015. Available at: http://www.gov.ph/2015/06/16/english-speech-ofpresident-aquino-during-the-ceremonial-turnover-of-weapons-and-decommissioning-of-the-milfcombatants (accessed on 24 November 2015).
51
Sajahatra Bangsamoro. Available at: http://www.opapp.gov.ph/sajahatra-bangsamoro (accessed on 26

November 2015)
52
TJRC Historical Injustice Study Group. Final Report. 5 October 2015. Pp. 6-7. (Hereinafter referred to
as TJRC Historical Injustice Study Group Report).
53
TJRC Listening Process Draft Report, p. 26; TJRC Historical Injustice Study Group Report, p. 9.
54
According to the TJRC Historical Injustice Study Group Report, experienced identities are identity
claims based on lived experiences of who they are and how they are treated by others. Perceived
identities, on the other hand, are based on a groups claim to have a common understanding of who they
are, while imagined identities refer to conjured images of who they are based on narratives (fictive or
real) from forefathers. Pp. 9-10.
55
Several State institutions, in the course of the history of the Bangsamoro, have been instrumental in the
perpetuation of injustice over time. Foremost of which are the colonial governments of Spain and the
US that reconfigured Mindanao to serve resource-based interests through a variety of land policies and
military-forms of governance. On the one hand, existing governance structures in Mindanao (i.e.,
Sultanates) were dispossessed of political power, while the Moros and IPs were dispossessed of their
lands. In the case of the latter, communal/Moro lands were transformed into private property (by settlers)
and corporate landholdings, fueling the rise of the resettlement and corporate sites into economic
enclaves that make up todays densely populated provinces of Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur, Lanao del
Norte, South Cotabato, North Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Basilan, and Tawi-Tawi. This practice was
carried on by the post-colonial Philippine government through the instrumentalization and corruption of
State mechanisms (i.e., laws) and organizations (i.e., military) as well as the institutionalization of a
Christian, elite-led self-image of a monolithic Philippine nation through a process of cultural assimilation
and of state-engineered demographic shifts. The institutionalization of (direct) violence against the
Bangsamoro, particularly, in light of the strategic use of paramilitaries to cleanse Moro and IP
communities, has been solidified during the Martial Law regime.
56
Educational institutions and historians may have been unwitting supporters of historical injustice in a
way that narratives of the Bangsamoro and IPs have not been part of the mainstream study and teaching
of Philippine History. Where they are included, they are depicted in negativesas bandits or criminals. In
the case of media, they help reproduce and refuel myths against the Moros by adopting and repeating
ethnoreligious labels.
57
For example, in 1992, President Fidel V. Ramos launched a nationwide consultation aimed at
developing a strategy for talks with various armed groups in the country. A National Unification
Commission (NUC) was established to conduct the consultation process. The NUC produced a
90
government policy frame known as the Six Paths to Peace that guided subsequent government
administrations on peace processes. The creation of the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace
Process (OPAPP) was one of the NUCs institutional recommendations.
58
TJRC Listening Process Draft Report. P. 34.
59
Ibid.
60
TJRC Key Policy Interview. 17 September 2015. Cotabato City.
61
Stories of Moro resistance to American colonization were gathered during the Listening Process
sessions with participants from the Lanao areas.
62
Jubair, Salah. 2000. Bangsamoro: A Nation Under Endless Tyranny. Kuala Lumpur: IQ Marin.
63
TJRC Listening Process. 22 March 2015. Lanao del Sur.
64
TJRC Listening Process. 15 April 2015. Lanao del Sur.
65
TJRC Listening Process. 19 May 2015. Tupi, South Cotabato.
66
The heightening of the Islamic system in Sulu/Tawi-Tawi also contributed to this development.
67
For example, according to one Listening Process participant, who was forced to seek work abroad:
Women like me need to go abroad, when there are no opportunities for employment in Basilan. It is
very difficult to work abroad, because our employer has a different culture from that which we have here.
TJRC Listening Process. 14 June 2015. Basilan.
68
Historically, this has been the case as well. It is well known that the campaign undertaken by the US
Army against Moro insurgents in Sulu involved the massacre of women and children. Reporting on the
battle of Bud Dajo in March 1906, the New York Times highlighted the killing of the non-combatants.
See: The New York Times. 11 March 1906. Women and Children Killed in Moro Battle. Available at:
http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archivefree/pdf?res=9A0DEED7103EE733A25752C1A9659C946797D6CF (accessed on 17 March 2015).
In June 1913, troops under US command committed a similar massacre of a Moro community, including
an unknown number of women and children, in Bud Bagsak, Sulu. The account recorded in the 1913
Report of the Philippine Commission to the Secretary of War, however, suggests that practically all the
non-combatants had left the Moro stronghold before a surprise attack was staged. See: Report of the
Philippine Commission to the Secretary of War 1913. 1914. Washington. Available at:
https://ia700709.us.archive.org/6/items/reportofphil00unit/reportofphil00unit.pdf (accessed on 17 March
2015).
69
TJRC Listening Process. 19 April 2015. Kalamansig, Sultan Kudarat.
70
The following analysis is based on the section on history education in the Dealing with the Past
Assessment Draft Report. Pp. 10-11.
71
Universal Declaration on Human Rights. Available at: http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/ (accessed

