Russia and Turkey in Syria: How did we get here, and what next?

What is going on in Syria between Russia and Turkey? Let’s appraise the situation in a brutally honest fashion.

First, Russia. Russia is indeed a world power, but it is not a modern state. Despite revolutions large and small, the Russian state still resembles Jenghiz Khan’s Eurasian empire: an institution whose sole aim is to project power and perpetuate itself. The Russian state is not really for the people or by the people: the well being of its citizens does not appear to be a big concern to the rulers. How does such a state survive? The Russian people are stoic, and they (perhaps for good reason) fear the rest of the world even more than they fear their own government. Putin is a natural leader for this kind of state.

Next, Turkey. Turkey has come a long way in developing into a mid sized economic power since hitting the bottom a century ago, but it has not been able to resolve its identity crisis. Is it going to be a secular and Muslim member of a secular and mostly Christian Europe, or is it going to remain part of the non-secular, Muslim Middle East? EU refusal to admit Turkey as an equal member did not make things easy. Several non-Turkish ethnicities which had migrated to Turkey from the Balkans, Caucasus and beyond were successfully integrated in the Anatolian Turkish “melting pot”, but the Kurds still stand out. Erdoğan has the strong backing of the relatively religious and insular Turkish “centre”, but he is rejected by the secular Turks as well as the Kurds.

It looked like a democratic compromise was within reach during the first term of the ruling AKP in 2002-2007, with the EU accession process in the background. During the second AKP term in 2007-2011, Erdoğan took on the military establishment and won. During the third AKP term in 2011-2015, he unveiled a vision to be a regional leader, uniting the Sunni Muslim parts of the Middle East behind a neo-Ottoman and less secular Turkey. He failed. It turned out that AKP and the broader pan-Islamist political movement in Turkey did not have the capability to execute such a grandiose strategy.

When the Arab spring started, Turkey stood behind mainstream pan-Islamist opposition such as the Muslim Brotherhood. In Syria, Assad decided to hang on to power at whatever cost, seeing the fate of Mubarak in Egypt. Erdoğan decided to help remove Assad without direct  Turkish military intervention but backing all Sunni Islamist opposition.

Russia initially stayed out of Syria, because the risk/return profile looked unattractive. Challenging Turkey in its backyard far away from Russia just was not worth it. However, it the all-against-all civil war in Syria, only the most violent elements were left standing: Assad’s army, local and international jihadists and PKK-backed Syrian Kurds. It turned out that Erdoğan’s mainstram Islamist proxies could win elections but could not fight wars. The Sunni Arab rebellion was taken over by jihadists of all sorts.

The Turkish government tested whether it could control the jihadists but soon discovered that it could not. ISIS, the most antagonistic group to the AKP government among the Sunni Muslim rebels, became the leading anti-Assad force. Turkey refused to help the Kurds in Syria and consolidated all non-ISIS and non-Kurdish elements in enclave son the Syrian side of the border.

Turkey’s failure in Syria gave Russia an opening. After annexing Crimea without any resistance from the Ukrainian government and carving out a separatist zone in the east of Ukraine, Russia embarked on a more distant adventure in Syria. Taking advantage of the western hostility to ISIS, Russia decided to prop up the Assad regime and reposition it as an alternative to ISIS.

It is not yet clear why Russia chose Syria to make such an aggressive move. Was it because it was the easiest place for a show of force? Or was there a bigger motive in the background? There is speculation the real Russian aim in Syria was getting Saudi Arabia’s attention. Russia is hurt by the low oil prices caused by the Saudi supply policy. Russia does not have much leverage with Saudi Arabia elsewhere, so Putin might have been planning to reach a broader deal with Saudi Arabia including a Syria settlement and an oil supply policy settlement. 

Whatever its motives, Russia was as aggressive as Turkey was passive in Syria. Being invited by the official government of Syria, Russian combat aircraft started flying freely in Syria. As the Russian plan was to reposition Assad as the only alternative to ISIS, Russia sought to destroy the non-ISIS, non-Kurdish opposition forces backed by Turkey first.

With such an aggressive Russian policy in Syria, a confrontation with Turkey was inevitable in the medium term. However, Turkey shooting down a Russian plane was very surprising to all parties, after its relatively passive and hands off approach in Syria for several years.

