INTRODUCTION
he Work, or the Agency,
of the Nonhuman in Premodern Art
ANNA KŁOSOWSKA and EILEEN A. JOY
he “human,” we now know, is not now, and never was, itself.
—Cary Wolfe
LACRIMAE RERUM: PREMODERN SOURCES
FOR A THEORY OF NONHUMAN SENSIBILITY
In a famous ballad on the theme of ubi sunt (in a sense, “where has everything
gone?”—the classic lament for the passing of time and the inevitable fading
of life), iteenth-century poet François Villon chose for his refrain the image
of the snows of yesteryear. Snow’s transformative and impermanent miracle
could be a Northern European version of cherry blossoms: “But where are
yesteryear’s snows?” [“Mais où sont les neiges d’antan?”]. Lending snow, beautiful and ephemeral, the same intensity as that which inhabits the names of
vanished queens and beauties, Villon alchemically turns melted snow into
lacrimae rerum, or “thingly tears,” making explicit the agency of things and
the important role things play in the human realization, performance, and
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reliving of existential, sweet, and inescapable sorrow, to the point that sorrow
and things become one with each other.
When Aeneas weeps at the depictions of the Trojan War in Carthage,
he enjoins his companion Achates to rally and let his fears dissolve, since even
this faraway nation will empathize with their plight: these, he says, “are thingly
tears, and the mortal things touch the mind” (Virgil, Aeneid, 1.462: “sunt lacrimae rerum et mentem mortalia tangunt”).1 Since Virgil, the expression lacrimae rerum [“thingly tears”] has marked that sweet and sad entanglement of
the mind and emotions with things—not necessarily warlike things, although
the line is oten quoted on military monuments. Virgil’s passage is famously
multivalent, and its gnomic half-line is usually cited out of context. Symptomatically, one classicist explicating lacrimae rerum called upon Ezra Pound’s
observation that truly great literature is “language charged with meaning to
the utmost possible degree,” concluding that “the passage, of course, cannot be
translated.”2 All agree that this famous line’s enigmatic nature lends it a “sense
of wondrous beauty and pathetic dignity,” and “many would be disposed to
quote [it] as the best verse in Latin poetry.”3 Here are some readings that have
been given to the Latin verse over the years:
Tears for things, tears of things, tears that the things shed, things worthy of
tears. Tears are powerful and their efects are material, so that tears can as
well be called material things and considered real. he universe of material
things sheds tears for us in the face of our acute misery. hese images would
wring tears out of stone. Sorrow and tears are implicit in men’s afairs or
things. Nothing (or no thing) is free of tears. Depicted on the wall are events
(things) that bring on tears; these are tear-inducing things. We all cry at the
same things; great tragedies move us whether or not they happen to us and
ours or to distant others.
he line’s fruitful multiplicity of meanings is exactly what inspires the later
echoes.
Lacrimae rerum—the classical, premodern, and modern precursor of our
speculative materialisms, post/humanisms, and pasthumanisms—are not a
narrowly premodern European concept. Take mono no aware [“the afective
1. David Wharton, “Sunt lacrimae rerum: An Exploration in Meaning,” Classical Journal
103 (2008): 259–79.
2. John Wright, “Lacrimae rerum and the hankless Task,” Classical Journal 62.8 (1967):
365–66 [365–67].
3. Robert Yelverton Tyrrell, Latin Poetry: Lectures Delivered in 1893 on the Percy Turnbull
Memorial Foundation in John Hopkins University (Boston: Houghton Milin, 1895), 147; partially cited by Arthur L. Keith, “A Virgilian Line,” Classical Journal 17.7 (1922): 398 [398–402].
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and aesthetic force of things in the world”], a theoretical concept and practical
precept that permeates Japanese culture of the Heian period (794–1185). he
sensitivity, empathy, or enchantment to, of, and by things [mono] is used as
a critical term describing the heightened awareness of the ephemeral nature
[mojo] of things, combined with a sense of wistfulness and an almost glad
sorrow inspired by the consideration of transience evoked by objects, where
understanding and feelings merge.4 Aware is the ability to be moved. Sorrow,
pathos, or sadness are associated with aware (where aware = “alas!”), but primarily the term refers to an intense impression (where aware = “sigh,” “Oh!”,
and “Ah!”).5 he viewings of the moon and picnics of the cherry blossom season [hanami], a tradition noted as early as the third century, are permeated
with mono no aware, as the cherry blooms [sakura] move like a fantastical,
impermanent, earthbound cloud across the archipelago in a stately and inexorable wave. Since the rise of modern scholarship on Japanese literature, especially the contributions of Motoori Norinaga (1730–1801), examples of mono
no aware are oten drawn from the eleventh-century Tale of Genji, whose
author, Lady Murasaki, oten used the expression nominally, as when we say,
“He has a certain je ne sais quoi.” It was also Norinaga who emphasized the
Heian period commonplace that, when the awareness of things is particularly intense, only sharing poetry or narratives that result from this feeling,
and moving others as powerfully as one is moved, may bring relief.6 For us,
the themes of mono no aware and lacrimae rerum participate in a premodern
genealogy of the nonhuman as a work of art and the work or agency of the
nonhuman in art, the topic of the essays assembled in this volume.
POST/HUMANISM AND THE CRISIS
OF THE HUMAN/ITIES
he idea of enchantment with the world, and with its vibrant materialities,
and with thingly tears guided us as we approached this collection, conceived
4. Tomiko Yoda, “Fractured Dialogues: Mono no aware and Poetic Communication in the
Tale of Genji,” Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 59.2 (1999): 524 [523–57]. Yoda adds: “Mono
no aware refers to a profound feeling with which one spontaneously responds to a myriad of
things and occurrences in the world. To ‘know mono no aware’ refers to one’s ability to have
such a feeling for certain objects on an appropriate occasion” (526). See also Kazumitsu Kato,
“Some Notes on Mono no Aware,” Journal of the American Oriental Society 82.4 (1962): 558–59,
and Mark Meli, “‘Aware’ as a Critical Term in Japanese Poetics,” Japan Review 13 (2001): 67–91.
5. Motoori Norinaga, he Poetics of Motoori Norinaga: A Hermeneutical Journey, trans.
Michael F. Marra (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2007), 174.
6. Yoda, “Fractured Dialogues,” 527.
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as one possible answer to Judith Butler’s question, “What qualiies as a human,
as a human subject, as human speech, as human desire?”7 and also to Edward
Said’s provocation, in the context of the humanities, that
as scholars and teachers we believe we are right to call what we do “humanistic” and what we teach “the humanities.” [Yet,] are these still serviceable
phrases, and if so, in what way? How then may we view humanism as an
activity in light of its past and probable future?8
For a long while now, there has been a signiicant turn both to and beyond the
human (or, the liberal humanist subject) in aesthetic, historical, philosophical,
sociological, and more scientiic studies—a turn, moreover, which is also oten
accompanied by a nod to post-histoire, or the “end of history.” hus, we might
revise Butler’s question to something like, “What qualiies as a post/human and
what is at stake in this qualiication?” his poses a great challenge to those
concerned with the future of humanistic letters and education, especially when,
as John Caputo writes, “one has lost one’s faith in grand récits,” and “being,
presence, ouisa, the transcendental signiied, History, Man—the list goes on—
have all become dreams.” As Caputo writes, “We are in a ix, except that even
to say ‘we’ is to get into a still deeper ix. We are in the ix that cannot say ‘we,’”
and yet, “the obligation of me to you and both of us to others . . . is all around
us, on every side, tugging at our sleeves, calling on us for a response.”9 Caputo
expressed these sentiments (which are also worries) in 1993, but they accord well
with the anxieties of the editors of the 2007 issue of he Hedgehog Review on
“Human Dignity and Justice,” who were concerned that “transcendent accounts
of why the lives of all persons should be valued” no longer “make sense,” and
therefore, “one might ask whether a rhetoric of human dignity can be sustained
and whether calls [in numerous human rights discourses] to honor the dignity
of every individual can gain traction.” Is it possible any longer “to sustain justice
without the idea of human dignity, or a similar concept?”10
In relation to these concerns and anxious questions, multiple post/human
(and nonhuman, inhuman, ahuman, and even post-posthuman) disciplines
7. Quoted in “Changing the Subject: Judith Butler’s Politics of Radical Resigniication”
(interview with G. A. Olson and L. Worsham), in he Judith Butler Reader, ed. Sarah Salih
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2004), 356 [325–56].
8. Edward Said, Humanism and Democratic Criticism (New York: Columbia University
Press, 2004), 7.
9. John D. Caputo, Against Ethics: Contributions to a Poetics of Obligation with Constant
Reference to Deconstruction (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), 6.
10. “Introduction: Human Dignity and Justice,” Hedegehog Review 9.3 (2007): 5 [5–6].