on 20 October 2015).
72
Under IHL, mass atrocity crimes comprise war crimes or grave breach of the laws of war as provided
for in the Geneva Conventions and its Additional Protocols such as murder, mutilation, cruel and
inhumane treatment, torture, outrages on personal dignity, hostage taking, executions, intentionally
directing attacks against civilians and religious artifacts, pillage, rape and other forms of sexual violence
91
99
100
(including sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, enforced pregnancy), child soldiers, and enforced
displacement committed as part of a plan or policy and conducted on a large scale basis. Furthermore,
mass atrocity crimes are also considered crimes against humanity, which are acts that constitute
widespread and systematic attack directed against civilian population. A useful reference is: Human
Rights Watch. 2010. Genocide, Crimes against Humanity, and War Crimes. New York, NY. Available at:
http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/MC1/MC1-Part2Section1.pdf (accessed 20 October 2015).
73
Given the convergence of IHRL and IHL in contexts of armed conflict, it is worthy to note the obligations
of various actors. In the case of States, they are the primary duty bearers that have both positive
obligations (i.e., an obligation to do something) and negative obligations (i.e., an obligation not to do
something). State obligations with respect to human rights in times of armed conflict include rights that
have been violated directly (as in the case of torture) or rights that have been impacted on indirectly (such
as the right to education); State obligations regarding IHL imposes the imperative to protect civilians and
property. Furthermore, States are obligated to investigate and prosecute alleged violations of IHRL and
IHL in times of armed conflict. More importantly, when non-state actorssuch as paramilitariesare
linked to the State, under certain circumstances, States are also responsible for acts carried out by nonState actors. See, for example: UN Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights. 2011.
International Legal Protection of Human Rights in Armed Conflict. New York/Geneva. Available at:
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/HR_in_armed_conflict.pdf (accessed on 20 October 2015).
74
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention and Protocol II applies to all Parties to the conflict,
including non-state armed actors. More recently, developments in international criminal law now cover
non-state actors as individuals (whether as members or leaders of the group), who can be held liable for
the commission of grave and/or mass atrocity crimes, such as war crimes, crimes against humanity, and
genocide.
75
From the perspective of conduct of hostilities paradigm, certain principles govern the use of force. For
example, under the principle of distinction, it is prohibited to launch indiscriminate and disproportionate
attacks, while under the principle of precaution, there should be an intent to minimize harm to civilian
populations and objects. See: Gaggioli, Gloria. November 2013. The Use of Force in Armed Conflict:
Interplay between the Conduct of Hostilities and Law Enforcement Paradigms. Geneva, Switzerland.
Available at: https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/publications/icrc-002-4171.pdf (accessed on 20 October
2015).
76
For an account of the controversy surrounding the Jabidah massacre, see: Vitug, Marites Daguilan
and Glenda M. Gloria. 18 March 2013. Jabidah and Merdeka: The inside story. Available at:
http://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/24025-jabidah-massacre-merdeka-sabah (accessed on 30 March
2015). The National Historical Commission (NHC) established a commemorative marker on Corregidor
Island to denote the place of the reported killings in March 2015, some forty-seven years after the event.
77
A survivor recalled the details of the Malisbong Massacre during a TJRC Listening Process session in
Sultan Kudarat on 17 May 2015:
th
th
th
TH
When the 15 IB, 16 IB, 25 IB and 27 IB arrived, it was four days after the start of the Ramadan. We
were fasting then. One morning, the army went around the area. They first got the barangay officials and
one Municipal Councilor, named Hadji Tatu. They were gathered together and were about 1,000 individuals,
including the barangay officials and municipal official. They were the first ones who were captured and never
came back. There were also more than 1,000 persons who were left inside the mosque. Every day in the
mosque, the army would get 1 to 10 persons. Those who were inside the mosque would hear shots of fire
hours after these people were taken outside. And those who were taken outside never came back. After one
month, Hadji Drews Ali, the Mayor of Palembang, arrived together with Capt. Tayumo to get 200 people,
who were inside the mosque. But they were only able to take 150 peoplethere were 4 people from the 150
that were rescued. We never knew what happened to those who were left inside the mosque. My
grandfather (father of my mother) was buried alive and another relative was nailed to a cross like Christ.
Everyday inside the mosque. I had relatives taken7 to 9 relatives were taken outside, but only the brother
92
of my father survived. All of them were stripped of their clothes; they were brought to the beach; they were
made to dig for their own graves; and when they were done, they were shot and killed.
78
Mindanews. 26 September 2014. Malisbong massacre: 1,500 Moro massacre victims during Martial
Law honored. Available at: http://www.mindanews.com/top-stories/2014/09/26/1500-moro-massacrevictims-during-martial-law-honored/ (accessed on 30 September 2015).
79
Concerning the Tran Incident, a participant in a Listening Process session in Maguindanao on 19 April
2015 narrated:
Military pressured Moro barangay officials to call their constituents for a meeting in Poblacion Kalamansig,
Sultan Kudarat. When the Moro people were already gathered, the military surrounded them. They
separated women from the men. They brought [the men] to their barracks, locked them down for one week.
While they are being locked, the military were pulling out one or more Moro men every day, killing them in
front of the rest. On the seventh day of being locked down on that barrack, there were only 30 men
remaining in that barracks. They board[ed] these remaining 30 men on a naval boat to release them,
according to these military personnel, but instead the boat brought the men to barangay Tran then killed
them all. They were massacred.
On the other hand, while the military locked down Moro men in that barracks, they took women and children
on naval boat. While boarding the naval [boat], children were falling down to the sea water and the military
personnel looking at them like dying animals. On board the naval boat, they raped the women and then
brutally killed these Moro women.
It should be noted that the military has a very different account of events. According to military sources,
the so-called Tran Operation was one of the hardest fought battles of the campaign in Central
Maguindanao. As the main logistical base of the MNLF central command, Tran was heavily fortified with
bunkers, trenches, air raid shelters, and land mines and was guarded by some 600 MNLF combatants.
According to military historians, when AFP learned of the presence of women and children in the area,
they suspended offensive operations. On 3 August 1973, a thousand rebels and their families
surrendered to the government forces. After gathering them at the mouth of the Tran River, Navy boats
transported them to Cotabato City for processing [by] the Red Cross, Social Welfare and Health
agencies of the government together with civic organizations. See: Domingo, Ruben G. June 1995. The
Muslim Secessionist Movement in The Philippines: Issues and Prospects. A thesis presented to the
Faculty of the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. P. 51. Available at:
https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=714098 (accessed on 30 August 2015).
80
TJRC Listening Process Report. P. 45. Tong Umapuy is a small island that is now part of Sitangkay, a
second class municipality in the province of Tawi-Tawi.
81
Siay is now part of Zamboanga Sibugay.
82
In recent times referred to as Palimbang, and now part of Sultan Kudarat Province.
83
th
Roces, Marian. Events Pertinent to the Violent Politics of Identity in 20 Century Mindanao: Annotated
Timeline. (Hereinafter referred to as Annotated Timeline). Unpublished. Copy personally shared by the
author to the TJRC.
84
As narrated during a TJRC Listening Process session in North Cotabato on 23 March 2015:
In the early morning of June 1971, in Barangay Manili, Carmen, the Muslim residents including women and
children were called to gather in a mosque for a meeting on orders supposedly of a known Moro leader. It
turned out that the gathering was called by the Philippine Constabulary (PC) and Ilag members, which was
actually intended to take the village hostage in exchange for the surrender of Moro rebels in the area. The
local Moro commander was given 30 minutes to surrender, although the villagers knew that the time will not
be enough for the information to reach, as the location of the Moro commander was very far from the
mosque. True enough, after 30 minutes, the people inside the mosque were summarily executed, with
93
101
102
women and children killed and their bodies mutilated. Outside the mosque some houses were also burned.
The Philippine Constabulary and the Ilag indiscriminately fired their guns at the people inside the mosque
and the shooting only stopped when they heard gunshots from outside believed to have been fired by Moro
rebels to rescue the villagers. That was the time (when) the PC and Ilag withdrew from the area. Manili
became a ghost town (no mans land) after the incident as Moro residents evacuated and some reached as
far as Lanao.
85
It is said that a BBC broadcast about the Manili massacre drew the attention of Muammar Kaddafi to
the plight of the Moros in Mindanao and that his support for the Moro armed struggle began at this time.
See: Vitug, Marites Daguilan and Glenda M. Gloria. 2001. Under the Crescent Moon: Rebellion in
Mindanao. Quezon City: Ateneo Center for Social Policy & Public Affairs Institute for Popular Democracy.
86
TJRC Listening Process. 05 June 2015. Basilan.
87
TJRC Listening Process. 06 May 2015. Sultan Kudarat.
88
See: Article XVIII Transitory Provisions, Section 24 of the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines. Available at: http://www.gov.ph/constitutions/1987-constitution/#article-ii (accessed on 28
October 2015).
89
See the review of the emergence of the CAFGUs and CVOs in: The Institute of Bangsamoro Studies
and the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. 2011. Armed Violence in Mindanao: Militia and Private Armies.
Geneva, Switzerland. Available at:
http://www.hdcentre.org/uploads/tx_news/17MilitiainMindanaoreportfromIBSandHDCentreJuly2011.pdf
(accessed on 13 June 2015).
90
In 1987, Moro Kurier, a local publication by the Moro Peoples Resource Center (MPRC), identified
several paramilitary groups as responsible for committing human rights violations against Moro
communities: Alsa Moro, Kontra Moro Brigade, Poor Peoples Liberation Movement, Sulu United
Movement against Communism, Tinig ng Kristyano/Christian Liberation Army, Christian Liberation
Organization, Tornado Command, among others.
91
According to reports in the media, the Ilag began reemerging in 2008, backed by incumbent national
government officials. They allegedly targeted members of the MILF. See: MILF hits DILG Chief over
Innocence
on
Ilag.
10
September
2008.
GMA
News
Online.
Available
at:
http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/119303/news/nation/milf-hits-dilg-chief-over-innocence-on-ilaga
(accessed on: 22 October 2015).
More recently, a group of Ilag announced its presence in North Cotabato. See: Unson, John. 28
September 2013. Anti-Moro Group Resurfaces in North Cotabato. Philippine Star.
http://www.philstar.com/nation/2013/09/28/1239187/anti-moro-group-resurfaces-ncotabato (accessed on
22 October 2015).
92
For a full analysis of the Maguindanao massacre, see: Human Rights Watch. November 2010. They
Own the People: The Ampatuans, State-Backed Militias, and Killings in the Southern Philippines. New
York, NY. Available at: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/philippines1110W_1.pdf (accessed
on 20 June 2015).
93
Institute for Bangsamoro Studies and Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. 2011. Armed Violence in
Mindanao: Militia and Private Armies. Geneva, Switzerland. P. 24. Available at:
http://www.hdcentre.org/uploads/tx_news/17MilitiainMindanaoreportfromIBSandHDCentreJuly2011.pdf
(accessed on 26 June 2015).
94
The SCAA was established in 1989 by the AFP Chief of Staff to supplement the armed forces following
a cut in the military budget. Whereas the military provides weapons, ammunition, and training, the
operational costs of the SCAA are covered by Local Government Units (LGUs) and the companies
94
concerned. According to the AFP directive, the members must be qualified reservists drawn from regular
CAFGUs and employed by the companies, but often enough they include members recruited from the
CVOs and vigilante groups. See: Memo, Renato S. DeVilla, Guidelines on the Special CAFGU Active
Auxiliary, 4 April 1989; cited in: Asia Watch Report. August 1990. The Philippines: Violations of the Laws
of
War
by
Both
Sides.
USA.
P.
56.
Available
at:
https://www.hrw.org/reports/pdfs/p/philippn/philippi908.pdf (accessed on 26 June 2015).
95
TJRC Listening Process. 07 May 2015. Lambayong.
96
As a TJRC Listening Process participant recounted, Christian CAFGUs burned their houses in
Lambayong:
Noon 1980s sinunog ng mga Christians ang mga bahay ng mga Muslim sa kasagsagan ng gulo, sa Islamic
center sa Tacurong kami tumutuloy dahil natatakot kami na balikan kami ng CAFGU (In the 1980s, the
Christians burned houses owned by Muslims during the height of the armed conflict, we stayed at the
Islamic Center in Tacurong because we were scared of the CAFGU who might return).
97
See, for example, accounts from Mining Watch Canada, on the increase of human rights violations
committed by SCAA employed by the Canadian company, TVI Pacific Inc, in various places in Mindanao
http://www.miningwatch.ca/increased-human-rights-abuses-around-tvi-pacifics-philippines-operation and
http://www.miningwatch.ca/tvi-faces-social-political-and-environmental-risk-philippines-indigenoussubanon-muslims-and-other-r (both sources accessed on 22 October 2015). Additionally, information
provided during the TJRC Listening Process uncovered violent incidents in the IP areas of Maguindanao,
Sultan Kudarat, and North Cotabato, such the Tingin-Tingin Massacre allegedly committed by the Tunda
Force on 20 July 1992.
98
TJRC Listening Process. 21 March 2015. Lanao del Norte. Tingin-Tingin is a barangay in the town of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte
99
In Maigo, Lanao del Norte, the Ilag-Baracuda squabble was supposed to have been triggered with the
assault and killing of a female teacher whose reproductive organs and extremities were mutilated. In the
vernacular, he said nagsugod ang kagubot diri tungod sa pagpatay nila sa usa ka teacher nga gitusok
ang iyang pagkatawo ug gihiwa iyang batiis. TJRC Listening Process. 22 May 2015. Lanao del Norte.
The atrocity was allegedly committed by members of the Baracuda.
100
Regarding the Patikul massacre, which involved the murder of 35 AFP officers and soldiers, together
with Brig. Gen. Teodulfo Bautista, who had gathered for a peace dialogue with the MNLF, see: Cal, Ben.
10 October 2014. Elderly General Recalls 1977 Patikul Massacre. The Standard. Available at:
http://manilastandardtoday.com/news/-main-stories/top-stories/159856/elderly-general-recalls-1977patikul-massacre.html (accessed on 23 June 2015).
Concerning the Pata massacre, which resulted in the death of 119 AFP officers and soldiers, see:
Castro, Delfin. Undated. A Mindanao StoryTroubled Decades in the Eye of the Storm. Available at:
http://www.army.mil.ph/Pata/default.htm (accessed on 23 June 2015).
101
Santos, Soliman Jr. and Paz Verdades M. Santos. April 2010. In Primed and Purposeful: Armed
Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines, ed. Diana Rodriguez. P. 356.
102
For an account of the 2008 MILF offensive, see: Amnesty International. 2008. Shattered Peace in
Mindanao: The Human Cost of Conflict in the Philippines. London, United Kingdom. Available at:
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/asa35/008/2008/en/ (accessed on 28 July 2015). During
Listening Process sessions in Lanao del Norte, participants spoke about the attack of the MILF on
Kolambugan in 2008. The Maranao participants explained that they also fled when the MILF attacked,
saying namakwit mi ug apil kay walay pili ang bala, pati among mga balay naigo kay bisan asa mupusil
ang mga MILF (We also left our residences for fear of being hit by stray bullets, as the MILF were
shooting indiscriminately).
95
103
104
103
Amnesty International. 2009. Shattered Lives: Beyond the 2008-2009 Mindanao Armed Conflict.
London, United Kingdom. Available at: https://www.amnesty.de/files/Philippines-Shattered-Lives.pdf
(accessed on 1 October 2015). P. 29.
104
The document was submitted to the TJRC during a Listening Process session in North Cotabato in
March 2015. Allegations (unverified from other sources) were made that killings of IPs had taken place in
various sitios in Kabacan and Macabenban in Carmen, Cotabato.
105
Human Rights Watch. 19 September 2013. Philippines: Mistreatment, Hostage-Taking in