How can the crisis play out?

The vulnerabilities of Turkey are well known. Turkey’s Syria strategy was unnecessarily sectarian. Turkey does not have the risk appetite to back its rhetoric. Turkey’s intelligence capabilities in its near abroad are mediocre. Turkey’s relations with its NATO allies aren’t great. Kurd-phobia has complicated the Syria and Iraq strategy. Most importantly, Turkey’s internal divisions limit its foreign policy capabilities.

These vulnerabilities caused an understandable apprehension in the Turkish press, TV and social media after the incident. Not surprisingly, the Turkish government is trying to play down the incident. 

However, contrary to the prevailing global opinion, I think that Russia’s hand is as weak as Turkey’s. Here’s why:

1.       With oil prices at 50 dollars per barrel and expected to stay there for a while, Russia’s financial position is weak. They do not have the means to fund a long term military engagement in Syria.

2.       Russia’s claim to battle ISIS on “humanitarian grounds” is not credible. ISIS is obviously a barbaric force, but Russians are not much better. Putin is responsible for the massacre of tens of thousans of civilians in Georgia, Ukraine, Caucasus and Syria – not to mention Putin’s favorite Muslim ally Ramzan Kadyrov.

3.       Turkey has been buying natural gas at prices way above world prices due to previous mismanagement. Stopping gas supplies to Turkey would inflict a huge costs onto Russia. There are no ready buyers to replace exports to Turkey.

4.       Iran, Qatar and others are waiting to take market share from Russia. An energy supply crisis would make it impossible for Turkey to enforce US/EU sanctions on Iran.

5.       An overwhelming majority of the millions of refugees on Europe’s doorstep are running from Assad. A Syrian deal including Assad cannot solve Europe’s crisis. Russia’s envisaged deal in Syria would bring unbearable domestic political costs to EU members.

6.       Anti-Putin sentiment in the US is widespread. Just listen to the Republican presidential debates, especially to hawks such as Cruz, Trump and Fiorina.

7.       The sea traffic through the Turkish straits includes not only tankers carrying Russian oil but Russian military supplies to Syria and other destinations. Turkey cannot limit Russian access due to the Montreux treaty, but a clear and present threat from Russia would change this equation.

8.       There is significant Turkish investment in Russia, but the economic relationship is mutual: the nuclear power deal, Turkey-bound gas pipelines and Turkcell are worth several billions.

9.       All of Russia’s Middle Eastern and Central Asian allies face tough Islamist opposition. Aggressive Russian moves against Turkey would make life more difficult not only for Sisi and Egypt but also for the Russia-backed authoritarian regimes in Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan.

Under these circumstances, it is hard to say that Russia is playing a strong hand. The fact that Russia can inflict very high pain to Turkey is without doubt. But Turkey has the ability to make counter moves which are just as painful to Russia.

The current crisis is the result of two countries playing their relatively weak hands very differently. Turkey hit well below its weight in Syria due to a misguided strategic vision and incompetent execution. Russia hit well above its weight in Syria, just like in eastern Europe, due to its clear vision, determination and risk appetite. However, the sudden Turkish retaliation caught Russia in an over-extended position. Any aggressive economic or military moves are likely to backfire in a costly fashion.

I expect that Turkey will play down the incident as much as possible, while Russia will impose some low cost economic sanctions (such as eliminating visa-free travel and discouraging Russian tourists from going to Turkey) on one hand and try to create an occasion to shoot down a Turkish plane on the other.

In the medium term, however, Russia needs a resolution. The Russian position in Syria is precarious as the Assad regime is extremely weak without Russian support. Aerial bombing and anti-Muslim hysteria in Europe are greatly helping ISIS recruitment. There seems to be no reason why Syria will not become another Afghanistan for Russia. A hostile relationship with Turkey will make Russia’s life very difficult in Syria.

If reason prevails on both sides, we should expect a settlement in the not too distant future. But as I explained at the outset, both countries and their leaders are highly volatile and unpredictable. A tragicomical comment I heard yesterday may be right: “if Putin and Erdoğan handled the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, the world would have gone up in smoke”.

Let’s hope that reason prevails, but I suspect that we may yet see new surprises.