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have (for a while now) been in full swing in the ields of the arts, humanities, social sciences, and sciences.11 In 2006, the National Humanities Center
(NHC) announced a three-year project, “Autonomy, Singularity, Creativity:
he Human and the Humanities,” which sought to “crystallize a conversation
already begun” by “a small but growing number of philosophers, literary scholars, and other humanistic thinkers” whose thought and studies have “turned
to the work of computational scientists, primatologists, cognitive scientists,
biologists, neuroscientists, and others” in an attempt to “gain a contemporary understanding of human attributes that have traditionally been described
in abstract, philosophical, or spiritual terms.”12 he NHC wanted to consider
the possible ramiications of the approaching “posthuman era” by bringing
into conversation with these humanists the scientists who have been turning
their attention to questions typically reserved for the humanists—questions,
moreover, that have to do with “the nature of human identity; the legitimate
scope of agency in determining the circumstances or conditions of one’s life;
11. See, for example, most recently, Rosi Braidotti, he Posthuman (Cambridge: Polity,
2013); Claire Colebrook, Death of the Posthuman: Essays on Extinction, Vol. 1 (Ann Arbor, MI:
Open Humanities Press/MPublishing, 2014); Noreen Gifney and Myra J. Hird, eds., Queering
the Non/human (Hampshire, UK: Ashgate, 2008); Richard Grusin, ed., he Nonhuman Turn
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2015); Patricia MacCormack, ed., he Animal
Catalyst: Toward a Human heory (London: Bloomsbury, 2014); Cary Wolfe, What Is Posthumanism? (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009); and Joanna Zylinska, Minimal Ethics for the Anthropocene (Ann Arbor: Open Humanities Press/MPublishing, 2014). he
recent turns to “new materialisms,” “speculative realism,” and “object-oriented” studies have
given fresh impetus as well to the longer-standing post/human turn. See, for example, Stacy
Alaimo, Bodily Natures: Science, Environment, and the Material Self (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 2010); Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of hings (Durham,
NC: Duke University Press, 2010); Ian Bogost, Alien Phenomenology, or What It’s Like to Be
a hing (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2012); Levi Bryant, he Democracy of
Objects (Ann Arbor, MI: Open Humanities Press, 2011); Levi Bryant, Nick Srnicek, and Graham Harman, eds., he Speculative Turn: Continental Materialism and Realism (Melbourne:
re.press, 2011); William E. Connolly, he Fragility of hings: Self-Organizing Processes, Neoliberal Fantasies, and Democratic Activism (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2013); Diana
Coole and Samantha Frost, eds., New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, and Politics (Durham,
NC: Duke University Press, 2010); Graham Harman, Prince of Networks: Bruno Latour and
Metaphysics (Melbourne: re.press, 2009) and he Quadruple Object (Hants, UK: Zero Books,
2011); Quentin Meillassoux, Ater Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency, trans.
Ray Brassier (London: Bloomsbury, 2010); Timothy Morton, Realist Magic: Objects, Ontology,
Causality (Ann Arbor, MI: Open Humanities Press/MPublishing, 2013) and Hyperobjects: Philosophy and Ecology ater the End of the World (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
2013); Steven Shaviro, he Universe of hings: On Speculative Realism (Minneapolis: University
of Minnesota Press, 2014); and Tom Sparrow, he End of Phenomenology: Metaphysics and the
New Realism (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2014).
12. National Humanities Center, “Autonomy, Singularity, Creativity: A Project of the
National Humanities Center,” National Humanities Center, May 2007, http://onthehuman.org
/archive/more/.
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the relation of cognition to embodiment; the role of chance, luck, or fate; the
deinition of and value attached to ‘nature’; and the nature and limits of moral
responsibility.”13 From 2006 through 2009, the NHC ofered residential fellowships and convened symposia and seminars that brought together humanists
and scientists to engage in a more comprehensive dialogue on the following
three “distinct but related areas”:
(1)
Human autonomy, which entails the capacity for self-determination,
self-awareness, and self-regulation that is central to our conceptions of
free will and moral accountability;
(2) Human singularity, on which our privileged place in the order of being,
distinct from animals on the one hand and from machines on the
other, is premised;
(3) Human creativity, through which mankind demonstrates its capacity
for representation and expression, and which many take to be the distinctive feature of the human species.14
hese objectives make clear that the NHC focused its energies on three areas
that are distinctly related to what might be called an ongoing “crisis” of the
(supposed) stability and centrality of the liberal, sovereign human subject
within the realm of so-called human afairs (having to do with morality, governance, sovereignty, freedom, the arts, etc.), which are also traditionally held
to underpin the mission and projects of the human/ities, and the university
more largely.
According to Katherine Hayles, who helped to usher in the post/human
turn15 and who served as a Senior Fellow in NHC’s Project, “he humanities
have always been concerned with shiting deinitions of the human,” so “the
human has always been a kind of contested term.” But for Hayles, “what the
idea of the posthuman evokes that is not unique to the twentieth century, but
became much more highly energized in the twentieth century, is the idea that
technology has progressed to the point where it has the capability of fundamentally transforming the conditions of human life.”16 As Hayles elaborated:
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. See N. Katherine Hayles, How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics,
Literature, and Informatics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999) and My Mother Was
a Computer: Digital Subjects and Literary Texts (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005),
among other works.
16. Quoted in Don Solomon, “Interview with N. Katherine Hayles: Preparing the Humanities for the Post Human,” National Humanities Center, May 2007, http://onthe human.org
/archive/more/interview-with-n-katherine-hayles/.
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Even though “one of the deep ideas of the humanities is that the past is an
enduring reservoir of value, and that it pays us rich dividends to know the
past,” there are some things “that have never happened before in human history. . . . We’ve never had the possibility for manipulating our own genome
in a generation as opposed to 150 generations. We never had the possibility
for individually manipulating atoms as in nanotechnology, and so forth.”17
he post/human condition, then, in some respects (and according to some),
is thoroughly modern because of its dependence, partly, on technological and
medical innovations that could not have even been imagined in the past. It has
to be stated that in many post/humanist discourses that have been circulating
within the university, whether in the humanities or the sciences, the scholarship of those who work in premodern periods (such as classical antiquity,
late antiquity, the Middle Ages, and the Renaissance) is oten not considered
relevant to the discussion—even when that scholarship is concerned, as some
of it deinitively has been, with issues of the human and the animal, self and
subjectivity, cognition and theory of mind, singularity and networks, corporality and embodiment, bare life and sociality, lesh versus machine, and so
on. In more recent years, this has been changing, however, with monographs,
essay collections, and journal issues in premodern studies that play a prominent and inluential role in the post/human turn.18 Nevertheless, the question
of historical diference remains something of a problematic.
17. Ibid.
18. See, for example, Jefrey Jerome Cohen, ed., Animal, Vegetable, Mineral: Ethics and
Objects (Brooklyn, NY: punctum books, 2012); idem, Inhuman Nature (Brooklyn: punctum books, 2014); Jefrey Jerome Cohen and Lowell Duckert, eds., “Ecomaterialism,” special
issue, postmedieval: a journal of medieval cultural studies 4.1 (2013); Jean E. Feerick and Vin
Nardizzi, eds., he Indistinct Human in Renaissance Literature (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2012); Stefan Herbrechter and Ivan Callas, Posthumanist Shakespeares (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); Eileen A. Joy and Christine Neufeld, eds., “Premodern to Modern Humanisms:
he BABEL Project,” special issue, Journal of Narrative heory 37.2 (2007); Eileen A. Joy and
Craig Dionne, eds., “When Did We Become Post/human?” special issue, postmedieval: a journal
of medieval cultural studies 1.1/2 (2010); J. Allan Mitchell, Becoming Human: he Matter of the
Medieval Child (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014); he Petropunk Collective
[Eileen A. Joy, Anna Kłosowska, Nicola Masciandaro, and Michael O’Rourke], eds., Speculative
Medievalisms: Discography (Brooklyn, NY: punctum books, 2013); Laurie Shannon, he Accommodated Animal: Cosmopolity in Shakespearean Locales (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
2013); Karl Steel, How to Make a Human: Animals and Violence in the Middle Ages (Columbus:
he Ohio State University Press, 2011); Karl Steel and Peggy McCracken, eds., “he Animal
Turn,” special issue, postmedieval: a journal of medieval cultural studies 2.1 (2011); Henry S.
Turner, Shakespeare’s Double Helix (London: Bloomsbury, 2008); and Julian Yates, Error, Misuse,
Failure: Object Lessons from the English Renaissance (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 2002).
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So, for example, in an early prospectus (circa 2007) for the Posthumanities book series at the University of Minnesota, series director Cary Wolfe
argued that post/humanism cannot be glossed with reference to terms like
“post-industrialist” or “post-structuralist” or “post-modern,” for “the question
of ‘posthumanism’ is more complicated than any of these [other ‘post-isms’],
because it references not just chronological progression (what comes ater the
industrial, the modern, and so on) but also takes on fundamental ontological and epistemological questions that are not reducible to purely historical
explanation.” Indeed, it was Wolfe’s hope when inaugurating the series that the
books would draw “renewed attention to the diference between historicity and
‘historicism’ that seems to have been largely elided or avoided in much recent
work in the humanities.”19 he series, then, is “not ‘against’ history, of course,
but against historicism in its more unrelective and problematic forms.” he
imprint has since published 33 books, none of which are exclusively focused
on premodern subjects, although some of the books do tangentially touch
upon those,20 and thus, regardless of its claims to reject the overly simplistic
construct of “what comes ater” and to aim for a more complex historiography,
the series nevertheless remains somewhat stuck in the chrono-landscape of
contemporary thought and life, and its “historicism” is not very deep. Its prospectus also overlooks the fact that for quite a while now, in premodern studies, but also in cultural and historiographical studies, much work has actually
been done to attend to the diferences between historicity and historicism.21
19. he prospectus for University of Minnesota’s Posthumanities book series, authored
by Cary Wolfe, is no longer available online, but was irst accessed and transcribed by us in
October 2007.