Zamboanga. Available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/09/19/philippines-mistreatment-hostagetaking-zamboanga (accessed on 13 August 2015).
106
107
Some sample literature on the gender dimensions of conflict are: Ormhaug, Christin. 23 November
2009. Armed Conflict Deaths Dis-aggregated by Gender. PRIO Paper; Skjelbaek, Inger. 2001. Sexual
Violence and War: Mapping out a Complex Relationship. European Journal of International Relations
7:2; Thompson, Martha. 2006. Women, Gender and Conflict: Making the Connection. Development in
Practice; and Zuckerman, Elaine and Martha Greenberg. 2004. Gender Dimensions of Post-Conflict
Reconstruction: An Analytical Framework for Policy Makers. Gender and Development 12:3.
108
TJRC Listening Process Draft Report. Pp. 42-43.
109
TJRC Listening Process. 03 June 2015. Lanao del Norte.
110
TJRC Listening Process Draft Report. P. 42. Also mentioned in TJRC Listening Process. 20 March
2015. SocSarGen.
111
TJRC Listening Process. 22 May 2015. Lanao del Sur.
112
TJRC Listening Process Draft Report. P. 40. The same details were mentioned in the Listening
Process sessions conducted in Central Mindanao.
113
TJRC Study Group on Human Rights Violations. Draft Report. September 2015. P. 15. (Hereinafter
referred to as the TJRC Study Group on Human Rights Violations Draft Report).
114
TJRC Listening Process. 15 April 2015. Zamboanga Peninsula and Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
115
TJRC Listening Process. 15 April 2015. Tangawan, Zamboanga Sibugay. According to the TJRC
Listening Process Report, In 1976, a couple, Gulam Kanggah and Apoh Urah Kanggah, were forced to
st
have sex in front of soldiers from the 41 Infantry Battalion.
116
TJRC Listening Process. April-May 2015. Consolidated data from Lanao del Sur and Sulu.
117
TJRC Listening Process Report. P. 43.
118
TJRC Listening Process. 15-16 April 2015. Consolidated data from Lanao del Sur and Zamboanga
Peninsula.
119
TJRC Listening Process April-May 2015. Consolidated data from Zamboanga Sibugay, Tawi-Tawi,
Sulu, Basilan, and several indigenous communities. Victimized women were usually married off to
Christian soldiers without a dowry.
96
120
TJRC Listening Process April-May 2015. Consolidated data from Zamboanga Sibugay, Basilan,
SocSarGen, and several indigenous communities. In the case of IP women victims, there were stories of
women being used as comfort women during the American and Japanese occupations - these women
were impregnated and abandoned.
121
TJRC Listening Process Report. P. 43. This information came out during the Listening Process
session in Tawi-Tawi. 28 March 2015.
122
123
Such an investigation would focus, inter alia, on conflict-related sexual violence as constitutive of
grave mass atrocity crimes, as defined by the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). The
texts of the Rome Statute and its Elements of Crime are available, respectively, at: https://www.icccpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/ea9aeff7-5752-4f84-be94-0a655eb30e16/0/rome_statute_english.pdf
and
at:
https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/336923D8-A6AD-40EC-AD7B45BF9DE73D56/0/ElementsOfCrimesEng.pdf (accessed on 1 December 2015).
In 2013, 113 countries - including the Philippines - endorsed the Declaration of Commitment to End
Sexual Violence in Conflict. Available at:
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/274724/A_DECLARATION
_OF_COMMITMENT_TO_END_SEXUAL_VIOLENCE_IN_CONFLICT.pdf (accessed on 2 December
2015).
124
Santos, Soliman, Jr. 2010. War and Peace on the Moro Front: Three Standard Bearers, Three
Struggles, Three Tracks (Overview). In Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security
Efforts in the Philippines, ed. Diana Rodriguez. South-South Network for Non-State Armed Group
Engagement and the Small Arms Survey.
125
For a discussion on the international terrorist links of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), see: Abuza,
Zachary. 2005. Balik-Terrorism: The Return of the Abu Sayyaf. And Niksch, Larry. 2007. Abu Sayyaf:
Target of Philippine-US Anti-Terrorism Cooperation. CRS Report for Congress. Numerous kidnappings
for ransom of local and foreign individuals have been committed by the ASG since 2001. In 2004, it
firebombed a ferry off Manila Bay.
126
The declaration was made in response to crimes committed by the ASG that resulted in the conduct of
military operations in Basilan.
127
Proclamation 1946. http://www.gov.ph/2009/11/24/proclamation-no-1946-s-2009/ (accessed on 30

October 2015).
128
Proclamation 1959. Exempted areas were those that were identified in the operational guidelines of
the 1987 GRP-MILF General Cessation of Hostilities and proclamation no. 1959 proclaiming a state of
martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the province of Maguindanao,
except for certain areas (accessed on 30 October 2015).
129
TJRC Listening Process. 26 March 2015. Dimaporo; 31 March 2015. Tagoloan. 1 April 2015. Piagapo;
21 May 2015. Salvador; 27 May 2015. Maigo. Lanao del Norte.
130
TJRC Listening Process. 14-16 April 2015. Zamboanga Sibugay.
131
TJRC Listening Process. 15 April 2015. Zamboanga City.
132
Montlake, Simon. 14 March 2007. Pocket Wars and Peace in the Philippines. Christian Science
Monitor.
Available
at
http://cbcsi.blogspot.com/2009/07/military-says-idps-are-enemy-reserve.html
(accessed on 15 November 2015).
97
105
106
133
International Organization for Migration (IOM) and World Bank (WB). October 2015. Land: Territory,
Domain, Identity. A preliminary report realized on behalf of TJRC and submitted by the IOM-WB
Technical Team to the TJRC Study Group on Marginalization through Land Dispossession (hereinafter
referred to as TJRC Study on Land Dispossession Preliminary Report). P xxxvi.
134
For a full discussion on the complexity and dynamics of rido, see: Torres, Wilfredo Magno III. 2007.
Rido: Clan Feuding and Conflict Management in Mindanao. USAID and The Asia Foundation.
135
International human rights law, which is applicable in times of peace and armed conflict, addresses
both the prevention of displacement (e.g., the prohibition of cruel and inhuman treatment and the right to
peaceful enjoyment of property) and the protection of civilians during displacement (e.g., the right to
personal safety and to a home, as well as the rights to food, shelter, education, and access to work).
International humanitarian law, specifically the Fourth Geneva Convention and the Additional Protocols I
and II, provides for the protection of civilians, including internally displaced persons, in situations of armed
conflict.
136
The following overview of internal displacement due to the armed conflict in Mindanao and the Sulu
archipelago is based on the analysis of the TJRC Dealing with the Past Assessment Draft Report. Pp. 1720.
137
News media reported that some 5,000 persons, both Moros and Tedurays, fled sectarian violence in
the Cotabato valley in January 1971 and were living in appalling conditions. Another 37,000 persons were
displaced following violent incidents in North Cotabato in April 1971. See: Mindanao Cross. 23 January
1971. Hunger Plaguing Cotabato Minorities; and ibid. 21 April 1971. Refugee Relief. See: TJRC
Dealing with the Past Assessment Draft Report. P. 18, fn. 61.
138
Thomas McKenna. 1998. Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the
Southern Philippines. University of California. P. 156.
139
The Ecumenical Commission on Displaced Families and Communities (ECDFC) reported the following
figures to to the Global IDP Project of the Norwegian Refugee Council: Year 1997 - 189,000 IDPs; Year
1998 - 122,820 IDPs; Year 1999 - 200,000 IDPs; Year 2000 - 800,000 IDPs. The number of IDPs are
known to fluctuate and the displacement figures for the year 2000 are, in fact, contested. Whereas the
DSWD declared some 600,000 persons as displaced in June 2000, the ICRC estimated the number to be
around 150,000 and Philippine National Red Cross around 175,000. See: Global IDP Database of the
Norwegian Refugee Council. Profile of Internal Displacement: Philippines (as of 17 December 2001).
Available
at:
http://www.internal-displacement.org/assets/library/Asia/Philippines/pdf/PhilippinesDecember+2001.pdf (accessed on 12 August 2015).
140
More than 400,000 people were displaced in connection with the so-called Buliok offensive launched
by the AFP against MILF positions in Central Mindanao in February 2003. A cessation of hostilities
agreement was signed in July 2003 that enabled most of the displaced to return, although conditions
were often not conducive to sustainable reintegration.
141
Armed conflict broke out in Central Mindanao and in Sulu and in Basilan following the Supreme Court
decision disavowing the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) as unconstitutional.
The fighting displaced some 745,000 people between August 2008 and May 2009.
142
The MNLF siege of Zamboanga in September 2013 resulted in the displacement of more than 120,000
civilians and in the destruction of 10,000 houses. Many IDPs returned home after the siege ended, but
some 63,000 persons were unable to do so because their homes had either been destroyed or were in
parts of city subsequently declared to be no build zones (protected areas). City authorities encouraged
those who had settled in the city after migrating from other areas of Mindanao to move to new sites
nearby or to return to their original provinces. Many of the displaced Badjaos opposed resettlement
98
elsewhere and expressed their preference to return their former homes along the waterfront. See: Internal
Displacement Monitoring Centre. Philippines: Internal Displacement in Brief (as of December 2013).
Available
at:
http://www.internal-displacement.org/south-and-south-east-asia/philippines/summary
(accessed on 22 March 2015).
143
Following the Mamasapano incident in January 2015, the AFP launched an offensive against the
Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) that caused the displacement of some 123,537 persons in
Central Mindanao by mid-March. See: ARMM-HEART: Displacement Situation Map (as of March 16,
2015).
Available at: http://www.armm-info.com/wpcontent/uploads/2015/03/11015145_1041460662534154_1633395461_n.jpg (accessed on 20.03.15).
144
See: Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre. Philippines: Internal Displacement in Brief (as of
December
2013).
Available
at:
http://www.internal-displacement.org/south-and-south-eastasia/philippine/summary (accessed on 22 March 2015).
145
World Food Program and World Bank Group. December 2011. Violent Conflicts and Displacement in
Central Mindanao: Challenges for Recovery and Development.
Available at: https://www.wfp.org/sites/default/files/WB-WFP%20Entire%20Report%20FA%201of7.pdf
(accessed on 14 August 2015).
146
Cagoco-Guiam, Rufa. July 2013. Gender and Livelihoods among Internally Displaced Persons in
Mindanao, Philippines. The Brookings-London School of Economics Project on Internal Displacement.
Washington, DC. Pp. 7-8.
Available at: http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2013/07/gender-livelihoods-idpsphilippines/gender-and-livelihoods-among-idps-in-mindanao-philippines-july-2013.pdf (accessed on 12
August 2015).
147
Salvatore Schiavo-Campo and Mary Judd. February 2005. The Mindanao Conflict in the Philippines:
Roots, Costs, and Potential Peace Dividend. Social Development Papers. Conflict Prevention and
Reconstruction. No. 24. P. 6.
148
According to the latest data collected by the Philippine Statistical Authority in 2012, some 48.7 percent
of the families in the ARMM live at or below the poverty level. Within the ARMM, the provinces of Lanao
del Sur (67.3%) and Maguindanao (54.5%) have the highest incidences of poverty.
Available at: http://www.nscb.gov.ph/poverty/2012/highlights_fullyear.asp (accessed on 12 February
2015).
149
Internal Displacement Monitoring Center. 5 November 2009. Cycle of conflict and neglect: Mindanao's
displacement and protection crisis.
Available at: http://www.internal-displacement.org/assets/publications/2009/200910-ap-philippines-cycleof-conflict-and-neglect-country-en.pdf (accessed on 14 August 2015).
150
The cyclical relationship between poverty and conflict-related displacement and migration has been a
constant in Philippine history since the advent of migrant Christian settlers in Mindanao in the 1950s,
many of whom were themselves landless peasants who benefited from a government program designed
to pacify the Huk rebellion that originated in Central Luzon.
151
The use of children as soldiers, children associated with fighting forces (CAFF), or children involved
in armed conflict (CIAC) has been a major issue in relation to the protection of the rights of the child.
Related international conventions are the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and Optional
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, while several reports on children and armed conflict
by the UN Secretary-General have been released. In the case of the Philippines, a useful reference is: De
Castro, Elizabeth. 2001. Children in Armed Conflict Situations: Focus on Child Soldiers in the
Philippines. Kasarinlan 16:2.
99
107
108
152
Philippine Coalition to Stop the Use of Children as Soldiers. 2004. Armed or Not, They Are Children:
A Primer on the Use of Children as Soldiers in the Philippines. Available at
http://www.pstcrrc.org/docs/Armed_or_Not_They_Are_Children.pdf (accessed on 28 November 2015).
153
Gutierrez, Jason. 20 May 2015. Philippines Strives to End Recruitment of Child Soldiers. Available at
http://www.irinnews.org/report/101517/philippines-strives-to-end-recruitment-of-child-soldiers (accessed