20. Such as Tom Tyler, Ciferae: A Bestiary in Five Fingers (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2012).
21. See footnote 28 for the relevant works in premodern studies, and in the ield of cultural studies and history, see (as just a small sampling) F. R. Ankersmit, Historical Representation (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002); Roger Chartier, On the Edge of a Clif:
History, Language, Practices, trans. Lydia G. Cochrane (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University,
1996); Andreas Huyssens, Present Pasts: Urban Palimpsests and the Politics of Memory (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 2003) and Twilight Memories: Marking Time in a Culture of Amnesia
(New York: Routledge, 1995); Dominick LaCapra, Writing History, Writing Trauma (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001); Peter Osborne, he Politics of Time: Modernity and the
Avant-Garde (London: Verso, 1995); Eric L. Santner, Stranded Objects: Mourning, Memory and
Film in Postwar Germany (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993); and Hayden White,
he Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1990). It should be noted as well that practically the entire oeuvre of
the historians initially attached to the Annales, Histoire, Sciences Sociales journal (founded in
1929)—such as Marc Bloch, Lucien Febvre, and Fernand Braudel, among others—also attended
to the divide between historicity and historicism, although this is not always acknowledged in
current work on chronicity and historiography.
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Nevertheless, it is precisely to Wolfe’s hope of a theoretical post/humanism
that would pay better attention to the diference between historicity and an
unrelective historicism, and to Hayles’s assertion that certain aspects of the
post/human can only ever be modern (or, driven by certain post-nineteenthcentury technologies), that our volume of essays, Fragments For a History of
a Vanishing Humanism, addresses itself. Ater all, Wolfe himself has argued
that “the human is not now, and never was, itself,”22 and scholars in medieval studies have explored the question of the relation between the post/
human (or never-human) and the past—a question that has been explored,
for example, by Jefrey Jerome Cohen in his book Medieval Identity Machines,
where he writes that even in the Middle Ages human identity was, “despite
the best eforts of those who possess[ed] it otherwise—unstable, contingent,
hybrid, discontinuous.”23 In all times and places, as Cohen has argued elsewhere, being human really means “endlessly ‘becoming human.’ It means holding an uncertain identity, an identity that is always slipping away from us,”24
and this resonates with Hayles’s idea that human subjectivity emerges from and
is integrated “into a chaotic world rather than occupying a position of mastery
and control removed from it.”25 More speciically, we want to continue illing
in (and further complicating) what we believe has been a deinitive lacuna or
gap in post/humanist studies more generally: the absence of a theoretically
rigorous longer (premodern) historical perspective. Many of the contemporary discourses on post/humanism have mainly focused on the ways in which
new indings and developments in ields such as biotechnology, neuroscience,
and computing have complicated how we believe we are enacting our human
“selves,” ushering in the language of crisis over the supposed destabilization
of the category “human” in its biological, social, and political aspects (the
futurist-dystopic view).26 Or, they have concentrated on a theoretical reform of
22. Cary Wolfe, “Introduction,” in Zoontologies: he Question of the Animal, ed. Wolfe
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003), xiii [ix–xxiii].
23. Jefrey Jerome Cohen, Medieval Identity Machines (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003), xxiii.
24. Jefrey Jerome Cohen, “Aterword: An Uninished Conversation about Glowing Green
Bunnies,” in Queering the Non/human, eds. Gifney and Hird, 373–74 [363–75].
25. Hayles, How We Became Posthuman, 291.
26. For one of the best examples of the “crisis,” or dystopic, perspective, see Francis
Fukuyama, Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution (New York:
Farar, Straus and Giroux, 2002). See also Zygmunt Bauman, Liquid Modernity (Cambridge:
Blackwell, 2000); Benjamin Bratton, he Stack: On Sotware and Sovereignty (Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 2015); Kenneth Gergen, he Saturated Self: Dilemmas of Identity in Contemporary Life
(New York: Basic Books, 1991); Benjamin Noys, Malign Velocities: Accelerationism and Capitalism (Hants, UK, 2014); Eugene hacker and Alexander Galloway, he Exploit: A heory of Networks (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007); Paul Virilio, he Information Bomb,
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a humanistic tradition of thought (from the Renaissance through modernity)
believed to have produced, in Iain Chambers’ words, an oppressive “history of
possessive subjectivism” (the critical philosophical view).27 Or, inally, in some
circles (primarily scientiic but also cultural studies), the same post/human
turn has led to a language of hope and (even occasionally giddy) elation over
all of the ways in which we—whatever “we” might be—might inally be able
to escape or somehow make less vulnerable or more extensively enjoyable the
death-haunted “trap” of our all-too-human bodies (the futurist-utopic view).28
But what is missing from most of these discourses, even when they claim
to address the question of history, historicism, or historicity, are the incorporated dialogue of scholars who have a deep expertise in premodern studies (antiquity through the Middle Ages). While the past is oten invoked and
(oten crudely) drawn in contemporary theory, it is rarely visited via the route
of, or unsettled by, actual scholarship in premodern studies—scholarship that
in recent years has been deeply concerned with issues of the status of the
human and, in a theoretically sophisticated manner, also calls into question
the “straight” teleologies and causal explanations of a traditional, or in Wolfe’s
trans. Chris Turner (London: Verso, 2000); and Langdon Winner, he Reactor and the Whale:
he Search for Limits in an Age of High Technology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987).
27. Iain Chambers, Culture ater Humanism: History, Culture, Subjectivity (London: Routledge, 2001), 4. For an excellent overview of “critical humanisms,” see Martin Halliwell and
Andy Mousley, Critical Humanisms: Humanist/Anti-Humanist Dialogues (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2003). See also Tzvetan Todorov, he Imperfect Garden: he Legacy of
Humanism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002).
28. On the futurist-utopic (or more airmative) view, in both scientiic and cultural studies,
see especially Jean Baudrillard, he Ecstasy of Communication, trans. Bernard and Caroline
Schultze (New York: Semiotext(e), 1988); Nick Bostrom, Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) and “Why I Want to Be a Posthuman When I
Grow Up,” in Medical Enhancement and Posthumanity, eds. Bert Gordijn and Ruth Chadwick
(Dordrecht: Springer, 2008), 107–37; Rosi Braidotti, Metamorphoses: Towards a Materialist heory of Becoming (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002); Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guatarri, A housand
Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987); Judith Halberstam and Ira Livingston, “Introduction: Posthuman Bodies,”
in Posthuman Bodies, ed. Halberstam and Livingston (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1995), 1–19; Donna Haraway, “A Cyborg Manifesto: Science, Technology, and Socialist-Feminism
in the Late Twentieth Century,” in Cyborgs, and Women: he Reinvention of Nature, ed. Haraway (New York: Routledge, 1991), 149–82, and When Species Meet (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 2007); Eduardo Kac, Signs of Life: Bio Art and Beyond (Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 2007); Ray Kurzweil, he Age of Spiritual Machines: When Computers Exceed Human
Intelligence (New York: Viking, 1999) and he Singularity Is Near: When Humans Transcend
Biology (New York: Viking, 2005); Hans Moravec, Mind Children: he Future of Robot and
Human Intelligence (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1988); Lee Silver, Remaking Eden: Cloning and
Beyond in a Brave New World (New York: Avon, 1997); and Gregory Stock, Redesigning Humans:
Our Inevitable Genetic Future (Boston: Houghton Milin, 2002).
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terms an unrelective, historicism.29 Neither is this is a scholarship that Hayles
worries might adopt the “attitude that there’s nothing that has happened or
could happen that has not already happened in the past,” but rather, that these
studies pose the Middle Ages, in the words of Jefrey Jerome Cohen, as an
“interminable, diicult middle” that stresses “not diference (the past as past)
or sameness (the past as present),” but “temporal interlacement, the impossibility of choosing alterity or continuity.”30 Although seemingly wholly “Other,”
the past in these studies is “lodged deep within social and individual identity, a foundational diference at the heart of the selfsame” and could even be
described as a kind of “unbounded” space-time that is generative of human
identity through a “constant movement of irresolvable relations that constitute
its traumatic efect, an ever-expanding line that arcs back through what has
been even as it races toward what it shall be.”31 But these are lines of critical
thought that, for a while now, have been mainly conined to conversations
among premodernists (who might be discussing with each other, for example,
29. Regarding a medieval studies that subverts traditional historicist teleologies, see Kathleen Biddick, he Shock of Medievalism (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1998); Glenn
Burger and Steven F. Kruger, introduction in Queering the Middle Ages, eds. Burger and Kruger
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001), xi–xxiii; Jefrey Jerome Cohen, “Introduction: Midcolonial,” in he Postcolonial Middle Ages, ed. Cohen (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2000), 1–17, and “Time’s Machines,” in Medieval Identity Machines, 1–34; Andrew Cole and
D. Vance Smith, eds., he Legitimacy of the Middle Ages: On the Unwritten History of heory
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010); Kathleen Davis, Periodization and Sovereignty:
How Ideas of Feudalism and Secularization Govern the Politics of Time (Philadelphia: University
of Pennsylvania Press, 2008); Kathleen Davis and Nadia Altschul, eds., Medievalisms in the
Postcolonial World: he Idea of the “Middle Ages” Outside Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 2009); Carolyn Dinshaw, Getting Medieval: Sexualities and Communities, Preand Postmodern (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1999) and How Soon Is Now? Amateur
Readers, Medieval Texts, and the Queerness of Time (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2012);
L. O. Aranye Fradenburg, Sacriice Your Love: Psychoanalysis, Historicism, Chaucer (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002); Amy Hollywood, Sensible Ecstasy: Mysticism,
Sexual Diference, and the Demands of History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001);
Bruce Holsinger, he Premodern Condition: Medievalism and the Making of heory (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2005); Bruce Holsinger and Ethan Knapp, “he Marxist Premodern,” Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies 34.3 (2004): 463–71; Eileen A. Joy, “Like
Two Autistic Moonbeams Entering the Window of My Asylum: Chaucer’s Griselda and Lars
von Trier’s Bess McNeill,” postmedieval: a journal of medieval cultural studies 2.3 (2011): 316–28;
Eileen A. Joy, Myra J. Seaman, Kimberly Bell, and Mary Ramsey, eds., Cultural Studies of the
Modern Middle Ages (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); Elizabeth Scala and Sylvia Federico, eds., he Post-Historical Middle Ages (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); D. Vance
Smith, “Irregular Histories: Forgetting Ourselves,” New Literary History 28.2 (1997): 161–84; and
Paul Strohm, “Postmodernism and History,” in heory and the Premodern Text, ed. Strohm
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 149–62.