on 28 November 2015).
154
In the 2014 report of the Regional Human Rights Commission (RHRC) of the ARMM, a total of 116
cases of human rights violations have been recorded. Of these, the most common violations are torture
(19), illegal arrest (15) and killings (10). Of the five ARMM provinces, Sulu and Basilan registered the
highest number of cases (25), whereas Lanao del Sur has 21, Tawi-tawi 15, and Maguindanao 10.
155
The investigation undertaken by the Independent Commission to Address Media and Activist Killings,
known as the Melo Commission, is a case in point. The Commission, headed by former Supreme Court
Justice Jose Melo, was established in August 2006 to investigate the large number of extrajudicial killings
of militants and journalists, in order to determine the root cause of the killings, and if possible, to identify
the individuals or interest groups responsible. The Commission concluded that there was substantial
evidence linking elements of the military to the killings, but that there was no state policy sanctioning such
crimes. In the intervening years, the prevalence of extrajudicial killings continues to be a serious human
rights concern. Moreover, the justice system has been unable to prosecute the majority of the outstanding
cases successfully. In November 2012, the Aquino administration created a special Inter-Agency
Committee (IAC) to investigate human rights abuses both by state and non-state forces and to ensure the
resolution of all unsolved and new cases. For a fuller analysis of the issue of extra-judicial killings, see:
TJRC Dealing with the Past Assessment. Draft Report. P. 7-10.
156
The following remarks are based on the research and analysis of the TJRC Dealing with the Past
Assessment Draft Report. Pp. 12-14.
157
A truth commission, for example, might be mandated to examine the scope and nature of the human
rights violations that had occurred during a certain time period and to determine the identity of the victims.
158
In November 2014, the Senate approved a joint Congressional resolution to extend the deadline for
filing claims with the HRVCB. During the first filing period, which lasted from May to November 2014, the
HRVCB received some 46,985 submissions. The second filing period lasted from 18 April to 30 May
2014, during which time the Board received an additional 26,000 claims. Of these, some 10,000 claims
were submitted from persons residing in Mindanao and ascribing to a Bangsamoro identity. The HRVCB
has until 12 May 2016 to complete the validation of the applications and to award compensation to the
legitimate claimants.
159
According to the findings of the TJRC Archives Project, several nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs), namely Task Force Detainees of the Philippines (TFDP), Medical Action Group (MAG), Families
of Victims of Enforced Disappearances (FIND), and Balay Rehabilitation Center, have been documenting
human rights violations since the Martial Law period. A few universities also maintain archives
documenting human rights violations from this period. Post-Martial Law documentation may be found with
the CHR and RHRC. Additional efforts at documentation of human rights violations are being undertaken
by the various ceasefire mechanisms created within the ambit of the peace accords. In addition, local
peace and human rights groups, religious institutions, print media, and concerned individuals have their
own archives that can be explored.
160
Two TJRC studies were conducted on the issue of land dispossession. The first one was mainly a
literature review on land dispossession that was conducted by the TJRC Study Group on Marginalization
through Land Dispossession while the second one was a research on Land: Territory, Domain, Identity
100
that was conducted by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the World Bank (WB) for the
TJRC.
161
TJRC Study Group on Marginalization through Land Dispossession Draft Report. October 2015. P. 1.
162
TJRC Study on Land Dispossession Preliminary Report. P. xv.
163
See the definition of the Regalian doctrine formulated in: Marquez, Jaydee. 4 August 2015. The
Regalian Doctrine. Available at: http://phjuris.blogspot.ch/2015/08/the-regalian-doctrine.html (accessed
on 24 October 2015)
164
TJRC Historical Injustice Study Group Report. P 13.
165
Ferocious battles waged by Moro communities against American forces were widely reported in
communities around Lake Lanao, the highlands of Jolo islands of Sulu, and the wetlands of Cotabato.
See: Gowing, Peter. 1977. Mandate in Moroland: The American Government of Muslim Filipinos, 18991920. Quezon City: New Day Publishers; McKenna, Thomas. 1999. Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday
Politics and Separatism in the Southern Philippines. Berkeley: University of California Press.
166
Culled from Annotated Timeline.
167
TJRC Study Group on Marginalization through Land Dispossession, Pp. 11 and 42; Study Group on
Historical Injustice Report, p. 58. TJRC Study on Land Dispossession Preliminary Report; and Annotated
Timeline, P. 20.
168
Also see TJRC Study on Land Dispossession Preliminary Report, P. 26.
169
Bacho, Peter. 1987. The Muslim Secessionist Movement. Journal of International Affairs 41:1. P.
153.
170
Sepp, Kalev. 1992. Resettlement, Regroupment and Reconcentration: Deliberate GovernmentDirected Population Relocation in Support of Counter-Insurgency Operations. A thesis presented to the
Faculty
of
the
US
Army
Command
and
General
Staff
College.
Available
at
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a255055.pdf (accessed on 4 December 2015). P. 46.
171
The development of these sectors intensified following American withdrawal from the country in 1945
as the postcolonial government initiated policies supporting their expansion and continuation, in ways that
would increase corporate land coverage, especially those engage in logging operations, to 60,000
hectares. See Marginalization Through Land Dispossession Study Group, p. 11; Annotated Timeline, P.
14; TJRC Study on Land Dispossession Preliminary Report.
172
Silva, Rad D. 1978. Truth Behind the Mindanao Problem: Two Hills of the Same Land. MindanaoSulu Critical Studies Research; Gowing, Peter. 1988. Understanding Islam and Muslims in the
Philippines. Quezon City: New Day Publishers; Local Governance Support Program - ARMM. 2009.
Land Tenure Stories in Central Mindanao; Muslim, Macapado Abdon. 1994. The Moro Armed Struggle in
the Philippines: The Non-Violent Autonomy Alternative. Mindanao State University; University Press and
Information Office; Majul, Cesar. 1973. Muslims in the Philippines. Quezon City: University of the
Philippines Press; Majul, Cesar. 1985. The Contemporary Muslim Movement in the Philippines. Berkeley:
Mizan Press; Tan, Samuel. 1977. The Filipino Muslim Struggle 1900-1972. Manila: Filipinas Foundation;
World Bank. 2011. "Land Tenure in the Philippines, Parts I and II;" TJRC Study on Land Dispossession
Preliminary Report; TJRC Study Group Report on Marginalization through Land Dispossession; and
Annotated Timeline.
101
109
110
173
Silva, 1978; Gowing, 1988; Local Governance Support Program ARMM, 2009; Muslim, 1994; Majul,
1973; Tan, 1977; World Bank, 2011; TJRC Study on Land Dispossession Preliminary Report; TJRC
Study Group Report on Marginalization through Land Dispossession; and Annotated Timeline.
174
TJRC Listening Process. 27 April 2015. Malabang, Lanao del Sur.
175
TJRC Listening Process. May 19, 2015; Tupi, South Cotabato; 21 May 2015, Tampakan.
176
By the end of the 1940s and at the outset of the 1950s, the government created new agencies by law
or executive orders to accelerate the implementation of the resettlement programs while addressing the
problems they had incurred in the course of their implementation. These new agencies include the Rice
and Corn Production Administration (RCPA) in 1949; a Land Settlement Development Corporation
(LASEDECO) that replaced the debt-burdened National Land Settlement Administration (NLSA) through
President Elpidio Quirinos Executive Order No. 335 on October 23, 1950; an Economic Development
Corporation on December 15 also in 1950; and the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation
Administration (NARRA) that was created by Republic Act No. 1160 on June 18, 1954.
177
TJRC Listening Process. May 19, 2015. Tupi, South Cotabato.
178
The Blaans, particularly those from the Barangays Datal Blao and Bato, left and lived scattered in
Davao and other parts of Cotabato for a few years before returning to Tampakan. See the TJRC Listening
Process, 21 May 2015, Tampakan.
179
TJRC Listening Process. 21 May 2015. Tampakan.
180
TJRC Listening Process. May 19, 2015. Tupi, South Cotabato.
181
TJRC Listening Process. 21 May 2015. Tampakan.
182
Data generated by the Bangsamoro Conflict Monitoring System from 2011 to 2014. Available at:
http://bcms-philippines.info/vers1/dataanalysis-bcms (accessed on 26 August 2015).
183
TJRC Listening Process, May 19, 2015, Tupi, South Cotabato.
184
Ibid.
185
Gerrymandering refers to the manipulation of boundaries of particular electoral constituencies for