30. Cohen, “Introduction: Midcolonial,” 5.
31. Ibid.
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“old” versus “new” historicist approaches to their subjects of study), and they
do not always productively connect with the work of humanists (or scientists)
working in disciplines concerned with more contemporary or post/human
subjects, and who might view the too distant past as either beside or opposite
the point. his is not to say that scholars working in premodern studies are
not ever seeking a more cross-disciplinary or contemporary-minded audience.
Some of them are, and in pointed fashion, especially in the past several years.32
It was partly with the idea of both a post/human Middle Ages and an
approaching post/human era—neither of which can be free of concepts, identities, and social forms that are always both dead and alive at once—that this
volume was initially conceptualized. We also formulated the following as initiatory and guiding questions for our contributors:
• How does the concept (or reality) of the post/human impact the ways we
develop our notions of humanism, both past and present?
• How do the various historical traditions of humanism (classical, medieval, and early modern) productively and antagonistically intersect with
more modern antihumanisms?
• In what ways might premodern and more modern studies, with respect
to the vigorous debates over the value (or lack thereof) of the liberal
humanities, form productive alliances across the Enlightenment divide?
• What is the role of the individual, singular person in relation to concepts
of humanism, past and present?
• What is the role of language and literature in relation to being, body, and
mind, past and present?
• Is it true, as some have argued, that the individual (and a concomitant
emphasis on phenomenological inwardness) is a product of modernity
(or, at least, of the post-Enlightenment), or has the human self, constructed in philosophy and other arts, always been “deep”? Or, conversely,
has the “depth” of human persons always been an illusion?
32. For example, the mission and projects of the BABEL Working Group (http://babel
workinggroup.org) have been pitched in this direction. See, for example, the journal postmedieval: a journal of medieval cultural studies, edited by Eileen A. Joy, Myra Seaman, and Lara
Farina, which dedicated its inaugural issue in 2010 to the post/human turn and is in continual
dialogue with scholars across a wide variety of ields and temporal periods (see footnote 17).
See, also, in recent medieval cultural studies, Jefrey Jerome Cohen, ed., Prismatic Ecology: Ecotheory beyond Green (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2013); Dinshaw, How Soon Is
Now?; L. O. Aranye Fradenburg, Staying Alive: A Survival Manual for the Liberal Arts (Brooklyn, NY: punctum books, 2013); he Petropunk Collective, Speculative Medievalisms; Cole and
Smith, eds., Legitimacy of the Middle Ages; and E. R. Truitt, Medieval Robots: Mechanism, Magic,
Nature, and Art (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015).
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• How does the interplay between singular corporealities and social “bodies” afect our understanding of what it means to be human, both in the
past and in the present?
• What is the role of the Other (or, more generally, alterity) in our conceptions of humanism and “being human,” past and present?
• Is humanism a philosophy, or set of ideas, or a historically situated sociocritical practice that has lost its raison d’etre, such that it is time for a new
humanism or no humanism at all? Or is it time to reclaim a new “critical
humanism” in new modes of address and analysis?
his last question has special prominence in our collective project. here
is no doubt that humanism—especially of the variety in which, in Iain Chambers’s words, “the human subject is considered sovereign, language [is] the
transparent medium of its agency, and truth [is] the representation of its rationalism”—has a terrible reputation and has been responsible for some of the
worst atrocities perpetrated in history.33 Furthermore, we are aware that any
attempt to recuperate humanism now may always come too late if, as Foucault
supposes in the conclusion to he Order of hings, “man” has already been
“erased,” like “a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea.”34 Yet even the most
compelling antihumanist texts—such as Cary Wolfe’s What Is Posthumanism? or Karl Steel’s How to Make a Human—continue, in Kate Soper’s terms,
to “secrete” humanist rhetoric.35 here is a certain dependence of anti- or post/
humanist discourses upon the space (and languages) of the university humanities, where, as Derrida has written, the principle of unconditionality “has an
originary and privileged place of presentation, of manifestation, of safekeeping” as well as its “space of discussion and reelaboration.” And all of this
passes as much by way of literature and languages (that is, the sciences called
the sciences of man and culture) as by way of the nondiscursive arts, by way
of law and philosophy, by way of critique, by way of questioning—where it
is a matter of nothing less than rethinking the concept of man, the igure of
humanity in general, and singularly the one presupposed by what we have
called, in the university, for the last few centuries, the Humanities.36
33. Chambers, Culture ater Humanism, 2–3.
34. Michel Foucault, he Order of hings: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (London:
Tavistock, 1966), 387.
35. Kate Soper, Humanism and Anti-Humanism (London: Hutchinson, 1986), 182.
36. Jacques Derrida, “he University without Condition,” in Derrida, Without Alibi, ed. and
trans. Peggy Kamuf (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002), 207 [202–37].
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In this sense, we might practice what Martin Halliwell and Andy Mousley
have termed a critical or “baggy” humanism that “takes the human to be an
open-ended and mutable process.”37 And like Halliwell and Mousley, we might
develop a new or post/humanism that is “both a pluralistic and a self-critical
tradition that folds in and over itself, provoking a series of questions and problems rather than necessarily providing consolation or ediication for individuals when faced with intractable economic, political, and social pressures.”38
his is a humanism that acknowledges, with Chambers, that “being in the
world does not add up, it never arrives at the complete picture, the conclusive
verdict. here is always something more that exceeds the frame we desire to
impose.”39
A heretofore underdeveloped consideration of the deep past in the post/
humanist project is where we locate our point of entry into the ongoing conversation, but the (post/human) present always provides for us the pressing
questions. We are therefore intensely invested, as Fernand Braudel was in the
1950s, in the idea that
nothing is more important, nothing comes closer to the crux of social reality,
than [the] living, intimate, ininitely repeated opposition between the instant
of time and that time which lows only slowly. Whether it is a question of
the past or of the present, a clear awareness of this plurality of social time
is indispensable to the communal methodology of the human sciences.40
As regards our more narrow purview in this volume—literature, history, philosophy, narrative and critical theory, and the arts—we are especially concerned with developing, from a long or “slow” historical perspective, a critical
post/humanism that would explore: (1) the signiicance (historical, sociocultural, psychic, etc.) of human expression, and afectivity, especially as that
expression is enmeshed in various ecologies; (2) the impact of technology and
new sciences on what it means to be a human self; (3) the importance of art
and literature to deining and enacting human selves; (4) the importance of
history in deining and re-membering the human; (5) the artistic plasticity of
the human; (6) the question of a human collectivity or human “join”: what is
the value and peril of “being human” or “being post/human” together? and
37. Halliwell and Mousley, Critical Humanisms, 2.
38. Ibid., 16.
39. Chambers, Culture ater Humanism, 2.
40. Fernand Braudel, “Histoire et sciences sociale: La longue durée,” trans. Sarah Matthews,
in Histories: French Constructions of the Past, ed. Jacques Revel and Lynn Hunt (New York: he
New Press, 1995), 117 [115–45].
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inally, (7) the constructive and destructive relations (aesthetic, historical, and
philosophical) of the human to the nonhuman.