political purposes.
186
TJRC Study on Land Dispossession Preliminary Report. P. 71.
187
McKenna, 1999; Gowing, 1977.
188
On July 23, 1914, around the time when resettlement of farmers from the north to the agricultural
colonies had commenced, the Philippine Commission Act 2309 dismantled the military-governed Moro
Province and replaced it with a civilian administrated Department of Mindanao and Sulu. An Organic Act
No. 2408 reconfigured then military districts of Cotabato, Davao, Lanao, Sulu and Zamboanga into
provinces, and declared Bukidnon as a sub-province. In 1916, the civilian legislative districts of Agusan,
Bukidnon, Cotabato, Davao, Lanao, Zamboanga and Sulu were established. See: Annotated Timeline, p.
32.
189
TJRC Study Group on Marginalization through Land Dispossession Final Report. P. 10. Citing
Annotated Timeline pp. 74-75, 88-89, 90, and 135.
190
TJRC Study Group on Marginalization through Land Dispossession Draft Report. P. 21
102
191
Cotabato district covers todays provinces of South Cotabato, North Cotabato, Saranggani, Sultan
Kudarat and Maguindanao.
192
The broad areas of the then Davao district includes current day provinces of Davao del Norte, Davao
Oriental, Compostela Valley, Davao del Sur, and Davao Occidental.
193
Lanao district comprises areas currently known as Lanao del Norte and Lanao del Sur provinces.
194
Zamboanga district extends to the present day Zamboanga Peninsula provinces of Zamboanga del
Sur, Zamboanga del Norte, and Zamboanga Sibugay.
195
Sulu would later be divided into the provinces of Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-tawi.
196
TJRC Study Group on Marginalization through Land Dispossession Draft Report. P. 19.
197
Ibid. Pp. 2-3.
198
199
Ibid.
200
The TJRC Study Group on Marginalization through Land Dispossession Draft Report cites the
following Asia Indigenous Peoples Pact (AIPP) as main references to this claim: Recognition of
Indigenous Peoples Customary Land Rights in Asia. March 2015; Victims of Development Aggression.
Indigenous Peoples in ASEAN. 2010; and Briefing Paper on the Rights of Indigenous Women to their
Lands Territories and Resources in Asia. 2015.
201
Mastura, Ishak. Iting Ganguly, Sumit and Kanti Bajpai. 15 September 2008. Dreams of
Independence. Newsweek (Atlantic Edition) 152:11.
202
Tuminez, Astrid. May 2008. The Past is Always Present: The Moros of Mindanao and the Quest for
Peace. Working Paper Series No. 99. The Southeast Asia Research Center (SEARC); Gutierrez, Eric
and Saturnino Borras, Jr. 2004. The Moro Conflict: Landlessness and Misdirected State Policies. EastWest Center, Washington Policy Studies Series 8.
203
See: International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) (1966) and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (1966). The identically worded Arts 1 (3)
ICCPR and ICESCR call upon the States Parties, including those having responsibility for the
administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories, to promote and respect this right. In the same
article, they also state that all peoples may for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and
resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic cooperation, based
upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law and that in no case may a people be deprived
of its own means of subsistence (Articles 1 (2) of the ICCPR and ICESCR). By being included in Articles
1 (2) of the ICCPR and ICESCR, the concept of self-determination as a whole was given the
characteristic of a fundamental human right or, more accurately, that of a source or essential prerequisite
for the existence of individual human rights, since these rights could not genuinely be exercised without
the realization of thecollectiveright of self-determination. In their general formulation the ICCPR and
ICESCR provide essential evidence of the meaning and content of the principle of self-determination
even
for
States
which
are
not
parties
to
them.
Source :
http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e873# (accessed 7
December 2015).
204
TJRC Dealing with the Past Assessment Draft Report. September 2015. P. 5-6.
103
111
112
205
TJRC Study Group on Historical Injustice Report. P. 58. Citing: Tan, Samuel. 1973. The Muslim
Armed Struggle in the Philippines, 1900-1941. A doctoral dissertation presented to the Faculty of
Syracuse University.
206
TJRC Listening Process. 18 May 2015, Lanao del Norte and 12 March 2015, Sultan Kudarat.
207
According to a TJRC Key Policy Interview resource person, direct violence in the form of killing usually
takes place after a court resolution of any dispute (land or any other) that does not meet the needs of the
aggrieved party or does not generate satisfaction or is perceived as unfair or unjust. While seeking
remedies, persons and groups develop further violence against or between clans. TJRC Key Policy
Interview. 14 September 2015. Cotabato City.
208
Orentlicher, Diane. 2005. Report of the Independent Expert to Update the Set of Principles to Combat
Impunity. E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1. Available at:
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G05/109/00/PDF/G0510900.pdf?OpenElement.
(accessed on 1 November 2015)
209
Philip Alston. 2008. Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary
Executions, Addendum: Mission to the Philippines. A/HRC/8/3/Add.2 16 April 2008. Available at:
http://www.refworld.org/docid/484d2b2f2.html (accessed on 28 June 2015)
210
Ibid.
211
212
TJRC Study Group on Legitimate Grievances resource person interview.
213
214
215
Ed Quitoriano notes that the economic benefits that state actors generate from a shadow economy
that is masked or hidden underneath a general policy to decentralize or subcontract the means of
coercion to local elites in conflict-affected areas such as Muslim Mindanao. See: Quitoriano, Ed. 2013.
Shadow Economy or Shadow State? The Illicit Gun Trade in Conflict-Affected Mindanao. In Out of the
Shadows Violent Conflict and the Real Economy of Mindanao. International Alert.
216
Among the international human rights conventions are the following: (1) International Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD); (2) International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR); (3) the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR);
(4) Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; (5) Slavery Convention as
Amended; (6) Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide; (7) Convention
Relating to the Status of Refugees; (8) Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women (CEDAW); (9) Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women; (10) Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (CAT); (11) Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC); and (12) Optional
Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict.
217
The IHL conventions are: (1) 1949 Geneva Conventions; (2) Additional Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions; (3) Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes
Against Humanity; (4) Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC).
218
Relevant laws, in this regard, are: Republic Acts (RA) 7309, An Act Creating a Board of Claims under
the Department of Justice for Victims of Unjust Imprisonment or Detention and Victims of Violent Crimes
and for other Purposes; RA 9851, Philippine Act on Crimes against International Humanitarian Law,
104
Genocide and Other Crimes against Humanity; RA 10353, Anti-Enforced or Involuntary Disappearance
Act of 2012; and RA 10368, Human Rights Victims Reparation and Recognition Act of 2013.
219
International Council on Human Rights Policy. 2006. Negotiating Justice? Human Rights and Peace
Agreements. Versoix: Switzerland. Pp. 7-68.
220
Santos, Soliman. Jr. 2005. Obcit.
221
Beginning with the peace negotiations, involving the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in 1976.
222
IAG Policy Brief. June 2011. What Ails ARMM? quoting Presidential Spokesperson Edwin Lacierda
who said [The] ARMM is a failed experiment in terms of the aspirations of the Filipino people to give
justice
to
our
Muslim
brothers.
Konrad
Adenaur
Stifftung.
Available
at:
http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_23597-1522-1-30.pdf?110822074813 (accessed on 7 December 2015).
223
As defined in the Basic Principles and Guidelines on Reparation, victims are persons who individually
or collectively suffered harm through acts or omissions that constitute gross violations of human rights.
While categories exist to define war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, there is no single
normative definition of a perpetrator, as this qualification will often vary according to domestic legislation.
224
This kind of mechanism is not new in the Philippines, see for example, the National Commission for
Culture and the Arts (NCCA) and the EO No. 80, 1999.
__________________________________________________________________________________
105
113
114
ANNEX 1
115
116
ANNEX 2
LIST OF VISITED ORGANIZATIONS
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
ACADEME
Ateneo de Davao University
Ateneo de Manila Law School
Ateneo de Zamboanga University
De La Salle University Library
Mindanao State University
Notre Dame University Library
Rizal Library, Ateneo de Manila University
University of the Philippines
University of the Philippines-Diliman Library
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
GOVERNMENT
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)
ARMM Manila Liaison Office
ARMM Regional Human Rights Commission (RHRC)
Bangsamoro Transition Commission (BTC)
Bangsamoro Development Authority (BDA)
Commission on Higher Education (CHEd)
Commission on Human Rights (CHR)
Cotabato City Police Office
Department of Education (DepEd)
Department of Health (DOH)
Department of Justice (DOJ)
Department of National Defense (DND)
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD)
DSWD
Disaster Response Operations Monitoring and Information Center (DROMIC) DSWD
Government Coordinating Committee on Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH)
Human Rights Violations Claims Board (HRVCB)
House of Representatives
Joint Normalization Committee (JNC)
Moro Islamic Liberation Front Coordinating Committee on Cessation of Hostilities (CCCH)
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) - Peace Panel
National Archives of the Philippines (NAP)
National Commission on Indigenous People (NCIP)
National Historical Commission of the Philippines (NHCP)
National Library of the Philippines
National Prosecution Service
Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP)
Philippine National Police (PNP)
Provincial Prosecution Office of Maguindanao
Region 9 Prosecution Service
117
118
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
Regional Human Rights Commission