Following the example of the important three-volume collection edited by
Michel Feher in 1989, Fragments for a History of the Human Body,41 our volume is styled as a gathering of fragments toward a history of a humanism that
could never be rendered in any sort of monolithic totality, especially if one
is convinced (as we are) by the value of a discontinuist historicism in which
history is always uninishable and each temporal period is noncoincident with
itself. his is to say, no era can be perfectly captured in our hermeneutic nets
as there is never any “pure” or “whole” period to be captured that isn’t already
riven by its own contradictions and lack of self-knowledge, especially with
regard to the active suppression of the fact that the past always inhabits the
present (oten in uncanny ways), and that the “contemporary” is never really
the radical “break” with the past that it oten believes itself to be. As Dominick
LaCapra has cautioned, each period is always “beset with its own disruptions,
lacunae, conlicts, irreparable losses, belated recognitions, and challenges to
identity,”42 and part of the aim of our volume is to make this state of afairs
more visible, especially with regard to the supposedly postmodern genesis of
the post/human. Similar to Feher and company’s aim to provide the broadest
and most temporally and geographically varied coverage of the human body’s
discontinuist history, while also insisting that that same human body is always
constructed, always a social formation, and always representational, we too
insist on the always provisional and contingent formations of the human, and
of various humanisms, over time, while also aiming to demonstrate the diferent ways in which these formations emerge (and also disappear) in diferent
times and places. here can thus be no “total history” of this state of afairs as
it plays itself out in difering historical contexts, but nevertheless, we can see
at the same time that deining what “the human” is has always been an agon—
always an ongoing, never inished social-cultural-political project. We say also
a “vanishing” humanism, mainly to denote the ways in which, as noted above,
the foundations of the liberal humanist subject have been roundly critiqued
and dismantled in many university discourses, and thus, appears as a “vanishing” igure in the contemporary scene. Indeed, following Foucault’s assertion in he Order of hings that “man” is an invention of a more recent date
than most believe, our volume aims also to demonstrate that the contours
of the human igure and the humanisms attached to that igure have always
41. Michel Feher, ed. (with Ramona Naddaf and Nadia Tazi), Fragments for a History of
the Human Body, 3 vols. (Cambridge, MA: Zone Books, 1989).
42. Dominick LaCapra, History and Memory ater Auschwitz (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), 24.
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been—on both sides of the so-called Enlightenment divide—indeterminate,
contestable, slippery, and ephemeral. Post/humanism, as philosophy and also
methodology, would best be framed, we believe, by an attention to longer and
discontinuist, historical perspectives.
he volume is divided into two sections: the irst part (Singularity, Species,
Inter/faces) focuses on critical issues that circulate around questions of human
“singularity” and human “species,” with faces, visages, facades, and/or interfaces serving as the most explicit thought props through which each author
approaches the question of human being and human becoming, as well as the
undoing of the human. he second part of the volume (Human, Inhuman,
Spectacle) concentrates on the relations of the human to the inhuman and the
diiculties attendant upon maintaining any sort of line between the two, especially vis-à-vis the analysis of certain aesthetic (and oten surreal) spectacles
designed to provoke wonder and horror, and to also destabilize the human as
a igure of so-called “rational” and/or “humane” impulses. Although all of the
essays in the book can be read productively in relation to each other (because
each essay, in one form or another, takes up the question of the status—
epistemological, ontological, psychic, historical, cultural, aesthetic, and so
on—of the human being), the division of the book’s contents has been structured to highlight, in the irst section, the historical and critical problematics
surrounding the attempts (both in the past and the present) to delineate “the
human” as a singularity (whether as an individual or as a unique species),
and in the second section, to foreground the ethical and cultural dilemmas
that arise when the human is marked of from, but also merges with, what
is supposedly nonhuman or inhuman. Each section begins with what might
be called the most historically mute period—the so-called “prehistoric” (the
chapters by Jefrey Skoblow and Jefrey Jerome Cohen, respectively)—and then
includes chapters that consider instants and events of modern critical thought
and/or culture (such as, for example, Claude Romano’s “evential” hermeneutics, the surrealist biology of Roger Caillois, the iPod, Freud, Derrida’s turn to
the animal, biopolitical theory, George Lucas’s THX 1138, and Samuel Beckett’s Molloy) in relation to the slower currents of premodern thought and culture that still inhere in the present (such as, for example, the heroic quest,
the devotional manual, the Oedipus myth, the chivalric romance, historical
saga, and the idealized Lady of troubadour poetry). Finally, the essay by Craig
Dionne on Shakespeare, the post/human, and aesthetics constitutes the cautionary cultural-materialist coda to the volume, alerting us, ater immersion
in the contents of this volume, that while we “must not turn our backs to
the subaltern stories outside the manor” (the post/human), we “must [also]
be mindful not to aestheticize . . . bare life.” In other words, to speak of the
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post/human (if even in literary texts) is to call attention to forms of life more
broadly, and also to liveliness and processes of living, and thus we must be
careful to consider the material (“on the ground”) conditions that undergird
our theorizing, for living itself (human and otherwise) is at stake.
PART I: SINGULARITIES, SPECIES, INTER/FACES
Jefrey Skoblow opens his discussion of palaeolithic images at Chauvet and
Rouignac in France with a timeline. he paintings and engravings, some
13,000 years old, resemble others extant from the period throughout Europe
that are 35,000–40,000 years old. By comparison, the earliest tools, such as
a symmetrical hand ax, are 100,000 years old, and Skoblow judiciously suggests we should include them in the catalogue of human representations. Also,
80,000-year-old burials that associate ochre with human remains imply the
existence, at that time, of the belief that there is another, or a parallel, life in
addition to the present one.
All these manifestations exist in a near-vacuum: we know little about
the contexts that surround them. hus, these human representations are not
unlike things or animals: as Georges Bataille phrased it, “Whatever has no
meaning for itself is a thing.”43 However closely we attend to them, the results
of our eforts are meager. And yet, some paradigms emerge. For instance, the
vast majority of portraits bear “no apparent iguratively human dimension: the
delicate and expressive muzzles of horses, aurochs and lions, bison and mammoth eyes, horses’ manes and bison beards and so on” predominate (48). With
more schematic images, such as dots or V-shapes, interpretation is guesswork.
A pointy shape can be thingly, animal, or female: “an arrow, a bird track, or a
vulva” (49, quoted from Bahn, 159–60). What does that teach us about the
human? Skoblow warns that even the modest categories—male/female, animal/human, whole/fragment—used to group these images may be anachronistic. But, as he consoles us, at her most vulnerable, the prehistoric human is
also the most recognizable: we can easily embrace undecidability.
Skoblow describes what it was like to be in the caves themselves:
Mammoths, horses, bison, rhinos, and ibex required us to walk around in
circles and backwards with our heads back, looking up and spinning to keep
the images straight, to see them in their orientations as they crisscrossed and
43. Georges Bataille, Death and Sensuality: A Study of Eroticism and the Taboo, trans. Mary
Dalwood (New York: Walker and Company, 1962), 157.
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overlapped and spread across in their rough arc. All are illed with calm,
even the ibex running with legs at full stretch, many with eyes that look back
at you. Our guide answered questions and by way of wrapping up on the way
back, he said, as I understood him, that “of the people who made these things
we know nothing but one thing: they are us”—or he may have said “we are
them” which, if not exactly the same, amounts to the same thing: what could
only be called human. (47–48)
We might say that the cave visitors, then and now, as in Japanese literary contexts, “look like they know mono no aware”—that is, they look like poets.
We can imagine that cave space illed with sighs: aware cho [“to sigh ater
being stirred by something”].
Eileen A. Joy’s “Eros, Event, and Non-Faciality in Malory’s ‘Tale of Balyn
and Balan’” never departs from that sigh-poem space of shared awareness.
In De civitate dei, Augustine wrote that, unlike all other living creatures and
animals, God chose to create the entire race of man from only one individual
to bind humans “not only by similarity of nature, but . . . afection.”44 Against
Augustine’s optimism, Joy argues, most contemporary social theorists—for
example, Zygmunt Bauman, Ulrich Beck, Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim, Anthony
Giddens, Scott Lash—regard the late modern individual, as opposed to the
premodern person, as cut loose from social bonds. She does not even retain,
as a remainder, her own intact selhood—whatever “intact” might mean. Lash
calls her “a combinard” who “puts together networks, constructs alliances,
makes deals,” and lives in a world of risk and precariousness.45
Joy argues that the human has always been in the process of coming
unstuck from the consolations of local times and places, and tightly woven
family groups, partly because the idea of the heroic individual mastering the
world—whether the knight in Camelot or the inancier on Wall Street—has
been essential to the valorization of the human subject, while at the same time,
that same heroic individual can only ever really succeed or fail on the terms
set by the group from which she is always coming undone. In Malory’s Morte
darthur, Joy’s test case, Balyn, “the knight with two swords,” is a medieval
combinard just as multi-local and non-linear as Bauman’s “liquid modernity.”
Joy asserts that this contradicts the accounts of the supposedly monolithic and
44. Robert Flint, he Philosophy of History in Europe, vol. 1. London: William Blackwood
and Sons, 1874.
45. Scott Lash, “Foreword: Individualization in a Non-Linear Mode,” in Individualization: Institutionalized Individualism and Its Social and Political Consequences, eds. Ulrich Beck
and Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim and trans. Patrick Camiller. London: Sage Publications, 2002,
ix [vii–xiii].
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uniied premodernity that acts as a backdrop against which, to paraphrase
Carolyn Dinshaw, the modern and postmodern “groovily emerge.”46
Joy argues that “almost all of our notions of time and temporality are insuficient to [its] weirdness and ungraspability . . . what might be called time’s
continual and dissonant ‘forking’” (55). She reaches out to philosopher Claude
Romano’s “evential hermeneutics” to argue for a conception of the human
person as a type of queer location (a “highly localized site of awareness” in
the terminology of medieval historian David Gary Shaw47) that is always in
the process of “becoming” through the “impersonal events of the world” that
never cease “happening” to it (60). In this scenario, Balyn becomes “a nascently (or proto-)modern human individual” who is “thrust, through aventure,
into the ‘compulsive and obligatory self-determination’ of a certain alienating
pastmodernity” (56). Balyn is not so much a preexisting (and stably human)
identity, as he is “a break within the low” of the “absolute consciousness”
(60) of the assemblage of Camelot, especially when caught in the lux of the
events of his narrative, which he can never know in advance. Here, there is no
becoming-human, only a “taking place” in a becoming-world (64).