Regional Investigation and Detective Management Division, Police Regional Officer, ARMM
Regional Reconciliation and Unification Commission (RRUC)
Senate of the Republic of the Philippines
Zamboanga City Library
Zamboanga City Police
Zamboanga City Prosecution Service
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
8.
9.
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
International Contact Group (ICG)
Independent Decommissioning Body (IDB)
International Organisation on Migration (IOM)
World Bank (WB)
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
UN Women
swisspeace
Foundation
Third
Party Monitoring
Team (TPMT)
United
Nations
High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR)
Third Party
Monitoring
Team (TPMT)
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS

Alternative Forum for Research in Mindanao (AFIRM)
Anak Mindanao Party List
Asian Federation Against Involuntary Disappearances (AFAD)
Balay Rehabilitation Center
Bantay Ceasefire, Mindanao Peoples Caucus
Bantayog ng mga Bayani Foundation
Claimants 1081
Families of Victims of Involuntary Disappearances
Free Legal Assitance Group (FLAG)
Forum ZFD Civil Peace Service
Humanitarian Rehabilitation and Development Component, International Monitoring Team
Initiatives for International Dialogue
Institute of Bangsamoro Studies
Institute for Autonomy and Governance
International Alert
International Organization for Migration
Lopez Museum and Library
KARAPATAN Alliance for the Advancement of Peoples Rights
Medical Action Group
Mindanao Alliance for Peace
Mindanao Cross
Mindanao Human Rights Action Center (MinHRAC)
Moro Human Rights Center
Nisa Ul Haqq Fi Bangsamoro
Non-violence Peaceforce (NP)
Oblates of Mary Immaculate Philippine Province
Peace Advocates Zamboanga
Philippine Alliance for Human Rights Advocates (PAHRA)
Sentro ng Alternatibong Lingap Panligal (SALIGAN)
Task Force Detainees of the Philippines (TFDP)
United Youth for Peace and Development, Inc. (UNYPAD)
ANNEX 3