Tim Spence’s “he Book of Hours and iPods, Passionate Lyrics and
Prayers” weaves parallels between two media platforms—the medieval prayer
book and the personal music device playlist. For Spence, the overarching issue
that brings the prayer book and iPods together is “the personal veriication
and comfort that stems from the habitual use of devotional technologies” (80).
Prayers and contemporary songs are also alike in that both rely on a limited
vocabulary of personal sufering, particularly in love and love-longing,” both
forms are intentionally composed in a highly lyrical manner, illed with pathos,
and both can be used at will by individual agents to manipulate moods.
Spence divides history into three periods— medieval, modern, and
digital—as he compares prayer manuals and mp3 players, devotional songs
and rock-n-roll lyrics, all as technologies that individualize us and “allow us
46. Dinshaw writes: “Radical hybridity of postmodern identities is bought at the cost of
the medieval. Merely displacing rather than eliminating totality (as Paul Strohm has remarked
in relation to other postmodern theorists), [Homi] Bhabha produces via a convenient and simpliied Benedict Anderson a binary modernist narrative of history—produces a dense, obvious
(and white) Middle Ages against which the arbitrary modern groovily emerges—though he
routinely critiques such binary narratives in decrying ‘teleology and holism.’ And this totalizing
force applies pressure elsewhere in Bhabha’s work; it is no coincidence (at least to this queer
medievalist) that his treatment of an undiferentiated, homogeneous distant past intersects with
his treatment of sexuality”: Carolyn Dinshaw, “Queer Relations,” Essays in Medieval Studies 16
(1999): 93 [79–94].
47. David Gary Shaw, Necessary Conjunctions: he Social Self in Medieval England (New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 12.
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immediate access to our private passions” (91). he twelth-century Victorines
(Hugh, Adam, and others) were instrumental in composing and propagating prayers on Christ’s Passion and other practices, later anthologized in the
Books of Hours, allowing practitioners to interact “with their prayer books to
discover appropriate material for their prayers and meditations, either scripted
or original” (69). hese practices involved “complex technologies—some cognitive, some concrete,” including books, decorations, architectural spaces, calendars, and clocks (69).
Just beyond the edge of the historical density of these technologies,
ca. 1500, Spence locates the birthplace—or perhaps more accurately, the
College House—of Mr. Cogito, the character in Zbigniew Herbert’s poems
who embodies “the ironic contrast between an individual borne alot in an
untimely manner by his inner thoughts and the chaotic circumstances in
which he inds himself, a world always just outside of the thinking being’s control” (71). As Spence argues, “Mr. Cogito replaced Mr. Oratio—or the medieval deference to devotional prayer—at the moment introspective meditation
stopped producing prayers and began producing subjective analysis for the
self-relective individual’s independent self ” (71).
To console herself in her untimely predicament, today’s Mlle Cogito
participates in a ield of technologies that mirror the medieval Mr. Oratio’s:
“a network of technologies . . . woven together to form a very intimate and
sensual relationship between the individual user and a larger, corporate
body of being” (72). If for Mr. Oratio that corporation was ecclesiastic, for
Mlle Cogito it is, perhaps less glamorously, capitalist. Spence skillfully and
dizzyingly juxtaposes the Beguines and the band the Weather Underground,
the rosary and the iPod, Goliards and college students, Carmina Burana and
the band Public Enemy, the mystic Richard Rolle and the band Modest Mouse,
dying in a tavern and overdosing, the Word made Flesh and the Digital Age
Word that “has become electric.” Spence concludes that the study of medieval
prayer rituals renders more accessible certain aspects of the digital age that are
obscured because of our immersion in them, especially the corporatization of
private emotions and the role of the conveyances in habituating our emotions
to function within a larger corporate structure that is both “omnipresent and
invisible” (88).
Daniel Remein and Anna Kłosowska, in “What Does Language Speak:
Feeling the Human with Samuel Beckett and Chrétien de Troyes,” read Perceval (ca. 1165) and Molloy (1951) near to each other. Following Heidegger and
structuralism, they ask: if language speaks, what is the status of the human—
human desire and subjectivity? Perceval and Molloy both have an interesting
time naming themselves: their similarities rit the space-time of literary and
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intellectual history, but the essay is still careful to “not wrest what it calls away
from the re/moteness.”48
Remein and Kłosowska argue that it is the very moment when Molloy
and Perceval realize and say aloud their names that a strange infatuation or
erotic ixation on an object emerges, recalling the Japanese principle of mono
no aware, or the Virgilian lacrimae rerum, mentioned earlier in this introduction. In Molloy’s case, this ixation “amounts to a potential incident of public
inanimaphiliac intimacy with a bicycle that seems mechanically impossible”
(99). Rather more sublimely, Perceval is transixed by the procession of a candelabra, a bleeding lance, and the grail. Again, in a striking parallel to the
principles of mono no aware, Perceval is punished for failing to ask questions
about the condition of the Fisher King and thus failing to share his story, the
sharing of which is portrayed as the only form of relief for what ails not only
the king but also an entire kingdom, turned into a wasteland. Passing from
Heidegger to Lacan, Deleuze, and Graham Harman’s speculative materialism,
Kłosowska and Remein borrow from Reza Negarestani the phrase “complicity
with anonymous materials”49 to point out three similarities between Perceval
and Molloy. First, the narrative structure and content, from the description
of the objects (radiance and light) to the hero’s naming. Second, the objects
in the narratives are not part of nature but rather they are semiautonomous,
“somewhere in between tool and matter” (106). hird, these same objects
short-circuit the grand isolation of humans from the world of nonhumans.
Remein and Kłosowska use Graham Harman’s term allure, a “touch
without touching,” to describe the object’s fetching agency. No longer inert
or inhuman, Harman’s object is radiant matter that, as in medieval physics,
sends out beams that efect a cure or provoke longing, passion, and madness.
Kłosowska and Remein ask what allure/relation is between the radiant matter,
and the being, at the moment of naming—in terms of how they relate to what
we would want to call human, and they conclude that poetry is the “erotic
radiance of language caught on and besotted by fragments” (125). Second,
they claim that Chrétien writes enough episodes of erotic co-operations or
hybridizations with nonhuman matter to be reclaimed as a Beckettian modernist avant la lettre. Reading Chrétien, they submit, is the best training to
take pleasure in Beckett—to laugh, frolic, and absurdly giggle as we imagine
Molloy with his red rubber bicycle bulb, instead of shrinking from this and
other Beckettian texts as if they were grey clouds dripping dour pessimism.
48. Martin Heidegger, Poetry, Language, hought, trans. Albert Hofstader (New York:
Harper, 1971), 196.
49. Reza Negarestani, Cyclonopedia: Complicity with Anonymous Materials (Melbourne:
re.press, 2008).
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PART II: HUMAN, INHUMAN, SPECTACLE
In “Aninormality,” Jefrey Jerome Cohen asks: what is the role of nonhuman
agents in art? Take, for example, the three drops of blood on the snow in Chrétien’s Perceval or the famous winter scene in Sir Gawain and the Green Knight:
no amount of research on “Ricardian kingship or contemporary WelshEnglish relations” (132) (the human and historical context) can explain their
intensity, but neither can research on snowlakes or goose blood (the nonhuman context). Cohen turns to Roger Caillois’s 1934 essay on the praying mantis: intrigued by the mantis that plays dead, Caillois notes that her behavior
inspires a strange situational lyricism in the driest entomological accounts.50
Caillois concludes that myths are not only inspired by social phenomena
but also by striking natural ones: a slight instance of nonhuman agency, but
agency nonetheless. his serves as Cohen’s departure point for a consideration
of the nonhuman as it is bound up with the human in medieval fabulist art.
Cohen highlights a passage in Caillois’s writing on stone,51 where Caillois
talks of the intensities of various agents in three “kingdoms”—geological, vegetal, animal. To each kingdom’s particular density corresponds a particular
wavelength, speed, or frequency of its art, and since the art is set at diferent speeds, the mutual reading of each kingdom’s art produces the efect of a
blurred presence. If we really concentrate our attention, as Caillois and Cohen
urge, that presence can be brought out in sharper relief. hey both invoke
the term commonality to represent this network of mutually recognizable
(if blurry) yet also imperfectly perceived signals of nonhuman agents that
together make up the “aesthetics of the universe.”52 For Caillois, the “mobilizing element” of this commonality across kingdoms is beauty, a general
“innate lyricism,” a shared “universal syntax.”53 “Natural fantasy” is another
name Caillois gives to that nonhuman agency.54 Caillois does not propose an
“evolutionary, cultural or symbolic use value” (140) for nonhuman agency;
instead, suggests Cohen, Caillois’s idea is that impulse, mobility, or agency
are the normal states of the three kingdoms—what Cohen labels their aninormality, a suitcase word that brings together the ideas of the animal and the
anomalous to break up the deinition of normalcy.
50. Roger Caillois, “he Praying Mantis: From Biology to Psychoanalysis,” in he Edge of
Surrealism: A Roger Caillois Reader (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003), 66–81.
51. Roger Caillois, he Writing of the Stones, ed. Marguerite Yourcenar, trans. Barbara Bray
(Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1985).
52. Ibid., 49.
53. Ibid., 104.
54. Ibid., 84.
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Against the anxiety that thinking in terms of the nonhuman is tantamount to thinking unkindly or unethically, with “pessimism, even misanthropy” (139), Cohen argues that posthumanism is not less but more caring in
trying to “view the world through a less anthropocentric lens” (139). Cohen
locates “medieval aninormality” (140) at work in Geofrey of Monmouth’s History of the Kings of Britain (ca. 1136) and also in the work of Marie de France
(ca. 1160), who weaves a lyrical world of human-animal and human-object
hybrids: man-wolf, man-osprey, talking deer, not to mention adventure plots
that turn on bits of cloth, knots, and sticks. Cohen’s attention to the inal image
of the earth, in whose porous cavities the heroine of Marie de France’s Yonec
discovers slumbering lovers ready to spring into action in yet-unnarrated stories that mirror her own, helps us to see what Cohen means by inhuman art:
the transformative potentiality of stories that always already inheres in the
geological crevasses of their landscapes.
In “Humanist Waste,” Michael A. Johnson challenges the periodization
where Renaissance humanism overcomes the medieval, and postmodern posthumanism overcomes the Enlightenment humanist subject. he Middle Ages,
in this periodization, bears persistent material traces of “concepts, identities,
and social forms that are always both dead and alive at once” (152). Because
“dead and alive at once” has a decidedly excremental ring to it, Johnson’s critique of periodization logically focuses on waste. Johnson cites two sides of
one particular debate over periodization: representing the medieval troubadour tradition as “proto-humanist,” or as antihumanist or inhuman—a tradition, as Johnson points out, “in which a persistent metaphorics of excrement
troubles the question of the human” (152). Johnson looks, in medieval and
more modern contexts, at technologies of waste disposal, literary and philosophical metaphors of waste, the complex interplay of individual and community “haunted by animal excrement” (152), and waste as a metaphor for a loss
of meaning.
Johnson irst takes us through the psychoanalytics of excrement.
He explains that according to Lacan (via Žižek), the problem of waste disposal is linked to interiority and the distinction between human and animal:
humans face shit disposal as a problem, while for animals, lacking an ‘interior’ of the sort humans experience, shit—this exteriorization of what was
once interior—poses no problems. For Freud, the degree of separation from
waste—through diferent means of disposal, repression, and sublimation—is a
measure of civilization. Repression may go too far, as in the science iction
dystopian commonplace of the food pill that eliminates eating and waste,
perceived negatively as the “imposition of an inhuman exteriority” (154) that
is accompanied by other measures that erase interiority and individuality.
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A similar example that Johnson turns to is George Lucas’s ilm THX 1138,
where the protagonist “inserts his wages, in the form of a colored dodecahedron, into a toilet-like device, as though to eliminate the process of consumption and waste altogether” (154), the “toilet” serving as “a vestigial trace of its
original function,” an absurd scenario that explains why later THX cannot
mourn his mate: THX and others have “no interior, no ‘private self,’ because
they do not shit” (155).
Parallel to Karl Steel’s discussion of the superlative deliciousness of human
lesh (see below), Johnson studies texts that laud the superiority of human
excrement. his excellence notwithstanding, waste also stands in metaphorically for a collapse of diference, hierarchy, and value. Johnson guides us
through Baudrillard, Freud, and Alenka Zupančič’s reading of Lacan, to focus
on Lacan’s Seminar VII on sublimation, a point (many scholars agree) when
Lacan moves from mostly abstract and structuralist language to a more
embodied image of subjectivity. Johnson shows that troubadour poetry frequently combines the excremental, the animal, and the feminine, while at the
same time these poems “plug up” the Lady’s “explosive and ilthy materiality
through the technological prosthetics of writing” (166). With Lacan, Johnson
uses the “scene” of in’amors as a pattern that may help us rethink the human
in and against this late-capitalist paradigm we currently inhabit.
Karl Steel’s “How Delicious We Must Be / Folcuin’s Horse and the Dog’s
Gowther, Beyond Care” looks at medieval discourses of anthropophagy as a
ground of distinction between humans and animals, demonstrating that the
binary is never successfully ixed in place. While most treatments of medieval
anthropophagy use it as a metaphor—of profanation of the Host; of excessive cruelty or illegitimate government; of the painful formation of subjectivity, allowing psychoanalytic discussions—such metaphorical readings partly
eface the visceral horror that Steel aims to restore.
he distinction between lesh and meat is like the distinction between
human and animal, the animate—literally, “ensouled,” or possessed of a soul
or anima—and the inanimate. To show how blurry that distinction is, Steel
summarizes Christian theories of life, including the commonplace understanding brought to the fore in Giorgio Agamben’s Homo Sacer that animals
possess mere biological life, zoe rather than bios.55 he distinctive human characteristics that animals lack are usually deined as reason, language, and soul.
Paradoxically, since the humans are superior to animals, their lesh must taste
55. See Agamben’s introduction to Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998).
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better than animal lesh. his rather too literal appreciation for human superiority is explicit, as Steel shares, in many medieval texts, including Poggio
Bracciolini’s tale of a teenage serial killer, a iteenth-century hunting manual
of Edward of York, the story of king Cadwallo in Geofrey of Monmouth’s
History, the Middle English romance Richard Coer de Lyon, the Chanson d’Antioche, Marco Polo’s account of Japanese customs, and John Mandeville’s similar account of the people of Lamore, which all describe human lesh as “the
most restorative and most delicious” of meats (176).
Steel asks: what work does the distinction between eating animal and
human lesh do? He suggests that the distinction is not intrinsic but rather
constructed, a “carnophallogocentrism,” as Derrida called it in he Animal
hat herefore I Am.56 his makes the horror of anthropophagy seem less
noble: not a horror of violating the human, but a horror of violating the
human privilege, human “exemption from routine violence.” Next, Steel examines medieval alternatives, wherein “medieval people could imagine other
relations to the animal, less concerned with violence and saving human privilege” (185). Noting that Cary Wolfe in Animal Rites discounts the meaning
of such examples for the cultural paradigm because they are exceptions that
conirm the rule—“the logic of the pet . . . the individual who is exempted
from the slaughter in order to vindicate, with exquisite bad faith, a sacriicial structure”57—Steel argues against Wolfe by focusing on two texts where
exceptions to the sacriicial economy are never explicitly claimed to serve
some purpose, but rather seem to be “interruptions of economy” (idylls or
utopias, even stories of companionship): Folcuin of Lobbes’s story of a horse
that led the funeral procession of its saintly master and aterward refused to
carry anyone, and also the Middle English romance Sir Gowther, whose hero
commits heinous crimes, ater which the Pope prescribes as a penance a diet
of food snatched from a dog’s mouth. A greyhound feeds him “whyte loafe”
until Gowther is ready to “forthe gon”—ight and snatch food forcibly from
other dogs—in a three-day “hillside idyll” (188). In such stories, says Steel,
we learn to “suspend ourselves between two impossibilities: the unjustiiable
need to defend ourselves from the appetite of others, and the dizzying fact of
temporary mattering, our own and others, within a near universal indiference, where we must make cuts to care, even if what we protect takes no notice
of us at all” (192).
56. Jacques Derrida, he Animal that herefore I Am, ed. Marie-Louise Mallet, trans. David
Wills (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008), 93.
57. Cary Wolfe, Animal Rites: American Culture, the Discourse of Species, and Posthumanist
heory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), 104.
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Daniel Kline’s essay, “Excusing Laius: Freud’s Oedipus, Sophocles’ Oedipus
Rex, and Lydgate’s Edippus,” shows how the focus of Lydgate’s story, diferent
from Sophocles’, can allow us to read the story of Oedipus diferently from
Freud, more along the lines of Emmanuel Lévinas’s critique of Freud. Kline
examines the genesis of Freud’s theory of the Oedipal complex, citing Lévinas’s
critique of psychoanalysis as the “end result” of a rationalism—in other words,
a humanism—that fails to account for realities more profound than ourselves
and that are, ultimately, beyond our intentions. For Kline,
Freud’s Oedipal complex isolates aggression in the child and obfuscates
parental responsibility for that violence in much the same way Oedipus Rex
seems to condemn Oedipus. hus, the father’s violence against the child and
the necessity of that violence in constituting the patriarchal family is relocated from age to youth, from external world to internal fantasies, and from
the social realm to the intrapsychic. (194)
And yet, in the Oedipus story, “the Sphinx’s riddle inheres in the paradox of
aging and of retaining identity or sameness within temporal diference” (194).
To push against this forgetting of the riddle and against making actual violence in Oedipus only a symbol, and at that, the relatively benign symbol of
the social apprenticeship of the healthy individual, Kline underlines that “the
Oedipus narrative begins not with the child’s violence against the parents, but
with attempted infanticide” (195), and he thus shows that Freud’s account of
Oedipus was a very particular choice, given his knowledge of other versions
of the story.