of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro
ANNEX 3
The TJRC Dealing with the Past conceptual approach
I. The Transitional Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC)
What is the status of the TJRC?
The Normalization Annex of the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro,
signed on January 25, 2014, provides for the creation of the Transitional Justice
and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) in order to protect and to enhance the
right of the Bangsamoro people and other communities in the Bangsamoro to live in
dignity.
What is the mandate of the TJRC?
The TJRC is mandated to undertake a study and to make recommendations with
a view to promote healing and reconciliation of the different communities that have
been affected by the conflict.
The TJRC will propose appropriate mechanisms:
to address legitimate grievances of the Bangsamoro people;
to correct historical injustices;
to address human rights violations, including marginalization through
land dispossession
In addition, the TJRC can recommend immediate interventions to be made in
support of reconciliation and the healing of the physical, mental, and spiritual wounds
of the conflict. To this end, the TJRC may recommend measures to address the
causes of the conflict and to prevent their recurrence.
II. The Terminology of Transitional Justice
What is transitional justice?
As formulated in his 2004 report on the rule of law and transitional justice, the UN
Secretary General defines transitional justice as the full range of processes and
mechanisms associated with a societys attempt to come to terms with a legacy of
119
120
large-scale abuses committed in the past, in order to achieve accountability, serve

justice, and achieve reconciliation.1
In the same report, the UN Secretary General describes the mechanisms of
transitional justice in more specific terms; transitional justice employs both
judicial and non-judicial mechanisms, including individual prosecutions,
reparations, truth-seeking, institutional reform, vetting and dismissals, or a
combination thereof.2
What is the conceptual framework for dealing with the past/transitional
justice?
The TJRC uses the Swiss Dealing with the Past (DwP) framework that is both
practice and process-oriented and includes conflict transformation as an important
element. The four key areas of activity complement one another thematically and
practically: The Right to Know, the Right to Justice, the Right to Reparation, and
Guarantees of Non-Recurrence. As such, it offers a constructive manner to deal with
past wrongdoings, while supporting and strengthening the peace and conflict
transformation process. Significantly, the framework suggests that some form of
dealing with the past on a societal level is a prerequisite for reconciliation.
The principles against impunity acknowledge and define the rights of victims and the
obligation of the State to provide remedies for serious violations of IHRL and IHL.
Moreover, the TJRC sees a potential framework for dialogue and trust building
between State institutions and disaffected sectors of society in the acknowledgement
of the rights of victims and of the obligation of the State to provide remedies.
Taken together, the principles against impunity form the components of a holistic
strategy for dealing with grievances and past abuses.
Although there is no standard model for transitional justice, in recent years a number
of precedents have been established through the work of special rapporteurs and
Report of the UN Secretary General on the Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict
Societies (S/2004/616), p. 4. Available at: http://www.unrol.org/files/2004%20report.pdf
Ibid. p. 4. Available at: http://www.unrol.org/files/2004%20report.pdf
experts of the United Nations on the issues of reparations, impunity, and best
practices in transitional justice.3
One of the most significant developments in this regard has been the progress made
toward establishing standards in the struggle against impunity. The principles against
impunity were formulated by Louis Joinet in a report to the UN Sub-Commission in
19974 and were later revised by Diane Orentlicher in 2005 at the behest of the
Commission on Human Rights.5 Known as the Joinet/Orentlicher principles, the
principles against impunity describe a conceptual framework for transitional
justice by defining the rights of victims and the obligations of the State to
provide redress for serious violations of international human rights law and
international humanitarian law.
What are the principles against impunity?
The Joinet/Orentlicher principles identify four key areas of activity that complement
one another thematically and practically in the struggle against impunity: The Right to
Know, the Right to Justice, the Right to Reparation, and Guarantees of NonRecurrence. Taken together, the principles against impunity form the components of
a holistic strategy for transitional justice.
What is the Right to Know?
-
The right of victims and of society at large to know the truth.

The duty of the State to preserve memory.
The Right to Know is based on the right of individual and collective victims and
on the part of society at large to know the truth about past events and the
circumstances that led to the perpetration of massive or systematic human rights
violations, in order to prevent their recurrence in the future. It involves an obligation
on the part of the State to undertake measures, such as securing archives and
3
See the reports submitted by Theo Van Boven (E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/8; E/CN.4/Sub.2/1996/17;

E/CN.4/1997/104) and Cherif Bassiouni (E/CN.4/2000/62) on reparations. Concerning best practices in
transitional justice, see the analytical study on human rights and transitional justice (A/HRC/12/18 and
A/HRC/12/18/Add.1), prepared by the OHCHR in 2009. With regard to the reports on impunity, see footnotes 3
and 4 below.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/20/Rev 1. Available at:

http://193.194.138.190/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/a0a22578a28aacfc8025666a00372708?Opendocume
nt
5
The revision (E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1) focused on identifying best practices in combating impunity and did not
significantly re-formulate the principles themselves.
Available at: http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G05/109/00/PDF/G0510900.pdf?OpenElement
121
122
other evidence, to preserve collective memory from extinction and so to guard

against the development of revisionist arguments.
To ensure this right, the Joinet/Orentlicher principles propose the creation of extrajudicial commissions of inquiry (in practice, often called truth or truth and
reconciliation commissions). The commissions themselves serve a twofold purpose:
1) to dismantle the administrative machinery that led to abuses in the past, in order
to ensure that they do not recur; and 2) to preserve evidence for the judiciary. The
second measure often entails gathering, preserving, and ensuring the access to
archives and information relating to serious human rights violations.
What is the Right to Justice?
-
The right of victims to a fair remedy.

The duty of the State to investigate, prosecute, and duly punish.
The Right to Justice implies that any victim can assert his or her rights and
receive a fair and effective remedy, including the expectation that the person or
persons responsible will be held accountable by judicial means and that reparations
will be forthcoming. The Right to Justice also entails obligations on the part of the
State to investigate violations, to arrest and prosecute the perpetrators and, if their
guilt is established, to punish them. Domestic courts have the primary responsibility
to exercise jurisdiction in this regard, but international or internationalized criminal
tribunals may exercise concurrent jurisdiction, when necessary, in accordance with
the terms of their statutes.
The Right to Justice imposes restrictions upon certain rules of law pertaining to
prescription, amnesty, right to asylum, extradition, non bis in idem, due obedience,
official immunity, and other measures, in so far as they may be abused to obstruct
justice and benefit impunity.
What is the Right to Reparation?
-
The right of individual victims or their beneficiaries to reparation.

The duty of the State to provide satisfaction.
The Right to Reparation entails measures for individual victims, including relatives
or dependents, in the following areas:
- Restitution, i.e. seeking to restore the victim to his or her previous situation;
- Compensation, i.e. for physical or mental injury, for lost opportunities with
respect to employment, education, and social benefits, for moral damage due to
defamation, and for expenses related to legal aid and other expert assistance;
- Rehabilitation, i.e. medical care, including physiotherapy and psychological
treatment.
The duty of the State to provide satisfaction pertains to collective measures of

reparation. These may involve symbolic acts, such as an annual homage to the
victims, the establishment of monuments and museums, or the recognition by the
State of its responsibility in the form of a public apology that discharge the duty of
remembrance and help to restore victims' dignity. Additional measures in this regard
foresee the inclusion of an accurate account of the violations that occurred in public
educational materials at all levels.
What is the Guarantee of Non-Recurrence?
-
The right of victims and society at large to protection from further violations.
The duty of the State to ensure good governance and the rule of law.
The Guarantee of Non-Recurrence focuses on the need to disband para-military

armed groups, to repeal emergency laws, and to remove senior officials from office
who are implicated in serious human rights violations. It also foresees the reform of
laws and State institutions in accordance with the norms of good governance and the
rule of law. In particular, it regards the reform of the security sector and of the
judiciary as priorities. With regard to para-military groups, it makes reference to the
process of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former
combatants with special attention to be paid to the demobilization and social
integration of former child soldiers. The vetting of public officials and employees
should comply with the requirements of due process of law and the principle of nondiscrimination. In addition, civil complaint procedures should be introduced.
123
124
125

Report of The Transitional Justice and Reconciliation Commission

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Report of The Transitional Justice and Reconciliation Commission

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Report of the Transitional Justice and Reconciliation Commission