Unlike the Sophocles version that assumes our knowledge of the backstory, medieval versions provide “prologues” to the episodes of patricide and
incest, somewhat decentering the latter episodes crucial to Sophocles and
Freud. Freud dismissed postclassical versions as religious rewritings that were
supposed to inspire piety. Kline walks us through Freud’s library in London,
stopping at Léopold Constans’s 1881 volume on twelth-century French renditions of Oedipus that Freud heavily marked on almost every page, indicating
that medieval versions of the story inluenced Freud’s thinking on the Oedipal
Complex.
As Kline explains, Lydgate’s Siege of hebes is likewise based on these
French renditions, and Kline attends to the ways in which Lydgate baroquely
expanded the encounter with the Sphinx. his provides Kline grounds for a
Lévinasian reading that “dismantles the hierarchy of father over son, of parent
over child, by observing that the father’s exteriority, most clearly present in
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the other who calls the father to responsibility, is found in, but is not reducible
to, the child” (221). Lydgate’s “generous and humane” (216) account of Oedipus emphasizes the responsibilities inherent in the parent-child relationship.
Conversely, in Lydgate, somewhat surprisingly to modern critics, the horror
of incest and patricide committed by Oedipus is not emphasized as much.
As Kline suggests, that again allows us to think of Lydgate along the lines of
Lévinas and not Freud: “If Freud sees Oedipus as the universal human subject, the autonomous individual who acts in history, Lydgate’s Edippus is the
exemplary individual who is tethered to” history (222). Lydgate’s Lévinasian
Oedipus is a creature of “change, not stasis; is embedded in culture, not isolated; adapts to the vagaries of age and change; and remains irmly wedded to
the warp and woof of history” (222).
In the volume’s cautionary coda, “he Trick of Singularity: Twelth Night,
Stewards of the Posthuman, and the Problem of Aesthetics,” Craig Dionne
relects on the crisis of the humanities and asks, how are literature and culture
relevant if they do not “directly speak to the complexity of the modern world?”
(224). Dionne closes with an indelible image from Trevor Nunn’s ilm version
of Twelth Night: Feste is banished to the dark world outside. he spectator,
placed in the same dark space as Feste, observes the wedding feast through the
glowing warm windows of the manor. Dionne enjoins those of us invested in
the posthuman turn to not “turn our backs to the subaltern stories outside the
manor” (243). We must be mindful of our responsibility to shape a more just
society in economic and practical senses.
Dionne opens by evoking Robert Scholes’s 2004 MLA presidential address,
“he Humanities in a Post-Human World,” concerned with religious fundamentalism and the so-called “pragmatic” or “real” neoconservative politics,
as well as economics not invested in practices of care. Against the association of the term posthuman with these neoconservative political and fanatical religious values that go against the humanities, Dionne deines posthumanism as a label for a constellation of theorists and social critics working
on the same problem but from positions within diferent critical discourses,
including cyborg theory, informatics, systems theory, queer studies, the turn
to the body and to animal rights, new materialism and the turn to ontology,
theories coalesced around the BABEL Working Group, and scholars such as
Cary Wolfe, Katherine Hayles, Cora Diamond, Ian Hacking, Ralph Acampora,
Judith Butler, and others.
In Twelth Night, Dionne sees an already postmodern play that hinges on
the problem of deining a singular identity in the face of modernity’s blurring of identities, as opposed to a humanist reading of the play as a rehearsal
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of “Renaissance melancholy or self-consuming love” (228). Among others,
Dionne reads Malvolio as “a crude parody of Tudor humanist learning that
is meant to bolster traditional venues of social ascension through courtly service” (234) and shows that Malvolio is the exponent of the unorganic, posthuman concept of the subject. Lastly, Dionne sees Malvolio’s story as a parable
of the academic. Malvolio’s contradictory use of materialist language that
“speaks us” and individual agency at the same time presages our own plight:
“the problem of establishing an aesthetics of diference during a time of great
economic, political, and ecological instability—a strangely familiar reminder
for humanists that our own professional longing to return to aesthetics might
replay something of a return of the repressed” (227).
Dionne closes with an image of reversible consciousness, like the chamois
glove that can be turned inside out. If Frederic Jameson’s A Singular Modernity
attributes to ilm as a medium the rise of the postmodern experience of and
preoccupation with contingency—a moviegoer emerging into the bright light
experiences the shock of contingency—Dionne notes Twelth Night’s obsession
with this problem. We may have brought it to new heights—for example, “in a
world of digitalized textual production—out-sourced and team-written texts
that appear on the computer screen in a stream from a placeless nowhere”—
but the problem was always already there in Orsino’s “manic love,” “a miming
of the itinerant identity that appropriates its oscillating emotional states and
shiting standpoints as a form of courtly pastime” (240). It was already there
in the igure of Feste and the play’s obsession with contingency and bare life,
which should force us to examine the conditions of our posthumanist work in
our own “manor.”
ALL THE WAY TO THE VEGAN DEMON
Jean de la Fontaine (1621–95) once wrote: “If a lute played by itself, I would
run away, although I passionately love music.”58 La Fontaine says this à propos
of a scene in Apuleius’s Psyche, which he translated, where the young woman,
Psyche, marries a powerful man whom she cannot see, Cupid, and lives in a
castle surrounded by a post/human kind of opulence and love: a castle illed
with invisible servants and musicians. he tableau of post/human musical performance is so insuferable for La Fontaine that he adds harp-playing nymphs
to explain where the music comes from. But anyone who has seen Jean
58. Jean de la Fontaine, “Preface,” Amours de Psiché et de Cupidon (Paris: Claude Barbin,
1669), n.p. his phrase is picked up in André Gide’s Journal (13 October 1927).
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Cocteau’s 1946 ilm La Belle et la bête is aware that charm and grace, desire
and pleasure don’t need human agents: a partly human beast, rows of moving
disembodied hands, and other human fragments all contribute to a breathtaking love story. In La Fontaine’s own seventeenth century, extended thought
experiments relegated humans to insigniicance, as in a relection on cabbage
in Cyrano de Bergerac’s famous science iction novel, State and Empire of the
Moon (1657). Bergerac’s protagonist encounters a vegan Demon so particular
that he will only eat those vegetables that died of natural causes. Harvesting a
live cabbage, wounding it with a knife, would have been unconscionable and
unnatural:
Is not this cabbage, as you are, a part of Nature? Is she—Nature—not the
mother of both of you equally? It even seems to me that she made provisions with a greater urgency for the vegetative rather than for the reasonable
kind, since she let the engendering of men to the caprice of their fathers
who can, as they please, engender them or not: a stricture with which she
did not, however, choose to alict the cabbage: because instead of leaving
the germination of the sons to the fathers’ discretion, as if she were more
apprehensive that the cabbage race might die out than the human race, she
constrained them willy nilly to give being to one another, and not at all as
it is with men, who only engender children by caprice, and who can only
engender twenty at the most throughout their lifetime; while cabbages can
produce four hundred thousand per head. To say that Nature loved man
more than cabbage is to tickle yourself to make yourself laugh. . . . add that
man cannot be born without sin . . . while we know full well that the irst
cabbage had never ofended its Creator.59
And then, in the Demon’s imaginary account, the cabbage speaks. hat,
as Joanna Zylinska insists, is a neat way to think about the ethics of the post/
human turn. “What if x responded?” can be a useful touchstone in theorizing
the ethics of the nonhuman. As Zylinska says, when we dismantle the hierarchy, we open the possibility of a better ethics. An ethics that is open ended,
based on “a prior demand on those of us who call themselves humans to
respond to the diference of the world critically and responsibly, without taking recourse all too early to pre-decided half-truths.”60 As we follow Zylinska,
59. Cyrano de Bergerac, Histoire comique des etats et empire de la lune, in Oeuvres, vol. 2
(Amsterdam: Jacques Desbordes, 1709), 83–85.
60. Joanna Zylinska, “Bioethics Otherwise, or, How to Live with Machines, Humans, and
Other Animals,” in Telemorphosis: heory in the Era of Climate Change, vol. 1, ed. Tom Cohen
(Ann Arbor: Open Humanities Press/MPublishing), 2012. (203–25).
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let us take comfort in the familiarity of the thought exercise that allows us to
imagine “x” responding, a post/human exercise that by far predates what we
call modernity, as this volume well attests.
hought experiments, texts, narratives, and other ways to think with, and
not merely about, nonhumans are collected in the chapters of this volume.
hese chapters amount to something like cognitive engineering, because
they allow us to think a little farther beyond ourselves. And, we inherit these
thought experiments from a premodern world that extends all the way to the
bear nests in prehistoric caves. Moving closer to the present, these thought
experiments extend to vegan Aristoxenus and succulent vegetarian Pythagoras; moving closer still, to the medieval Marie de France, whose protagonists
fall for avian boyfriends; to the three drops of goose blood that make Chretien’s Perceval think about Blanchelor; to the greyhound who feeds a knight;
and all the way to the scientiic revolution of the 1650s when Bergerac’s supervegan Demon converses with cabbage. Was there resistance to these thought
experiments? Yes, as La Fontaine’s alteration of the myth of Cupid and Psyche
shows. Did the post/human imagination always exist in explicit, self-aware
and mainstream ways? To that question, we ofer a resounding “yes”—not
least because much of post/human thought seems to correlate with an ethical
imperative to not diminish and avariciously contract the world, but rather to
expand the scope of human sympathy and ethical being.